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 Much has been learned in the literature about property tax base erosion in larger 
states. However for the most part, the research is limited to states with more urban 
populations than states like South Carolina. To address this gap, this research investigates 
two sources property tax base erosion in South Carolina including property tax incentives 
for business location and property tax exemptions for nonprofit organizations.  
 State and local governments use several types of property tax incentives to attract 
new and expanding firms. The use of property tax incentives has resulted in local 
governments foregoing billions of dollars in tax revenue annually with limited fiscal 
impact analysis. A survey method with embedded interview approach was utilized to 
determine that the local government impact analysis of property tax incentive use is not 
adequate in South Carolina. A study of two large scale development projects appears to 
support findings in the literature that businesses value attributes like infrastructure and 
the presence of a qualified labor force over property tax incentives.   
 Property tax exemptions for nonprofit organizations primarily impact 
municipalities. South Carolina municipalities have the authority to decide which 
organizations receive property tax exemptions. Many nonprofit organizations provide 
valuable charitable services while others serve a narrower client base. Some nonprofit 
organizations are large consumers of municipal services and others do not own property. 
This research finds a significant fiscal impact of property tax exempt land across the 
thirty most populated municipalities in South Carolina. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
 The importance of the property tax to local governments, equity effects of tax 
base erosion, and the research gap in rural states are the motivating factors for this 
research. The property tax is important to local governments in South Carolina and base 
erosion reduces their ability to raise revenue. The property tax represents 27 percent of 
own-source local government revenue in South Carolina. Base erosion redistributes the 
burden of taxation in ways that are not always equitable and that lead to more resentment 
toward the tax.  
 A research gap on tax base erosion exists in rural states. The issues in South 
Carolina are similar to those in more urban states, but it plays out differently in a state of 
largely rural counties and small municipalities. There are six metropolitan, 90 urban, and 
174 rural municipalities in South Carolina under Census Bureau guidelines. The 30 
largest municipalities in the state have populations ranging from 12,000 to over 130,000 
residents.  
 This research deals with urban counties in a rural state when studying property tax 
incentives for business location and the impact of property tax exemptions for nonprofit 
organizations on larger municipalities in a state of small towns. Nonprofit organizations 
tend to locate in more populated municipalities to achieve critical mass, but they also 
serve the surrounding rural areas. The fiscal costs associated with both policies are 
localized while the benefits are widely dispersed.  
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  There are 270 incorporated municipalities in South Carolina. Only 19 
municipalities have a population greater than 20,000 residents and 124 municipalities in 
the state have populations less than 1,000 residents. The overwhelming majority of 
municipalities in the state are rural. Metropolitan areas in the state quickly give way to 
urban and then rural areas.  
 One of the economic development projects studied in this research, BMW, is 
centrally located between two of the largest municipalities in the upstate of South 
Carolina. The City of Greenville is 16 miles away from the BMW facility and boasts a 
population of 58,409.  The City of Spartanburg is 17 miles away from BMW and has a 
population of 37,013. The closest urban municipality is Greer, which is 5 miles away 
with a population of 25,515. However, more rural communities like Lyman (5 miles 
away, population 3,243), Duncan (4 miles away, population 3,181) and Wellford (6 miles 
away, population 2,378) are affected by BMW’s presence.   
 In South Carolina an interdependence is present between rural residents and more 
populated areas. Rural counties are often bedroom communities or locations for 
secondary suppliers to manufacturers in urban and metropolitan areas. South Carolina is 
demographically different from the places where base erosion has been studied but 
similar to a large number of states, especially in the South and the intra coastal West.  
 Much of the current literature about property tax base erosion has been completed 
in larger states with more metropolitan and urban areas. To address this gap, this research 
investigates two sources of property tax base erosion in South Carolina including 
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property tax incentives for business location and property tax exemptions for nonprofit 
organizations. These policies are evaluated for efficiency, equity, and revenue adequacy.  
 This research addresses four major research questions. Three research questions 
are addressed in Chapter Five, Property Tax Incentives for Business Location. The first 
question addresses whether firms value infrastructure and a qualified labor force over tax 
incentives when deciding where to locate and/or expand operations. The second question 
focuses on whether local governments in South Carolina conduct adequate impact 
analysis when using property tax incentives for business location. The third question is 
addressed in Chapter Five and asks whether incentives are primarily offered to new firms 
or existing/expanding firms. Chapter Six, Property Tax Exemptions for Nonprofit 
Organizations, addresses a singular quantitative research question: what is the fiscal 
impact of property tax exempt municipal land across the thirty most populated 
municipalities in South Carolina? 
 Before exploring the policies in South Carolina that lead to property tax base 
erosion, a firm understanding of property tax reform, the historical and institutional 
context, what constitutes a tax base, and the research methodology must be established. 
The remainder of this chapter focuses on property tax reform, features of the property tax, 
and how property tax revenue systems are evaluated. Chapter Two provides an overview 
of institutions that are relevant to this research, property tax revenue in the public sector, 
and the property tax revenue system in South Carolina. Chapter Three defines what 
constitutes a tax base and discusses forms of tax base erosion. Chapter Four provides 
detail of the research methodology utilized in this research. Property tax incentives for 
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business location and property tax exemptions for nonprofit organizations are then 
explored in Chapters Five and Six, respectively. Chapter Seven concludes this manuscript 
with policy recommendations based on the findings in this research.   
Property tax reform 
Property tax reforms over the last three decades have reduced state and local 
reliance on property tax revenues in many ways. California’s Proposition 13 in 1978 
brought sweeping nationwide changes that have lasted for last 35 years with only limited 
modification. The initial movement reduced the escalation in real property assessments 
and placed limits on the rates that local governments could levy. Throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, many states limited the growth of the property tax by enacting property tax 
relief programs such as assessment limits, expanded property tax exemptions, and 
expanded economic development programs that included property tax incentives for 
business location.  
Many property tax reform policies transfer fiscal responsibilities from local 
governments to the state government, which fundamentally changes the relationship 
between the layers of government. As local governments become more dependent on 
state aid, local autonomy may suffer. This research examines two policies in South 
Carolina that lead to issues of policy efficiency, equity, and local government revenue 
adequacy as well as local autonomy challenges.  
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Property tax as a revenue source 
Property taxes have consistently been used as a primary way to finance local 
governments in the United States. The property tax first appeared in South Carolina in 
1865 (Fisher, 2002). By 1902, property taxes totaled 45 percent of state government 
revenues and 68 percent of combined state and local revenues in the United States. By 
1992, property tax revenue represented only 1.2 percent of state revenues and 18 percent 
of combined state and local revenues (Wallis, 2001). However, from 1992 to 2010, the 
per capita property tax increased by 66 percent across the Southeast, 100 percent in the 
United States, and over 130 percent in South Carolina as illustrated in Table 1.1 (United 
States Census Bureau, 2011). 
The property tax remains a significant source of local general revenue in South 
Carolina and throughout the United States. In 2010, the property tax accounted for 27 
percent of local general revenue in South Carolina and over 29 percent for United States. 
Some states that place restrictions on property taxes have attempted to offset the revenue 
loss with increased state aid. Despite being a substantial local general revenue source, 
state aid has remained flat or decreased slightly over the last twenty years for the United 
States. State aid still represents approximately 30 percent of the municipal revenue base 
in South Carolina, but is not an area where revenue growth has occurred or is expected to 
occur in the near future.  
The overall decline in the economy as a result of the Great Recession reduced 
revenue from local sales and income taxes. These taxes are generally less reliable in 
supplying own source revenue for local governments during economic downturns than 
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property taxes, which provide a more stable revenue source because property values are 
generally more stable. Thus, the anti-property tax measures enacted in the last three 
decades have undermined the fiscal stability of local governments.  
Salient features of the property tax 
Property taxes are different from other types of taxation. For all other taxes, 
lawmakers establish rates that change infrequently. Revenues will then fluctuate based 
upon changes in the size of the tax base and constituent behavior. Local governments set 
the property tax rate each year based upon revenue needs and the value of taxable real 
property. When property is removed from the tax base while the budgetary requirement 
remains the same, the mill rate must be increased for the remaining property (Brody, 
2002). If rates were not increased, municipalities would not meet their revenue goals for 
service provision. With increases in the share of exempt property, nonexempt property 
owners observe increased property tax rates in order to maintain or expand service levels, 
and local governments rely on an increasingly narrow property tax base.  
There are many different kinds of property that can be taxed.  The three broad 
categories of property are land itself, improvements to land like buildings, movable 
personal property like vehicles, and intangible property like ownership in a firm. Land 
and land improvements can be combined into real property. This research focuses on 
erosion of the real property tax base.   
Weaknesses of the property tax include taxing only a narrow base of wealth, 
benefits from services funded by property tax revenues that are not proportional to the 
value of property taxed, and rising home values that may also drive up taxes without 
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corresponding increases in the demand for or cost of public services. The property tax is 
also a salient tax that is billed annually, unlike the income and sales tax. This salience 
makes the property tax unpopular among property tax payers.  
Tax revenue system evaluation criteria 
 
 The three most important qualities of a tax revenue system are efficiency, equity 
and revenue adequacy. Efficient systems minimize unintended distortions. Equitable 
systems are fair. Tax revenue systems should also be administered in a manner that 
controls collection and compliance costs to raise adequate funds to provide the desired 
level of public services.  
Scholars have explored local revenue adequacy, efficiency, and equity in relation 
to tax base erosion for urban areas (Brody 1998, 2002, 2007, 2010 a, 2010 b; Cordes, 
Gantz, and Pollak, 2002; Kenyon and Langley 2010; Kenyon, Langley and Paquin 2012), 
but very little research has been undertaken in states the size of South Carolina. These 
issues have both commonalities and differences when explored in more rural areas.   
Local governments and their residents, regardless of population size, are affected by state 
restrictions on property taxes and state requirements for property tax incentives business 
location. Rural and suburban local governments often have fewer alternative resources to 
tap than more urban governments (Brody, 1998). Efficiency, equity, and local 
government revenue adequacy are central to the evaluation of the impacts of policies and 
programs that create property tax base erosion.   
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Efficiency  
 Policymakers must be careful not to distort citizen decision making processes in 
the market. Efficient policy is defined as policy that provides incentives or disincentives 
for citizens to behave in a desired manner without distorting other behaviors. The 
possibility of distortion resulting in inefficiency should temper the use of market 
intervention broadly. However, due to market failures, or the tendency of a market to 
overproduce certain goods while under producing others, the need for policy intervention 
exists. For example, throughout the last three decades, the housing market has had a 
tendency to overproduce luxury homes while affordable housing was under produced. In 
terms of economic efficiency, the quantity being produced was not an issue, but the 
variety of housing options created a market failure. In response, the federal government 
provided subsidies and incentives for affordable housing to prevent massive shortages 
and homelessness. This policy correction was successful because it resulted in the 
building of more affordable housing.     
Efficiency in taxation requires that taxes minimize unintended influence on 
private economic decisions. An inefficient tax causes taxpayers to adjust their market 
behavior, which may shift the ultimate burden of the tax to others or may lead to them 
seeking to avoid the tax all together (Bell, 2012). Fisher (1996) adds that as economic 
actors adjust their behaviors to shift or avoid the tax, the tax has distorted private 
economic decisions and the economy is moved to a less efficient welfare situation.  A 
simple tax system with a broad tax base and few tax exemptions, deductions, and credits 
with low rates is the best method to avoid inefficiencies (National Conference of State 
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Legislatures, 2011). The property tax does not distort short run market behavior relative 
to income and sales taxes because most property is immobile and cannot easily be 
hidden. As a tax becomes more complex, the odds of causing distortions increase (Bell, 
2012). Administrative and compliance costs also increase with a more complicated tax 
system.  
Efficient governments try to raise revenues at the lowest possible costs (Wallis, 
2001). For local governments, the property tax has the lowest marginal cost because it 
can be utilized as a benefit tax. Local residents can see property tax revenue being used in 
local schools, roads, and other infrastructure projects and are more likely to approve of 
the taxation. Local government expenditures can also raise local property values and 
generate additional property tax revenues (Fischel, 2000).   
Equity 
 Equity is defined as some agreed upon notion of fairness in the distribution of 
costs and benefits among groups of citizens while balancing the needs of present and 
future generations (Ulbrich, 2011). Equity is a normative concept and should not be 
confused with equality. Society allocates resources quite unequally. Some inequality is 
earned and some is inherited. Most movements toward less inequality, particularly 
movements that create opportunities for the disadvantaged, can be seen as a move to 
improve equity.  
 Markets are primarily driven by efficiency resulting in unequal outcomes. 
Government usually inherits the responsibility to address inequality and is inherently 
redistributive through its policymaking process (Whether the goal of any intentional 
 10 
redistribution should focus on equality of opportunity or equality of results is the subject 
of great debate).  Equality of opportunity means providing education, access to health 
care and other basic services that allow individuals to develop into and remain productive 
adults. Equality of results seeks to reduce the disparities in income and poverty. Some 
needs that arise from these disparities are immediate and cannot wait on education or 
training. Some needs are long run and can best be addressed with providing equal 
opportunities. A simultaneous approach of both strategies is ideal, but political and 
budget limitations cause policymakers to fill the most immediate needs while delaying 
many long run strategies (Ulbrich, 2011).  
When policy is formed and adopted, there are policy winners and losers. 
Recipients of corporate handouts, farm subsidies, and special tax breaks gain benefits 
while the fiscal costs of those policies are more broadly distributed. There is also 
redistribution from the rich to the poor through income taxation. Government is a 
powerful tool for redistribution. This power must be guarded from groups that seek to 
affect policy to their advantage.  
The concept of equity is rooted in the ethical concept of justice, which comes in 
the following three forms: retributive, restorative, and distributive (Ulbrich, 2011). 
Retributive justice requires penalties for acting in a manner that harms others. Restorative 
justice establishes a way to compensate a person harmed. Distributive justice involves 
providing access to the necessities of life without regard to ability to pay. This research 
examines equity through the lens of distributive justice.  
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 Defining equity in policy has been a central debate among economists and 
policymakers with few definitive answers. Theoretical models have largely guided the 
process. Rawls (1971, 1993) provides a decision framework to design a system to 
distribute opportunities, resources, and rewards among workers, non-workers, old and 
young, productive and unproductive, skilled and unskilled. Rawls’ “veil of ignorance” 
requires decision makers to think about how to design a system of incentives and rewards 
without knowing where he or she will be located in the system once it is in place. This 
thought experiment results in protecting those that find themselves most vulnerable 
(Ulbrich, 2011). People with fewer skills, less education, or the disabled may be unable to 
provide for themselves and should be the initial recipients of policymaker focus when 
addressing issues of equity. 
Revenue adequacy 
While designing a tax system that achieves both equity and efficiency makes for a 
good revenue system, it is also important to design a system that draws from a diversity 
of sources to provide adequate funding for public goods and services. Public revenues are 
different from private sector revenues (Ulbrich, 2011). Private sector revenues and 
expenditures are closely linked. Funds come onto a balance sheet and are tied to 
expenditures and profits. Government revenue systems must generate adequate funds to 
pay for the desired level of public services. Public revenues are much more difficult to 
track as they are not directly tied to expenditures. Revenue in the public sector can meet, 
exceed, or fall short of the fiscal need to provide the desired level of public services. 
Public officials with excess funds are likely to find pet projects and face the possibility of 
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expenditure limitations placed on them by the public. Poor budgeting and lower than 
expected tax revenues can lead to budget shortfalls and the inability to provide the 
desired level of public services.  
Service demand is tied to population growth and changes in income (Ulbrich, 
2011). Citizens with increased income may begin to demand more services as private 
consumption rises. As areas increase in population, costs naturally rise across a broader 
service base.  Economic factors like inflation also drive up public service costs. Each of 
these factors may cause service costs to outpace revenue levels. A disjuncture between 
generating public revenues and public service demand only perpetuates the problem. 
When policymakers change the way public revenue is collected, it affects revenue 
adequacy. When shifting between revenue sources, policymaker’s most important role is 
to be good stewards of revenue and ensure that adequate funds are collected from reliable 
sources across a broad tax base in the most efficient and equitable manner.  
Property tax base erosion in South Carolina 
The impact of property tax exemptions as economic development incentives for 
business location, for nonprofit organizations, and property tax relief on the property tax 
base is an important and ongoing policy challenge in South Carolina. This research will 
examine issues of efficiency, equity, and local government revenue adequacy across two 
policies that create property tax base erosion in South Carolina. Property tax incentives 
for business location and property tax exemptions for nonprofit organizations have 
greatly expanded in South Carolina. As more property leaves the property tax base, the 
tax burden on remaining taxpayers increases.  
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Business location incentives 
The use of property tax incentives for business location as a strategy for state and 
county government economic development has been a prevalent practice for the last 
thirty years (Wallis, 2001). Although incentive programs have continued to expand in the 
last 30 years, there is little evidence to support their validity and effectiveness. Research 
indicates that these incentives increasingly do not matter significantly in business 
location decisions (Bartik 1985, 1991, 1994; Papke, 1991; Zheng and Warner, 2010).  
State economic development policies often drive tax incentive programs used in 
economic development projects, but local governments bear the brunt of the costs 
through services demand that may exceed any additional local property tax revenues 
captured from the incentivized project. The benefits of new businesses locating in an area 
may be widely dispersed across multiple jurisdictions. However, the costs of service 
provision are often concentrated in a smaller area, sometimes even a single jurisdiction. 
New development brings increased population, more students, and new demand for local 
public services. 
Property tax incentives are one of the most common economic development 
strategies in South Carolina. Property tax incentives including preferential rates and 
exemptions have become a regular part of economic development strategies for local 
government. Business incentives are generally considered to be in two categories. The 
first group is tax instruments, which include property tax abatements, tax increment 
financing, sales tax exemptions and credits, and corporate income tax exemptions and 
credits for investments and job creation (Peters and Fisher, 2004). The second category of 
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business incentives used to attract new businesses is non-tax incentives. These incentives 
include business grants, loans and loan guarantees.  
Several studies (Due, 1961; Oakland, 1978, Newman and Sullivan, 1988; 
Eisinger, 1988; Bartik, 1991; Wasylenko, 1997) have found little evidence of a 
significant impact of property tax incentives on local economic development. State and 
local government officials maintain that property tax incentives are an essential part of 
any economic development strategy. The competitive environment between jurisdictions 
may not allow one local government to cease offering incentives without risking a loss of 
businesses to another area resulting in a zero sum competition between local governments 
(Zheng and Warner, 2010). Many local governments fear that discontinuing the use of 
incentives will lead to the loss of competitiveness against other communities that do offer 
tax incentives, which may lead to a zero sum game between communities.  
This research employs a statewide survey of county, municipal, and economic 
development officials with embedded interviews of two large economic development 
projects to better understand the effect of property tax incentives for business location in 
South Carolina. The purpose of the survey and development project study was to 
illuminate a decision or set of decisions and uncover why decisions were made, how they 
were implemented, and with what result. More recent research methodological techniques 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2013) guide this research. 
The first study examines the impact on Greenville and Spartanburg counties, and 
the City of Greer, as a result of property tax incentives offered to attract automobile 
manufacturer BMW to the Upstate of South Carolina in 1992. The second study will 
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examine the impact on Charleston County, and the cities of Charleston and North 
Charleston as a result of the property tax incentives offered to attract a Boeing 
manufacturing facility to the coastal region of South Carolina in 2004.  The statewide 
survey and two case interview processes are utilized to better understand the issues and 
outcomes related to efficiency, revenue adequacy, and equity when using property tax 
incentives for business location.  
Exempt property for nonprofit organizations 
The intent of the exemption policy is to offer a tax exemption to charitable 
organizations, which are a subset of nonprofits. Not all nonprofit organizations are 
automatically exempt from property taxes, although the law varies from state to state. 
Charitable organizations can be defined as those registered under 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code. Examples of 501(c)(3) charitable nonprofits include nonprofit hospitals, 
public universities, museums, soup kitchens, churches, and housing developments for the 
elderly. The exemption was also extended in most cases to property owned by state and 
local government. Some organizations such as social and recreational clubs obtain 
nonprofit status, but serve a narrower group of individuals. 
South Carolina is one of seventeen states that grant municipalities the power to 
decide which organizations can obtain property tax exemptions. Nationally, 1.14 million 
charitable nonprofits are registered with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The total 
number of nonprofits registered in South Carolina is 22,138 (National Center for 
Charitable Statistics, 2014).  
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Property tax exemptions for nonprofits primarily impact municipalities and create 
issues of revenue adequacy, efficiency, and equity. Property tax revenues finance 
municipal services and infrastructure like public safety and storm water management. As 
more property becomes property tax exempt, municipalities may be challenged to 
maintain adequate revenue to provide services.  
This research uses statistical analysis to measure the fiscal impact of property tax 
exemptions for nonprofit organizations. This study focuses on the thirty most populated 
municipalities in South Carolina. Larger municipalities have a greater presence of tax 
exempt property and more valuable land holdings (Brody, 2002).  
Research importance 
 The two policies studied in this research are critical factors in property tax base 
erosion in South Carolina. This research seeks to lay the groundwork for future research 
on property tax base erosion in smaller states like South Carolina. Property tax incentives 
for business location are widely used in economic development and may generate great 
economic benefits. But more evidence is needed to understand how benefits are evaluated 
against fiscal costs and the attractiveness of incentives to new and existing firms.  
 Property tax exemptions for nonprofit organizations assist organizations that 
provide critical services that might not otherwise be offered or would have to be offered 
by state and local governments at a higher cost. The benefits gained from nonprofit 
organizations come at a fiscal cost. Understanding the potential per capita cost of 
property tax exempt land may assist South Carolina municipalities when deciding to offer 
exemptions.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
HISTORICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
 North (1990) defines institutions as the rules of the game or more formally as 
constraints that shape human interaction. These constraints can be either formal like 
political and legal rules, or informal like societal norms and conventions. Institutions 
provide structure to everyday life and reduce uncertainty. North advocates for using a 
historical perspective when taking into account the effect of institutions on the current 
status of policy. 
 Institutions affect the performance of the economy because of the incentives they 
create. Political rules lead to economic rules and consequences, including effects on the 
level and composition of economic activities, but the causality runs both ways (North, 
1990). Poor economic performance has political implications, while policymakers 
unintentionally create economic ripples with each policy passed. The polity and economy 
are inextricably linked. 
 If government creates a policy that exempts some property types but not others, 
an incentive to own the exempted property type is created. These rules of the game, or 
institutions, affect what people do based on holding different types of property. 
Organizations seek to maximize wealth within existing institutional frameworks. These 
frameworks create incentives to behave in a certain way in order to maximize wealth. A 
property tax increase on industrial or commercial property increases costs for businesses, 
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which respond by adjusting their strategy. Special tax treatment of homeowners 
discourages investment in rental residential property. The revenue changes affect the 
quality of local public services. 
Institutional efficiency and Pareto improvements 
 Institutions do not necessarily promote and sometimes undermine efficiency as 
defined in neoclassical economics. Neoclassical economics defines Pareto improvements 
as any policy change that makes everybody better off without making anyone worse off, 
thus increasing economic welfare. Such a change would be defined as efficient. Such 
measures would seem to invite unanimous support yet they are often not implemented. 
Stiglitz (1998) provides four reasons why Pareto improvements do not regularly occur.  
 The first reason is the inability of government to make credible commitments. 
Government through its code of laws can enforce agreements between private parties. 
However, government itself changes. Administrations and political environments change. 
Thus, a long term commitment to a particular policy is not credible. As elected officials 
turn over, existing policies are at risk.  
 Coalition formation and bargaining is the second reason why potential Pareto 
improvements do not always occur. When policy is negotiated and bargained, it is fraught 
with imperfect and asymmetric information. One side may possess more information than 
another such as a local government negotiating economic development incentives with a 
large corporation that employs relocation specialists. Neither side may have enough 
information for policy to reach efficient outcomes, which results in fallback alternatives 
as solutions.  
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 The next reason that Pareto improvements are not reached is destructive 
competition. In the absence of perfect competition, competition among policies can 
become destructive. Political systems are more susceptible to this issue (Frank and Cook, 
1995). A political party does not want to make a competing party look like a policy 
winner even if the policy proposed is for the good of the country. This destructive 
tendency places political wins and losses ahead of potential Pareto improvements.  
 The last reason Stiglitz (1998) offers for the failure to enact Pareto improvements 
are the uncertainty about the consequences of change. Political systems are set up to 
serve those that are heavily involved initially. The American political system initially 
favored white male landowners. Over time, constitutional amendments have granted 
more rights to minorities, women and non-landowners. However, this change has been 
slow. The abolition of slavery occurred in the United States in 1865, some 32 years after 
the United Kingdom outlawed it. Women did not receive the right to vote in the United 
States until 1920, which was 144 years after the Revolutionary War. Clearly, bad 
institutions can persist as long as the people that benefit from them can keep them going 
(Mantzavinos, 2001). Thus, the way in which a system is set up initially provides the 
institutional structure from which change can occur. Institutional change will occur when 
one or more of policy participants think that his or her interests are better served under a 
new approach (Mantzavinos, 2001). The challenge of this research is to examine the 
institutions that create property tax base erosion and the possible impacts.    
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Institutional change 
 The most difficult changes can be those that significantly alter the status quo. The 
inability to foresee all of the consequences of a policy change, combined with the desire 
for those in power to remain at an advantage hinders many potential Pareto 
improvements. With imperfect information, the consequences of policy change become 
less clear. Thus, the common response is to resist change in favor of the status quo. Even 
when change occurs, deciding on which policy to pursue and identifying the alternatives 
can be the most difficult aspect (Mantzavinos, 2001).  
South Carolina political institutions 
 This research was primarily concerned with the erosion of property tax base in 
South Carolina. However, the property tax needs to be understood within the larger 
framework of public revenue. The remainder of this chapter will describe the current 
property tax in South Carolina from an institutional perspective.   
 The political environment from the mid-twentieth century to present day provides 
insight into the political institutions that shape policy in South Carolina today. The state 
Democratic Party controlled the government in South Carolina at almost all levels prior 
to the 1960s.  The Republican Party did not gain a presence in the state until United 
States Senator Strom Thurmond switched parties in 1964. The Republican Party has 
gradually gained strength in the state since the 1960s. The state has supported all 
Republican presidential candidates since 1980. The state Republican Party has dominated 
the executive branch since 1990 with four out of the last five governors, lieutenant 
governors, and secretaries of state. The South Carolina Republican Party currently 
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controls eight of the nine statewide offices and holds majorities in the state Senate and 
House of Representatives.  
 The South Carolina Republican Party is anti-tax and supports less progressive 
taxation, limited property taxes, the reduction of income taxes, no new tax increases, 
maintaining tax cuts, and the repeal of the estate tax (South Carolina Republican Party 
State Convention, 2012). These positions help to provide context for the state’s tax policy 
over the last few decades.  
The revenue system in South Carolina 
 The ideal tax system generates sufficient revenue, distributes tax burdens fairly, is 
not overly complicated or expensive to administer, and has an absence of distortions that 
affect market behavior.  A good tax system relies on multiple sources at relatively low 
rates rather than few sources at relatively high rates. A broad based tax system is more 
stable and has the potential to grow as population, inflation, and service needs grow.  
 An evaluation of the South Carolina revenue system using these attributes reveals 
a middling score. The state does not regularly raise enough money to support public 
education, higher education, infrastructure, and health care at levels comparable to other 
states. Public education spending by the state has not kept pace with education costs, and 
the state’s roads and bridges need repair due to revenue adequacy issues. The South 
Carolina system is not always equitable across several dimensions between the rich and 
poor, the old and young, homeowners and non-homeowners, and brick-and-mortar sellers 
and online vendors. Distortion issues also exist in South Carolina. Property tax 
exemptions, incentives for business location and homeowner tax relief are not always 
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given to the citizens that need the most help. The policies can also send the wrong market 
signals and affect behavior in unintended or undesired ways.  
 When examining the distribution of tax burdens on the income group, the highest 
percent of income paid in taxes is on incomes from $27,000 to $44,000. The group 
paying the lowest percent is earning $390,000 or more.  By age, income taxes for the 
elderly in South Carolina are 80 percent lower than for families of comparable income 
under the age of 65 (Edwards and Wallace, 2002).  
Revenue system issues in South Carolina 
 The South Carolina revenue system faces several issues. These include limits on 
the taxation of internet sales, low gasoline tax rate, the need for a broader sales tax base 
to including more services, and reform of property tax relief. Each issue contributes to a 
narrowing of the tax base, revenue adequacy issues, equity issues and problems with 
inefficiency.  
 The Congressional restriction on collecting sales tax on internet purchases leads 
to discrimination against South Carolina retailers who must collect the tax and also pay 
income and property taxes and support local communities. However, the current 
legislative obstruction is in Congress and not South Carolina. Being able to collect sales 
taxes on internet purchases would broaden the tax base in South Carolina allowing for 
additional revenue and/or make it possible to lower overall rates.  
 South Carolina currently has one of the lowest gasoline taxes in the country. This 
reduces the share of state tax revenue gathered from truckers driving through the state. 
The tax is also not adjusted for inflation, which results in slow growth of tax revenue.  
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Gas tax revenues have not kept pace with inflation, while the cost of state roads and 
bridges has continued to rise.  
 The state currently has a number of sales tax exemptions that chip away at the 
revenue base.  South Carolina only taxes 36 of a possible 160 services that are taxed in 
other states. Services are a major growth area for the economy. Broadening sales taxes on 
service taxes would allow for lower rates on currently taxed goods and services and/or 
more overall tax revenue.  South Carolina is a manufacturing state, and manufactured 
goods are subject to sales taxes in most states.  If buyers spend relatively more on 
services because they are not taxed, we are penalizing our own economic base. 
 Incentives are regularly offered by state and local governments to entice business 
location but are seldom evaluated for effectiveness. Property tax exemptions for nonprofit 
organizations are widely granted. Some exemptions allow the provision of services that 
might not otherwise be provided. Others subsidize organizations that only benefit a 
limited number of people in the taxing jurisdiction.  
 South Carolina has established several property tax relief measures for 
homeowners. In 1995, the state exempted the first $100,000 of market value of owner 
occupied property from school operating taxes. In 2006, Act 388 expanded the exemption 
to include the entire market value of owner occupied property from school operating 
expenses. The state also grants homestead exemptions for the first $50,000 in market 
value for the elderly and the disabled. Act 402, which was also enacted in 2006, created 
an assessment cap of 15 percent over any five year reassessment period.  This legislation 
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slowed the growth of the local property tax base for cities and counties as well as school 
districts.  
 Act 388 guarantees that every South Carolina county will get at least $2.5 million 
in property tax relief funds. However, because counties differ vastly in terms of rich and 
poor, as well as number of students educated, the dollar guarantee per county has created 
windfall gains for some areas while distributing very little to others.  
How the property tax works in South Carolina 
 The South Carolina property tax has several significant features. The state utilizes 
a classified tax system, which means that property is categorized based on its use and 
each classification is taxed differently. Classifications include commercial, residential, 
industrial, personal, and agricultural. Commercial and residential property represents the 
majority of property in South Carolina. The state’s property tax system also provides tax 
exemptions for certain types of properties. Assessments are based on market value 
multiplied by the assessment ratios for the property’s classification. Another important 
feature of the property tax in South Carolina is the state’s oversight of the system. Each 
system aspect is detailed more specifically in this section.  
 The purpose of property classification is to categorize property assessment ratios 
by property type. Classification in South Carolina also helps determine whether a 
property will be assessed by either a county assessor (for real property), county auditor 
(for personal property) or by the South Carolina Department of Revenue (for 
miscellaneous real and personal property as specified under SC Code §12 4 540). Real 
property includes not only land but also all structures attached to the land (S.C. Code §12 
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37 10(1)).  Personal property subject to property taxation in South Carolina includes 
business personal property, furnishings of rental property, cars, boats, and aircraft, but 
does not include assets such as money, bonds, stocks and company ownership.  
 This research focuses is on real property. There are three major categories of real 
property in South Carolina. These categories are business property (including retail and 
service property, rental property, manufacturers, and utilities), agricultural land, and 
residential (including primary and secondary residential). Each category has unique 
attributes and varying rates of assessment. This research will focus on real property of an 
industrial, commercial and residential nature.  
 Business property 
 The South Carolina Department of Revenue and county auditors follow business 
classifications offered by the North American Industry Classification System Manuel 
when assessing the property of businesses (S.C. Code §12 43 335(A)). Under Article X 
of the South Carolina Constitution, manufacturing real or personal property is assessed at 
10.5 percent of its fair market value. Commercial personal property is assessed at 10.5 
percent, while commercial real property is assessed at six percent. The 10.5 percent 
assessment ratio can be, and often is, negotiated to six percent for new or expanded 
facilities, with four percent being possible for very large investments (South Carolina 
Department of Revenue, 2013). Property associated with manufacturing, but with no 
business headquarters or research and development facilities, is subject to an assessment 
rate equal to 10.5 percent in South Carolina (S.C. Code §12 43 220(A)). Utilities are also 
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assessed at 10.5 percent and include water companies, power companies, electric 
cooperatives, telephone companies, sewer companies, and cable television companies. 
 Some forms of commercial property qualify for a six percent assessment ratio 
(These properties include any real property that is owned by, or leased to, a manufacturer 
and used primarily for research and development and is not considered used by a 
manufacturer in the conduct of its manufacturing business for purposes of classification 
of property). The state clarifies that real property owned by, or leased to, a manufacturer 
and used primarily as an office building or warehouse and/or wholesale distribution is not 
considered used by a manufacturer in the conduct of the business of the manufacturer for 
purposes of classification of property, if the office building is not located on the premises 
of, or contiguous to, the plant site of the manufacturer (S.C. Code §12 43 220(A)). A 
right of way for a public road or an easement for a railroad running between a 
manufacturer’s plant site and its office building does not destroy contiguity (Sunoco v. 
S.C. Department of Revenue, (2008)).   
 Property tax incentives for economic development are regularly offered in South 
Carolina. These incentives include special assessment ratios and negotiated valuations, 
and some exemptions. South Carolina offers certain tax credits to encourage economic 
growth and revitalization as well as fee in lieu of property tax programs. The major 
exemptions and negotiated assessment ratios exist for new manufacturers, corporate 
headquarters, and research and development facilities.  
 All new manufacturing establishments are exempt from county property taxes for 
five years from the time of establishment. Further, all additions to existing manufacturing 
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establishments are exempt from county property taxes for five years from the time such 
additions are made, if the cost of such addition is $50,000 or more (S.C. Code §12 37 
220(A)(7)). This exemption is only for county taxes and does not exempt the property 
from school or municipal taxes. Municipalities may agree to exempt this property from 
municipal property taxes for up to five years (S.C. Constitution Article X, §3).  
 All new corporate headquarters, corporate office facilities, distribution facilities, 
research and development facilities as well as all additions to those facilities are exempt 
from non-school county ad valorem taxes for a period of five years from the time of 
establishment, construction, or being placed in service if the cost of the new construction 
or additions is $50,000 or more and 75 or more new full time jobs are created in South 
Carolina (S.C. Code §12 37 220(B)(32) and S.C. Code §12 37 220(B)(34)). This 
exemption is only for county taxes and does not exempt the property from school or 
municipal taxes. However, municipalities can agree to exempt this property from 
municipal property taxes for up to five years as well (S.C. Code §12 37 220(B)(39)).  
 Legal residence 
 A legal residence with no more than five contiguous acres occupied by the 
property owner is taxed based on an assessment ratio of four percent. The owner must 
occupy the legal residence during the majority of the tax year (S.C. Code §12 37 620). 
The four percent assessment ratio does not apply to residences that are rented, or to any 
business for-profit located on the residential property (S.C. Code § 12 43 220(C) and S.C. 
Code § 12 43 221). While a primary residence is taxed based on a four percent 
assessment ratio, a secondary residence is taxed based on a six percent assessment ratio.  
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 Residential real property is exempt from all property taxes imposed for school 
operating purposes in South Carolina. If only a portion of the property value qualifies for 
the four percent assessment ratio (i.e., parcels larger than five acres) that exemption is 
likewise limited. However, the exemption is limited to operating expenses and does not 
apply to millage imposed for the repayment of general obligation debt (S.C. Code § 12 37 
220(B)(47) and S.C. Code § 12 43 220(C)(8)). Table 2.1 provides a summary of 
assessment ratios for commercial and residential property in South Carolina.   
Table 2.1 Assessment Ratios by Property Type in South Carolina 
Property Classification Property Tax Assessment Ratio 
Manufacturing property 10.5% of fair market value 
Utility property 10.5% of fair market value 
Railroads, private carlines, airlines and 
pipelines 
9.5% of fair market value 
Primary residences (owner occupied) 4.0% of fair market value 
Agricultural property (privately owned) 4.0% of use value 
Agricultural property (corporate owned) 6.0% of use value 
Other real estate (commercial/rental/second 
home) 
6.0% of fair market value 
Personal vehicle property tax 6.0% of fair market value 
Personal property 10.5% of income tax depreciated value 
  
Exemptions 
 In addition to the special considerations given to owner-occupied residential 
property in South Carolina, there are several broad categories of organizations that 
receive property tax exemptions. Nonprofit, charitable, religious, educational, and 
fraternal organizations are entitled to property tax exemptions when the qualifying owner 
uses the property to hold its meetings and conduct its business. Property held by these 
organizations that is deemed exempt from taxation is also exempt from assessment (S.C. 
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Code §12 43 330). However, if real property that is subject to a property tax exemption is 
leased for a definite term and the lessee does not qualify for an exemption, the 
leaseholder is subject to property tax (S.C. Code §12 37 950).  
 Property of all schools, colleges and other institutions of learning and all 
charitable institutions like hospitals and other institutions caring for the infirmed, the 
handicapped, the aged, children and indigent persons is exempt from property taxes, 
except where the profits of such institutions are applied to private use (South Carolina 
Department of Revenue, 2013; S.C. Code §12 37 220(A)(2); S.C. Code §12 37 222; S.C. 
Constitution Article X, §3). Property held by public libraries, churches, parsonages and 
burying grounds is exempt from property taxes as well (S.C. Code §12 37 220(A)(3); 
S.C. Constitution Article X, §3). All real property of churches that extends beyond the 
buildings and premises actually occupied by the churches is exempt from property taxes 
if no profit or benefit from any operation on the churches’ real property inures to the 
benefit of any private stockholder or individual and no income producing ventures are 
located on the property (S.C. Code §12 37 220(B)(31)). 
 Counties and municipalities may require the owners of all real property exempt 
from property taxation to pay reasonable fees for the provision of public safety services 
(S.C. Code §12 37 235). These fees are sometimes called fee in lieu of taxes (FILOT). 
FILOTs cannot exceed the amount of taxes that would be levied on the property if the 
property were subject to taxation and are negotiated between local government and 
exempted organizations. 
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 Personal property taxes on motor vehicles  
 The structure of personal property taxes on motor vehicles varies widely across 
states. While many states utilize only fees and licenses, local property taxes based on 
value are applied to motor vehicles in 17 states (American Automobile Association, 
2013). Research on the effects of motor vehicle property taxes has been somewhat 
limited in the last 20 years.  
 Personal property taxes based on the value or age of automobiles have a 
significant negative effect on the new car share of total vehicles (Beck and Bennett, 
2003). Pritchard and DeBoer (1995) examined the effect of vehicle taxes and concluded 
that low-income people may be more likely to abandon auto ownership in response to 
property taxes on vehicles, whereas higher income people merely purchase a less 
expensive car.  Two studies (Ott and Andrus, 2000; Craft and Schmidt, 2005) have 
conflicting findings over the effect of vehicle personal property taxes on the purchase of 
new vehicles. New car sales have decreased in South Carolina during the Great 
Recession, and the age of the average light motor vehicle on the road has increased over 
the last decade (American Automobile Association, 2013).  
 South Carolina motor vehicle personal property tax assessment ratios decreased 
from 10.5 percent in 2001 to six percent by 2006. While the number of vehicles on South 
Carolina roadways increased over this period, the average age of vehicles on the road 
rose. The population grew by 11.7 percent in South Carolina (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013), 
which may explain the increase in the number of vehicles. However, a prolonged 
economic downturn may have increased the average age of vehicles on the road as well. 
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The combination of lower assessment rates on vehicles and an aging fleet with lower 
assessed values led to lower growth, and in many cases decline, in revenue from personal 
property taxes. Table 2.2 illustrates the decrease in the average vehicle personal property 
tax bill from 2000 to 2008 in South Carolina. This legislative change is one of several 
additional sources of property tax base erosion not addressed in this research.  















2000 6,308.81 0.105 662.42 272.3 180.38 
2001 6,553.36 0.105 688.1 273.6 188.27 
2002 6,170.83 0.105 647.94 284.4 184.27 
2003 6,806.68 0.09 612.6 283.7 173.8 
2004 6,951.12 0.083 576.94 277.8 160.27 
2005 7,058.72 0.075 529.4 278.5 147.44 
2006 7,769.34 0.068 528.32 278.5 147.14 
2007 8,100.58 0.06 486.03 290.2 141.05 
2008 7,768.11 0.06 466.09 297.6 138.71 
 
From valuation to revenue 
In South Carolina, property that is subject to property taxes include real property, 
personal property used in business, and certain other personal property such as motor 
vehicles, boats and airplanes. Property taxes are generally assessed and collected by local 
governments, but the South Carolina Department of Revenue assesses and collects some 
property taxes and oversees all property tax assessments to ensure equitable and uniform 
assessment throughout the state. There is no state or local tax on intangible personal 
property or inventories. There are three elements involved in calculating property taxes: 
valuation, classification, and millage. 
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 Valuation 
Real property, other than agricultural property and property subject to a 
negotiated fee in lieu of taxes, is appraised to determine fair market value. Real property 
is reappraised on a countywide basis every five years (S.C. Code §12 43 217). For 
purposes of reassessment, Article X, Section 6 of the South Carolina Constitution 
specifies that any increase in the fair market value of any parcel is limited to a cap of 15 
percent. This cap on value remains in effect until there is an assessable transfer of interest 
(ATI). An ATI will result in a valuation that is not limited by a 15 percent cap (S.C. Code 
§12 37 315). The fair market value of improvements and additions are added to the fair 
market value of a parcel after completion. The 15 percent cap does not apply to the fair 
market value of improvements and additions in the year they are first subject to property 
tax (S.C. Code §12 43 217; S.C. Code §12 37 312 through S.C. Code §12 37 317). Such 
improvements would be subject to full value upon reassessment, which could possibly 
discourage improvements and additions, as well as sales or taxable transfers of interest. 
The assessment cap, implemented in 2007, is another source of property tax base erosion, 
or more accurately, legislative action that has slowed the growth of the property tax base.  
 Assessment ratios 
The South Carolina state constitution establishes differential assessment based on 
property classification. Each different classification of property has independent 
assessment ratio. Manufacturing property, commercial personal property, and utility 
property is assessed at 10.5 percent unless otherwise exempted. A homeowner’s primary 
residence is assessed at four percent with any second (non-primary) residences and any 
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other real property is taxed at six percent. Rental properties are included in the higher six 
percent assessment classification. Thus, under differential assessment in South Carolina, 
primary homeowners pay the lowest real property tax when compared to manufacturing, 
commercial and rental properties.  
 There is some question among county tax assessors over whether the presence of 
different assessment ratios create an incentive to cheat and claim more valuable 
residences as primary owner-occupied when in fact, they are second homes (personal 
communication, September 15, 2014). Several of the tax assessors contacted for this 
research indicated that applications requesting a change to owner-occupied classification 
with a four percent assessment ratio have increased along the coast of South Carolina 
(personal communication, September 25, 2014). The addition of the exemption from 
school operating taxes for owner-occupied residential property but not other rental 
property has certainly increased the tax differential between owner-occupied and other 
rental residential property. Again, this is a third source of base erosion not addressed in 
this research because of the difficulties in developing an appropriate database.  
 Assessment caps limit the annual increase in assessed value of each individual 
property to a specified percentage of the prior year’s value or the value at the previous 
assessment. Act 402 (2006) established an assessment cap in South Carolina to provided 
property tax relief to owners of all categories of real property (S.C. Code §12-37-
3140(B)).  Reassessment occurs every five years on a rolling schedule across counties, 
and also when eligible properties are sold or undergo substantial improvements (e.g., new 
home construction or additions). While South Carolina limits the percentage increase at 
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reassessment to 15 percent every five years, the state does not implement revenue limits 
(Anderson, 2006).  
 True revenue loss attributed to the assessment cap was difficult to quantify 
because at reassessment, millage is recalculated to compensate for changes in value, 
which is required by statute. So if value (and assessment) does not rise as far it normally 
would due to the assessment cap (or goes down due to a decline in the market), then 
millage either goes up to compensate for the loss in tax base or does not fall as far as it 
otherwise would have due to the assessment cap. Therefore, counties report no tangible 
revenue loss. However, the assessment cap does have a fiscal impact in reducing revenue 
obtained from some properties, especially property with higher rates of value 
appreciation.  
 Assessed values are obtained by applying the appropriate assessment ratio to the 
fair market value Taxes are then levied based on that assessed value. Some properties are 
taxed under a Fee In Lieu of Taxes (FILOT) agreement. Businesses that invest $2.5 
million or more in South Carolina by either relocating or expanding in the state can 
negotiate a reduction in the regular 10.5 percent assessment ratio down to six percent for 
20 years with no increases in the value of their property over the same period. Some 
economically distressed areas of the state are permitted to offer the same program with a 
lower one than million dollar investment. Larger investments can obtain a four percent 
assessment ratio over thirty years on a case-by-case basis.   
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 Millage 
Individual taxing jurisdictions (i.e., counties, municipalities) determine their 
property tax rates, or millage, annually by dividing the cost of its annual budget (net of 
other projected revenues) by the total assessed value within the taxing jurisdiction. This 
calculation results in a millage rate, which is so many thousandths per dollar of valuation. 
The average millage rate for cities, counties and school districts combined in South 
Carolina is 298.7 mills (South Carolina Department of Revenue, 2013). Below is an 
example of a property tax calculations illustrating how millage rates work: 
A manufacturing firm owns property with a value of $100,000. Commercial 
manufacturing property has an assessment ratio of 10.5 percent in South Carolina. 
The assessed value of that property is $10,500 ($100,000 x 10.5 percent). If a 
municipality has a total yearly budget requirement of $4 million from property tax 
revenue and a total assessed value of property of $50 million, then the annual 
millage rate would be 80 mills ($4 million / $50 million = .080). The property tax 
liability of the property owner would be $840 ($10,500 x .080).  
 Local budget needs change from year to year. However, any mill rate increases in 
a taxing jurisdiction are subject to legislative restrictions (S.C. Code §6 1 320 and S.C. 
Code §12 37 251(E)). Generally, millage rates can only be increased for general 
operating purposes from the previous year by the rate of change in the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) plus increase in population. Special purpose increases above and beyond CPI 
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plus population change require governing body approval via a two-thirds vote (S.C. Code 
§6 1 320(B)).  
 During the year following reassessment, a special millage rate is used. Instead of 
using the previous year’s millage rate as a base rate, a “rollback millage” rate is used. 
Rollback millage rates are calculated by dividing the prior years property tax revenue by 
the adjusted total assessed value and is typically lower than the previous year’s millage 
rate to avoid shocks and windfalls related to significant increases in property values. 
Rollback millage rates include a countywide equalization and reassessment pattern. The 
amount of assessed value is adjusted by deducting assessments added for property or 
improvements not taxed previously like additions or new construction (S.C. Code §12 37 
251(E)). 
 State oversight 
 The responsibility for valuation of property in South Carolina is divided between 
the state’s Department of Revenue and county assessors and auditors. The division of 
responsibility depends on the type of property owned and its use. The Department of 
Revenue generally values property held by manufacturers, utilities, mining companies 
and certain transportation companies such as railroads and airlines.  
 County assessors and auditors value all the remaining property, which includes 
commercial, residential and agricultural property. County assessors value real property in 
South Carolina (S.C. Code §12 37 90) while auditors value personal property (S.C. Code 
§12 39 340). Property taxes are levied by local government entities and are assessed 
uniformly across a classified system (S.C. Code §12 37 30). In the case of real and 
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personal property assessed by the Department, the Department generally certifies the 
assessment to the county auditor, who computes the tax and forwards the tax amount to 
the county treasurer for billing. The county assessor is responsible for appraising and 
assessing all real property in the county not appraised and assessed by the Department of 
Revenue (S.C. Code §12 37 90). The assessor also determines eligibility for the four 
percent assessment ratio applicable to owner occupied real property (S.C. Code §12 43 
220(C)).  
 County assessors assess (i.e., determine the value and assessment ratio) of real 
property and county auditors assess personal property. The South Carolina Department of 
Revenue has the sole responsibility for the appraisal, assessment, and equalization of the 
taxable values of corporate headquarters, corporate office facilities, and distribution 
facilities and of all of the property owned by, or leased to, the following businesses and 
used in the conduct of their business (South Carolina Department of Revenue, 2013): 
manufacturing, railway, private carline, airline, water, heat, light and power, telephone, 
cable television, sewer, pipeline, and mining.  
The property tax in public revenue 
 Revenue sources for local governments are somewhat limited because the 
personal income tax is too costly for local governments to administer. South Carolina has 
also trailed both the nation and regional averages for per capita intergovernmental 
revenues over the last 20 years (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2014 b). The next most 
likely local revenue alternatives are local option taxes and property taxes. Local sales and 
excise taxes are less stable than property taxes (Ebel and Peterson, 2012; Ulbrich, 2011). 
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Stability is not as important for a central government that can run deficits during 
economic downturns. However, local governments have less fiscal leeway and many are 
constitutionally required balance budgets annually (Ulbrich, 2011).  
 State and local governments obtain the largest share of tax revenues from property 
taxes and sales and gross receipts taxes. Property taxes represent 34.1 percent of the total 
state and local government revenues nationally (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013). In South 
Carolina, property taxes represented 37.5 percent of revenues for local governments in 
2012 (South Carolina Budget and Control Board, 2013). Property taxes are the most 
prominent source of local tax revenues in the United States. Taxes on residential and 
commercial real estate are often the largest revenue source for local governments (Prante, 
2009).  
 The next largest source of revenue, sales and gross receipts taxes, provided 34 
percent of state and local government tax revenue nationally in 2012 (Lincoln Institute of 
Land Policy, 2014 b). General sales and excise taxes are included in this category. 
General sales taxes are levied on all kinds of goods and services while excise taxes are 
collected on specific items consumed like alcohol, tobacco, and motor fuels. Local sales 
and excise taxes are less stable than property taxes, especially during economic 
downturns (Ebel and Peterson, 2012; Ulbrich, 2011).  
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Methods of comparing taxes 
 The Tax Foundation ranks states on two measures annually, state and local taxes 
as a percent of state personal income and taxes per capita (Tax Foundation, 2012). To 
measure the burden of taxation, how much income individuals and households have to 
sacrifice to the state in order to pay for public services, the percent of income is the 
correct measure. While the property tax is a tax on wealth, it must be paid out of personal 
income. Thus, the burden of the property tax is measured as a percentage of income 
required to pay annual property tax liabilities. However, the percent of income measure 
does not allow comparisons based on how much tax was collected for each person living 
in the state.  Per capita taxes offer a measure of tax resources, or how much state and 
local governments have to work with to fund public services. A low income state may 
rank high in taxes as a percent of income but low in per capita taxes.  
 The number of people served largely drives the cost of public services. Other 
factors such as the age distribution, poverty, population density and climate may figure 
into the cost of public services. Areas with a larger number of elderly residents have a 
different public service demand than areas with a lot of school children. However, 
population is the primary driver of the cost of public services. The demand for services 
like public safety, public education, parks and recreation, environmental protection, 
libraries, and public health is affected by population size.  
 Over the last twenty years, the United States population has increased by 21 
percent. Both the southeast (30 percent) and South Carolina (28 percent) have seen 
slightly higher population growth rates than the nation as a whole. It should be noted that 
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South Carolina (15 percent increase) has outpaced both the national (10 percent increase) 
and regional (14 percent increase) population growth rates in the last ten years (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2012). Therefore, it is appropriate to compare resources by adjusting for 
differences in population from state to state. Low per capita taxes, unless supplemented 
by nontax revenue sources such as fees, charges, and revenue from natural resources, are 
likely to mean low levels of services. 
 Citizens would prefer to have a low tax burden and a high level of public services. 
In general, wealthier states tend to rank higher in per capita taxes than in taxes as a 
percent of income, while poorer states will be the opposite, South Carolina ranks 48th in 
per capita taxes collected and 42nd in taxes as a percent of income (Tax Foundation, 
2014). States with higher per capita tax revenues generally have more public services.  
 Neither taxes as a percent of income or taxes per capita reveals how the tax 
burden is distributed across individuals and households, or how much more or less it may 
cost to serve different kinds of households or communities. Neither measure gives any 
indication of where taxes might be increased with relatively little hardship, or where tax 
cuts or adjustments would do the most good in terms of fairness or encouraging economic 
development. Neither measure tells us anything about the quality and mix of public 
services that those taxes are being used to fund (Ulbrich, 2010). With those limitations in 
mind, measuring the property tax as a percent of income and examining per capita 
property tax revenue can provide some context for the property tax in the United States, 
the Southeast, and South Carolina. This analysis has the caveat that any revenue changes 
reflect the combined effect of changes in the tax base and changes in tax rates.   
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Comparing taxes: South Carolina, the Southeast and the Nation 
 While state totals and national averages are straightforward, many features of the 
South Carolina property tax bear a regional imprint.  In addition, the nature of the 
property tax base reflects regional patterns of lower income, fewer large cities, and large 
undeveloped areas. The Association of American Geographers defines the Southeastern 
region of the United States as Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. This analysis will 
utilize that geographical definition.  
 Taxes in the United States average 10.2 percent of income (Tax Foundation, 
2013), or $4,245 per capita (Tax Foundation, 2012).  State and local taxes in the 
Southeast region average 9.2 percent of income (Tax Foundation, 2013). The 
Southeastern per capita annual tax is lower than that national average at $3,281 (Tax 
Foundation, 2012). Per capita income for the nation in 2010 was $41,195 while the 
Southeast averaged $35,531.  
 South Carolina taxpayers do not pay high taxes when compared to the nation. 
Taxes in the state represent 8.6 percent of income, which is lower than the national and 
regional averages (Tax Foundation, 2013). The per capita taxes paid in South Carolina 
are $2,845, which is significantly lower than national averages (Tax Foundation, 2012). 
The per capita income in South Carolina is $33,044, which trails both the national and 
Southeastern averages.  
 If South Carolina increased taxes to the national average as a percent of income, 
the state would still only have $3,238 per capita to work with, which is 77 percent of the 
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national average. State and local governments in South Carolina have less tax revenue to 
work with in providing public services (Tax Foundation, 2014). Table 2.3 provides a 
summary of national, regional, and state tax revenues per capita and as a percent of 
income.  













United States 9.8% $4,217 $42,693 
Southeast 8.9% $3,237 $37,150 
South Carolina 8.3% $2,784 $33,044 
Source: Tax Foundation, 2014  
Measuring property taxation in South Carolina, the Southeast and the Nation 
 Property tax as a percentage of personal income declined nationally between 1972 
and 1982, and held constant around 3 percent of personal income through 2008 (Bell, 
2012). In the most recent data, the per capita property tax averaged $1,428 nationally and 
represented 3.3 percent of income in 2012 (Tax Foundation, 2014). The Southeastern per 
capita annual property tax of $939 was lower than that national average (Tax Foundation, 
2014).  
 South Carolina property taxes are higher than the Southeast average, but are still 
lower than the national average. Property taxes in the state represent 3.1 percent of 
income, which is lower than the national percentage, but not the regional average (Tax 
Foundation, 2014). The per capita property taxes paid in South Carolina are $1,032 in 
2012, which is significantly lower than national average, but higher than the Southeast 
average (Tax Foundation, 2014). Table 2.4 provides a summary of national, regional, and 
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state property tax revenues.  
Table 2.4 Property Tax Revenues (2012) 
 
Property 






United States 3.3% $1,428 
Southeast 2.5% $939 
South Carolina 3.1% $1,032 
Source: Tax Foundation, 2014  
Property tax and local government 
 Property tax revenue as a share of state and local government revenue has 
decreased in South Carolina from 2002 to 2012. Intergovernmental transfers have either 
remained flat or decreased. There has been an increased reliance on local option taxation, 
which is more volatile during economic downturns. The convergence of these factors 
places local governments under additional fiscal stress during a period where those local 
governments experienced a 47.6 percent increase in spending and a 44.7 percent increase 
in revenues (South Carolina Budget and Control Board, 2013). 
 South Carolina counties  
 Counties in South Carolina are more reliant on property tax revenues than 
municipalities and the state. The property tax share of county revenues has consistently 
hovered between 42 and 43 percent over the last ten years. The share of total county 
revenue generated by local option taxes have doubled in the last ten years, increasing 
from 7.5 percent in 2002 to 15.8 percent in 2012. This growth occurred because only six 
counties had local option taxes in 2002, but by 2012, 29 counties were utilizing them. 
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Revenue share generated from state aid transfers decreased from 16.9 percent in 2002 to 
12.2 percent in 2012 while federal funds remained constant (around 3.6 percent). The use 
of fees and charges to generate revenue dropped over the same period, down from 27.7 
percent of total revenue for counties in 2002 to 23.6 percent in 2012 (South Carolina 
Budget and Control Board, 2013). 
 South Carolina municipalities 
 Municipalities in South Carolina relied on property taxes for 28.8 percent of their 
total revenues in 2002. This figure decreased to 26.5 percent by 2012.  The biggest 
change in sources of revenue for municipalities over the last ten years has been a shift 
towards the use of local option taxes including sales and excises (mainly 
accommodations and hospitality) taxes. Like counties, reliance on local option tax use by 
municipalities increased substantially since 2002. South Carolina municipalities received 
7.7 percent of their revenues from local option taxes in 2002. This figure increased to 
11.7 percent in 2012. The share derived from fees and charges decreased by 1.4 
percentage points from 2002 to 2012. The share of revenue coming from property taxes 
also dropped by 2.2 percentage points from 2002 to 2012. Federal aid as a share of 
municipal revenue remained flat and state aid decreased from 8.9 percent of total revenue 
to 7.2 percent (South Carolina Budget and Control Board, 2013).  
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 South Carolina school districts 
 South Carolina public school districts’ share of total revenues garnered from 
property taxes increased from 33.6 percent in 2002 to 38 percent in 2012. South Carolina 
school districts do not receive funding from local option taxes, but do receive funds from 
fees and charges that decreased from 8.9 percent in 2002 to 5.7 percent in 2012. School 
districts saw an increase in federal funding (8.7 percent to 11.1 percent) and decreases in 
stated funding (48.7 percent to 45.2 percent) over the same period. The heavy reliance on 
state aid is somewhat related to Act 388 passed in 2006, which exempted residential 
property owners from paying local public school operating costs. Act 388 shifted school 
operations funding to a penny sales tax administered by the state. The timing for the shift 
to a sales tax came right before the beginning of the Great Recession in 2007, which 
negatively affected consumer behavior and lowered the amount of revenue generated 
through sales taxes. The projected revenues for the penny tax fell short and the state has 
been forced to make up the difference. It should be noted that Act 388 also prevents 
school districts and other local governments from raising millage rates by more than a 
predetermined formula based on inflation plus population growth, and Act 402 caps 




CHAPTER THREE  
PROPERTY TAX BASE EROSION 
Tax bases 
 The fundamental questions in this research center on two policy actions that lead 
to property tax base erosion in South Carolina.  The effects of those policies on 
efficiency, equity and revenue adequacy are also evaluated.  The use of property tax 
incentives for business location and property tax exemptions for nonprofit organizations 
are substantial contributors to property tax base erosion.   
 A tax base is the assessed value of a set of assets, investments, or income streams 
that is subject to taxation. The tax base is determined by the tax code of the appropriate 
jurisdiction and economic activity or value of a particular revenue source. There are three 
primary tax bases from which tax revenue is generated. These bases are wealth, income, 
and consumption. Wealth is subject to the property tax, earnings are subject to the income 
tax, and consumption is taxed through sales and excise taxes.  
What bases measure 
 Each tax base measures some aspect of a taxpayer’s ability to pay as well as some 
level of benefit received from services financed by a particular tax source. Those with 
higher income have a higher ability to pay all kinds of taxes, but particularly income 
taxes. Taxpayers with higher wealth holdings are subject to higher property taxes and 
those who consume more pay more sales taxes. Ability to pay is the most widely used 
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criterion for tax fairness. Ability to pay implies that those who have more resources can 
and should make a larger contribution toward the cost of public services. The easiest way 
to measure ability to pay is by income level, followed by consumption and accumulated 
wealth, or property owned (Ebel and Petersen, 2012).   
The benefit principle links tax obligation to the value of public services received 
in exchange (Ulbrich, 2011). This concept is not new. Adam Smith (1776, page 888) 
opined that tax obligation should be “proportional to the revenue enjoyed under the 
protection of the state.” An individual’s income is obtained within a framework created 
and maintained by government(s). Therefore, the income received is subject to an income 
tax and, in Smith’s vision, a proportional income tax wherein those earning more pay 
more than those earning less. A similar argument can be made for taxes on wealth as 
those with more property benefit more from property related services and usually have 
higher incomes, so they can and do pay more taxes. Excise taxes and fees like the 
gasoline tax target those that use more of the services like roads for the maintenance of 
highway infrastructure. Individuals that drive more pay more gasoline tax to maintain the 
roads they frequent.   
Tax base erosion 
 Tax base erosion is not just a result of policy changes.  Base erosion is also an 
issue of a revenue structure that fails to adapt to changes in the fundamental taxable 
wealth and activity of the economy that generates tax revenue. When tax policy fails to 
keep pace with the population growth, changes in market behaviors, and income levels, 
significant base erosion can occur. This erosion affects all tax bases in some form. Tax 
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bases are especially vulnerable to policy changes and citizen market behavior as a 
response to changes in policy.  
The three bases are inextricably linked because wealth and economic activity are 
given expressions of not only the ownership of assets, but also in receiving income and 
consumption activities. Therefore, when erosion occurs in one tax base, there are ripple 
effects across others. A systematic review of each tax base will provide a theoretical 
foundation for this research.  
Sales and excise tax base 
 Increasing costs of local government services combined with almost four decades 
of efforts to limit property taxes, have led local governments to rely more heavily on 
consumption taxation (Brunori, 2007). Local governments use two types of consumption 
taxes, sales and excise taxes, which generate billions of dollars in revenue. The sales tax 
is a broad based consumption tax collected on the sale of goods and services. The excise 
tax is imposed on a specific item or service like gasoline, tobacco or alcohol (Ulbrich, 
2011). The sales tax is less salient than income or property taxes as individuals regularly 
make small purchases on which sales taxes are paid in very small sums. Sales and excise 
taxes account for 34 percent of state own source revenue and 22 percent of local 
government own source revenue (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013).  
 Consumption spending is a good measure of ability to pay taxes. The more an 
individual spends, the more willingness they are expressing to pay consumption taxes. 
Purchases cannot be easily hidden and consumption taxes are difficult to evade. 
However, sales and excise taxes tend to be regressive, because consumers with lower 
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incomes pay a higher percentage of their earnings in consumption taxes. Compliance and 
collection costs are also a higher percentage of revenue for small businesses. The ideal 
consumption tax system would have a broad base that allowed tax rates to be low with 
some adjustments to compensate for the higher percentage of low income earnings being 
used to pay consumption taxes.  
 Economic and demographic changes will directly influence tax bases. With 
consumption based taxation, the level of population will affect the total potentially 
taxable consumption and the age distribution of a population will affect the type of 
consumption (Wallace, 2012). Thus, state and local governments must consider these 
factors when creating and altering tax policy. The breadth of a consumption tax base for 
state and local governments determines how much revenue will fluctuate as 
demographics and the economy change.  
 Problems with the consumption tax base are multifaceted. Consumption taxes 
such as the retail sales tax are jurisdiction specific, which may cause consumers to seek to 
make purchases under the most favorable tax conditions. In that case, the tax has created 
market distortions and thus, inefficiency. This shift may move local consumption 
spending out of one area and into another. Increases in online purchases or consumption 
of more exempt items like food instead of taxed items like clothing also result from 
higher tax rates or increased competition.  
 Sales taxes are inherently regressive. Poorer residents pay a larger share of their 
income in sales taxes than do wealthier residents. A North Carolina study found that an 
increased local option sales tax resulted in an increase in the tax burden on less affluent 
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households that was up to twenty times greater the burden on the most affluent residents 
(Gardner, 1999). This regressivity becomes more pronounced when sales taxes are levied 
on necessities such as food, medicine, and utilities.  Legislative action provides another 
form of erosion in the consumption tax base. Legislators in some states have attempted to 
alleviate regressivity by exempting certain goods and services that are deemed 
necessities, but this has further narrowed the consumption tax base. One response to this 
concern in some states has been consumption tax rebates to low income consumers in 
order to reduce regressivity.  
 The relationship between the rate and the base is challenging for tax policies of 
any kind, but this issue is particularly important for excise taxes (Ulbrich, 2011). The tax 
base for a specific good or service is already narrow. An increase in excise tax rate, 
levied on an already narrow base, will result in a greater reduction in consumption of the 
item taxed than an increase in a tax with a broader base, especially at lower rates. 
 Local option sales and excise taxes provide a direct source of local revenue that 
helps local governments maintain some autonomy over their fiscal affairs (Lee and 
Gordon, 2005). When local governments have some control over consumption tax rates 
and base, the tax serves as a continuous source of revenue that can be spent by the local 
governments with less reliance on yearly appropriations by state legislature (Brunori, 
2007). However, even with some autonomy, states and local governments cannot control 
what goods and services are produced and consumed, and are thus subject to 
consumption taxation.  
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 Sales taxes are relatively inexpensive to administer and collect. Vendors are 
required to collect consumptions taxes at the point of purchase and state governments 
typically collect for local governments and disburse revenues back to the local level. 
Thus local governments incur minimal costs to administer a local option sales tax. 
However, collection costs can be a burden for vendors, especially smaller retailers. 
Complications exist when vendors make sales to taxpayers from different jurisdictions. 
Sales to customers in other jurisdictions may be subject to tax in the jurisdiction of the 
vendor or the jurisdiction of the customer, depending on the conditions of sale. (McLure, 
2001).  
 Consumption taxes are widely accepted, as a result taxpayers feel in control of 
their tax burden when they choose to purchase a good or service that is subject to a sales 
or excise tax (Brunori, 2005). This acceptance has led to political bias towards the use of 
sales and excise taxes over less popular income and property taxes. However, because 
U.S. retail sales taxes are largely levied on tangible goods with only limited coverage of 
services, the sales tax base has steadily decreased relative to the overall economy (Boyd, 
2000; Ebel and Petersen 2012). This shift is largely attributed to a shift away from a more 
easily taxed manufacturing based economy in the United States towards a less easily 
taxed service based economy (Ulbrich 2011).  
 The rise in online purchases that are largely untaxed has caused the loss of 
billions of dollars in sales tax revenues in recent years (Bruce, Fox and Tuttle, 2006; 
Ulbrich 2011, Ebel and Petersen, 2012). The estimated cost to state and local 
governments by 2011 was over $54 billion (Bruce, Fox and Tuttle, 2006). This shift to 
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increased (untaxed) electronic purchases has allowed some business to operate at a price 
advantage over businesses that have to charge consumption taxes and poses a significant 
threat to local option sales taxes (Bonnet, 1998), as well as to state and local revenue 
from property and income taxes paid by instate retailers.  
Income tax base 
 Income taxes are based on the flow of money into a household or firm. Income 
taxes measure ability to pay directly with adjustments for different circumstances such as 
family size, generosity, and medical expense. Many states, and to a much lesser extent 
local governments, impose levies on personal income and wages. Local governments can 
also tax various business activities and several of these taxes can be levied on income. 
The personal income tax is the most widely recognizable income tax, but the income tax 
category also includes payroll taxes like Social Security contributions, corporate income 
taxes, and some business license taxes (mainly local) that are determined by the level of a 
firm’s gross receipts and income.   
 The total personal income in the United States is estimated to be over $13.4 
trillion (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2013). This creates a strong revenue base for the 
personal income tax before exclusions, deductions, and credits. The United States relies 
almost exclusively on income taxes to fund its central government while forty-one state 
governments and over 4,000 local governments also rely on income tax revenues  
(Ulbrich, 2011). The personal income tax (26 percent in 2012) surpassed the general sales 
tax (22 percent in 2012) as the largest share of own source revenue for states in 2008 and 
accounted for $241 million in 2012 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013).   
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 Revenue from the income tax grows faster over the long term than sales or 
property taxes. Research by Bruce, Fox and Tuttle (2006) found that the average long run 
elasticity of personal income taxes is 1.832, which is more than double the elasticity of 
sales taxes. This elasticity is evident in research completed by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (2010), which found that state personal income taxes grew faster 
than income itself from 1977 to 2007. However, the high elasticity suggests that the 
income tax is more susceptible to loss during economic downturns in the long run. This 
elasticity is helpful in the long run, but raises a question of how state and local 
governments can adapt the structure of their income taxes to limit revenue declines 
during economic downturns.  
 The nationwide decline in employment during the most recent recession was 
approximately three times the drop observed in the previous four recessions (Dadayan 
and Boyd, 2011; Francis, 2012). Governors and state legislatures prefer to raise other 
taxes before increasing income taxes during economic downturns (Cordes and Juffras, 
2012). The National Conference of State Legislatures (2011) found that legislators tend 
to delay tax increases during recessions because of potential harm to individuals and 
businesses that are already facing possible decreases in earnings. Elected officials do not 
want to seem insensitive to economic distress or act hastily if the recession turns out to be 
short lived. All of these factors lead to instability in the income tax base as a source of 
revenue. 
 Like any other form of taxation, taxing income has benefits and costs. Income 
taxes are quite visible on biweekly or monthly pay statements. This visibility leads to 
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political pressure to limit personal income tax rates. Business tax rates can be limited for 
the same reasons. This visibility also leads taxpayers to try to hold elected officials 
accountable for what is done with the tax dollars collected. Many economists and public 
finance experts see the income tax as more efficient than other taxes (Bird, 1993; 
Brunori, 2007). The costs of administration and collection of the state and federal income 
tax falls on those broad governments that are much more capable of collecting income 
taxes than local governments. Thus, a lower reliance on income taxes by local 
governments makes sense in terms of administration.  
 Income taxes distort the tradeoff between work and leisure time, as untaxed 
leisure time is substituted for taxed working hours. While taxpayers at different income 
levels will react differently, all of them are likely to respond to a change in the taxation of 
their earnings, some by increasing their work hours to maintain their income, others by 
reducing their work time because earnings are taxed and leisure is not (Ulbrich, 2011). 
Income taxes impose burdens on mobile bases that can and will move, especially between 
states (Brunori, 2007). Some taxpayers will seek tax advantages through tax avoidance or 
evasion, while other taxpayers will simply work less. Likewise, higher income tax rates 
in one area will lead to tax avoidance and business investments elsewhere. These 
distortions lead to further erosion of the income tax base. Therefore, the ideal income tax 
would be broad with relatively low rates with minimal exclusions (Ebel and Peterson, 
2012).  
  State and federal income tax systems bring a degree of progressiveness to public 
finance (Strauss, 1995). As taxpayers earn more, they pay more income taxes, which 
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satisfies both ability to pay and benefit principles. In comparison, consumption taxes are 
inherently regressive because lower income citizens use a larger percentage of their 
earnings to pay sales and excise taxes.  
 The local option income tax was considered an alternative revenue source for 
local governments, but income taxes are unlikely to play a more important role in 
financing local government (Sheffrin, 1998). After the 1986 Federal Tax Reform Act, 
many thought that local option income taxes would become a vital source of local 
government revenue, but that potential was never realized (Brunori, 2007).  Local 
governments in the United States raised only $20 billion from taxing personal income in 
2005 and that number has failed to climb in the last decade (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013). 
Property tax base 
 The property tax base measures a blend of wealth and consumption (especially for 
households). There are three kinds of wealth, or property, which are taxed by 
jurisdictions. They include real property, personal property and intangible property. The 
most universal type of wealth is real property, which consists of land and land 
improvements. In some states, including South Carolina, real property is classified into 
categories such as agricultural, owner occupied residential, rental, commercial, and 
utility. Taxes are then differentiated among categories either in the way they are assessed 
or the mill rate levied on that assessment. 
 Personal property consists of selected other kinds of tangible property other than 
land and land improvements. Examples include automobiles, boats, business equipment, 
farm equipment, and business inventory. How much of personal property is subjected to 
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taxation is highly jurisdiction specific. Over the past few decades, several states have 
reduced personal property taxes by eliminating taxes on merchants’ inventory and by 
reducing or eliminating property taxes on personal vehicles (Ulbrich, 2011).  
 The third property category is intangible property. Intangible property includes 
stocks, bonds, or other assets that offer a means of storing wealth. Taxation of intangible 
property is difficult. Collection and compliance costs are high when taxing intangible 
property because it can be moved, hidden, or changed into different forms when taxed. In 
many cases, the juice may not be worth the squeeze when it comes to intangible property.  
The property tax remains a fixture in local government revenue with 97 percent of 
all property tax revenue going to local governments. However, over the last several 
decades, the property tax has declined in its relative share of local government revenue 
from 43 percent of local general revenue to 28 percent in the last 40 years (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2013). The property tax’s share of local own source revenue has also declined 
from 56 percent in 1968 to 45 percent in 2008 (Bell, 2012).  
A selective property tax is characterized by a lack of uniformity where some 
property types are given preferential rates or exclusions from the tax altogether. A 
general property tax is applied to all property uniformly. The original property tax in the 
early mostly agrarian United States was selectively imposed on certain classes of wealth 
that were easily identified such as land, improvements, and cattle (Lynn, 1969). By the 
mid nineteenth century, the property tax evolved into more of a general ad valorem tax 
that was uniformly applied to the value of a broader set of assets regardless of their form 
(Wallis, 2001). However, over the last several decades in the United States, the property 
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tax has reverted back to a more selective tax focused on real property in general and 
residential property more specifically, with less emphasis on personal property (Bell, 
2012). Personal property taxation declined from 17.2 percent of local gross assessed 
value in 1956 to 9.8 percent in 1986 (Bowman, 1995).  
In the mid to late twentieth century, residential property became increasingly 
important to the composition of the property tax (Bell, 2012). The United States Census 
reports that residential properties accounted for 54.1 percent of gross assessed values in 
1956, but by 1986, that figure was 61.2 percent. Commercial share of gross assessed 
values increased only modestly over the same period—16.6 percent to 17.3 percent. The 
share for industrial property fell from 10.8 percent to 7 percent of gross assessed values 
from 1956 to 1986.  The relative importance of personal property also fell from 17.2 
percent to 9.8 percent by 1986 (Bowman, 1995).  
As residential properties have played an increasingly important role in generating 
property tax revenue, homeowners have sought to reduce their tax burdens by seeking tax 
relief measures for residential property.  Relief policies have moved the property tax 
farther away from a broad based tax that is rich in efficiency, equity, and revenue 
adequacy.  When the property tax base is narrowed, it can distort private decisions by 
favoring some land uses over others. Relief policies that narrow a broad tax base move it 
away from being uniform and equitable (Bell, 2012).  Witte (2009) believes that the 
property tax base is becoming less accountable in terms of stability, revenue adequacy, 
efficiency and equity due to the “confusing and opaque jumble of special provisions that 
accumulate as the broad base of the property tax is destroyed.”  
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 Giertz (2006) finds that this trend toward homeowner tax relief is a result of a 
steady increase in residential property values along with a reduction in the importance of 
intensive manufacturing (using real property) in the United States. As the United States 
has moved to a knowledge-based economy, most businesses rely more on technology 
(Bonnet, 1998) and do not own significant amounts of real property.  The result is 
decreased revenue from business property taxes that shifted property tax burdens from 
businesses to residential property (Strauss, 2001).   
The increasing share of the property tax derived from residential property has led 
legislators and local officials to propose and support policy to alleviate the burden on 
those taxpayers. The last several decades have produced a movement towards both direct 
and indirect residential property tax relief. Direct property tax relief reduces the tax 
liability of residential homeowners while indirect relief shifts the local government’s 
reliance on the property tax to other areas like sales taxes and state grants (Bell, 2012).  
 Base erosion and the property tax 
 Several sources of property tax base erosion in the United States arose in part 
during the tax revolt that began in the late 1970s. These include assessment limits in the 
tax limitation movement, exemption proliferation, and certain forms of increased 
property tax relief. Base erosion is one way to reduce or slow the growth of property tax 
burdens and property tax revenue. Tax limitations are another. Legislative and statutory 
limits on property taxes erode the base in real terms by not letting it keep pace with 
inflation and population growth. The term base erosion is used when legislation (or a 
failure to legislate) removes items from the tax base, or reduces the taxable value of items 
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in the tax base. Therefore, a movement that places a ceiling on the growth of the property 
tax base is base erosion. However, rate limitations that are used to control property tax 
growth are not technically base erosion.  
 The genesis of the legislative and statutory tax revolt stems from Proposition 13 
in California. During the 1970s, California experienced explosive growth in property 
values. As values rose, so did the property tax burden. As burdens rose, so did the 
political pressure to offer property owners some relief. Proposition 13 set the maximum 
property tax rate at one percent, which hampered the ability of local governments in 
California to raise property tax revenues. A myriad of constitutional and statutory 
limitations emerged out of Proposition 13. From 1979 to 1984, 58 different ballot 
initiatives aimed at reducing property taxes were put on the ballot (Sexton and Sheffrin, 
1995). By 2007, 44 of the 50 states (88 percent) had some form of restriction on the 
ability of local governments to impose property taxes and by the mid 2000s.  These 
restrictions reduced property tax revenue up to 15 percent (Brunori, 2007).  
Tax limitations 
 Anderson (2007) argues that property tax limitations are similar to insurance 
taken out by citizens who do not trust their government to restrain taxes leading to the use 
of more tax limitations. Tax limitations take three forms including rate limitations, tax 
revenue limits, and assessment limits. Examples of each type of limitation can be found 
throughout the United States. Some are more prominent than others, while certain 
limitations are altogether absent in South Carolina. 
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Rate limits 
 Rate limits prohibit the increase in tax rates over a predetermined level. In 2012, 
37 states had such a limit in place nationwide (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2014 a). 
That number was up from 34 states in 2007 (Anderson, 2007). South Carolina has a rate 
limit called a maximum millage cap (S.C. Code § 6 1 320; S.C. Code § 12 37 251(E), 
2012). Under this policy, the increase in local millage rate for general operating purposes 
from the prior year’s rate is limited to the increase in the consumer price index plus the 
local entity’s percentage population increase in the previous year. During years when 
reassessment occurs, which is every five years in South Carolina, a five year rollback 
millage must be used in lieu of the previous year’s millage rate and the overall valuation 
increase is capped at 15 percent.  
Revenue limits 
 The second type of tax limitation is property tax revenue limits. A property tax 
revenue limit is established by law and restricts the amount of revenue that can be raised 
to certain levels. Revenue limits can be implemented in two ways: a reduction in property 
tax rates if total revenue exceeds a certain amount or a reduction in property tax 
assessment rates when total revenue exceeds a certain amount. Some states allow voters 
to override revenue limits, but instances of that occurring have been few. Regardless, it 
has been established that as property tax revenue is limited, local governments lose 
autonomy because as control of funding leaves the local level, so does the power to make 
decisions (Mullins, 2004).   
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 In 2007, 29 states had some form of revenue limits on the property tax (Anderson, 
2007). This form of property tax limitation has decreased in popularity in the last five 
years. Only ten explicit property tax revenue limits were identified among states in 2012 
(Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2014 a). South Carolina does not currently use property 
tax revenue limits per se. However, the state does limit what funds can be used to finance 
the operating expenses of public education that acts similarly to a revenue limit. That 
policy is administered under the auspices of property tax relief.  
Assessment limits 
 The final type of tax limitation, one that affects the tax base directly, is 
assessment limits.  Limitations on increases of assessed property values prevent the 
annual property valuation from increasing beyond the established constitutional or 
statutory limit. These limitations can lead to the continuous undervaluation of property 
that has neither been reassessed or experienced a change in ownership. A natural benefit 
of the property tax is its ability to increase revenue automatically as property values 
increase, which allows for increased revenue flows as costs rise (Brunori, 2007). 
However, when assessment limits impede that increase, the strength and stability of the 
property tax is diminished.  
 Nineteen states impose some form of a property tax assessment limit (Lincoln 
Institute of Land Policy, 2014 a). This number is up from twelve states in 2007 
(Anderson, 2007). In South Carolina, the Real Property Valuation Reform Act limits any 
increase in the fair market value of real property attributed to periodic countywide 
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appraisal and equalization program and is limited to 15 percent within a five year period 
(S.C. Code § 12 37 3140(B); S.C. §12 37 3150; S.C. Constitution Article X, § 6).  
 Extensive research has shown that tax limitations reduce local government 
reliance on the property tax nationwide. The estimated loss of revenue from property tax 
limitations lies in the tens of billions of dollars in the United States (O’Sullivan, 2000) 
and reduces local government fiscal autonomy (Mullins, 2004). The likelihood of the 
political and legal limitations on the property tax is not likely to be rescinded in the near 
future (Brunori, 2007). The combined impact of these base restrictions is rarely debated 
or even calculated (Ingram and Wolman, 2009).  
Exemption proliferation 
 While assessment limits have played some role in slowing the growth of the 
property tax base, an important source of property tax base erosion has been the 
proliferation of tax exemptions. Four distinct property tax exemptions have expanded 
over the last few decades across the United States. These include exemptions for 
charitable nonprofits, and the use of exemptions as an incentive for economic 
development, both of which have grown substantially over the last five decades. 
Additionally, there are numerous exemptions for farm property and government owned 
property. Almost all states have some level of exemption for agricultural property. The 
motivation around providing breaks for farmland is to preserve family owned farms, 
although the exemption has been also used politically to slow urban sprawl. Additionally, 
a large amount of land in the United States is exempt from local property taxes because it 
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is either federally or state owned. The Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution exempts virtually all Federal government property.  
 This research is primarily concerned with base erosion resulting from the use of 
exemptions as economic development incentives and exemptions for nonprofit 
organizations. These exemptions have cost local governments billions of dollars annually 
(Brunori, 2007). Kenyon, Langley, and Paquin (2012) estimate that economic 
development incentives alone cost state and local governments five to ten billion dollars 
each year in forgone revenue.   
 Exemptions as economic development incentives 
 Exemptions for property taxes are a popular economic development policy 
(Youngman, 1998). To attract new firms or entice existing firms to expand, state and 
local governments offer exemption incentives that reduce or eliminate a firm’s 
obligations to pay property taxes on its land and land improvements (real property). 
These incentives can be attractive to firms because they lower costs, which may allow 
businesses to operate at a cost advantage. Property tax exemptions are the most common 
type of tax incentive offered by state and local governments (Brunori, 2007).  
 In 1969, there were 15 states that offered property tax exemptions as a form of 
economic development incentive. By 2005, there were 35 states offering exemptions 
(Brunori, 2007). In 2012, there were over 40 states offering some form of economic 
development related property tax exemptions (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2014 a). 
There are currently six incentive programs for economic development used by the state of 
South Carolina. Of these, three programs involve property tax exemptions.  
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 The exemptions in South Carolina are for entities that are expanding or choosing 
to locate their research and development operations within the state, manufacturing 
expansion and/or relocating exemptions, and exemptions for having corporate 
headquarters, main offices, and/or distribution centers within the state. The extensive use 
of property tax exemptions as economic development incentives creates a balancing act 
for state and local governments in South Carolina. Exemptions impact how much local 
government can rely on the property tax as a revenue generator and can create issues of 
equity between exempt and nonexempt property owners. More often the lure of attracting 
new industry can sometimes be viewed as more politically and economically important.  
 Only four states—Arizona, Iowa, Oregon, and Washington—have integrated 
evaluation of their major incentives like exemptions into the policy process. This 
evaluation ensures that the economic and fiscal impact of those investments is regularly 
reviewed. Of the nine states that have scheduled recurrent reviews, Arkansas, California, 
and Nebraska perform these reviews annually. Delaware’s reviews occur every two 
years, and Connecticut recently initiated a once every three years assessment. Arizona, 
Iowa, Oregon, and Washington have set a revolving evaluation schedule ranging from 
five to 10 years. 
 South Carolina does not disclose all tax incentives or measure the effectiveness 
and economic impact of the economic development incentives. Estimates using data from 
the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the nonprofit resource center Good Jobs First, 
and the National Association of State Budget Officers databases put the total cost of 
South Carolina economic development incentives around $896 million annually (Center 
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on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2014; Good Jobs First, 2014; National Association of 
State Budget Officers, 2014). The same sources reveal that the per capita cost of 
economic development incentives for South Carolina was $194 in 2012, which was 
higher than neighboring Georgia ($144) and North Carolina ($69). The Pew Center on 
the States (2012) considers South Carolina to be trailing behind other states in making 
informed decisions about the use of economic development incentives such as 
exemptions, and fails to properly evaluate the success level of using exemptions.  
 Research indicates that the use of property tax incentives does not matter 
significantly in business location decisions (Bartik 1985, 1991, 1994; Papke, 1991; Zheng 
and Warner, 2010). Several studies (Due, 1961; Oakland, 1978, Newman and Sullivan, 
1988; Eisinger, 1988; Bartik, 1991; Wasylenko, 1997) have found little evidence of a 
significant impact of property tax incentives on local economic development. Bartik 
(1994) argues that tax cuts and exemptions do not provide enough leverage to attract new 
businesses. Bartik also found that while it is highly unlikely for the impact of incentive 
related revenues to be permanently negative, firm economic activity is not very sensitive 
to property tax incentives (Peters and Fisher, 2004). 
 Exemptions for charitable nonprofits 
 Increased use of charitable exemptions have provided another challenge for the 
property tax over the last three decades. Whole property categories have been exempted 
from the property tax. Property held by organizations like churches, schools, universities, 
and nonprofit and charitable entities has been removed from the property tax base and 
created significant political controversy (Youngman, 2003). In 2000, the total value of 
 66 
exempt property held by exempt organizations was believed to exceed $990 billion 
(Netzer, 2002).  Cordes, Gantz and Pollak (2002) believe the lost property tax revenue 
from charitable exemptions is as high as $13 billion. More recent estimates are difficult 
to find, but the foregone revenue is widely assumed to have grown along with the total 
number of exemptions offered.   
 Nationally, 1.14 million charitable nonprofits are registered with the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS). The total number of nonprofits registered in South Carolina is 
8,835 (National Center for Charitable Statistics, 2014). Some of these organizations are 
providing valuable public services, often on limited finances, and perhaps deserve to be 
subsidized by the rest of the community. Others benefit mainly their members or a 
limited and not particularly “needy” clientele. Some nonprofits are large users of 
municipal services, while others use very few services. Some own valuable property, 
while others rent their facilities, and do not benefit from the tax exemption. No apparent 
relationship exists between the value of the exemption and the value of the services 
provided. 
 Activities of these organizations are exempt from property taxes (or income taxes) 
only to the extent that they are in accordance to the organization’s nonprofit mission. 
Profits generated by activities deemed outside of this mission can be taxed. Regardless of 
the purpose of the tax exemption, the community subsidizes all property owning 
qualifying nonprofits through higher property taxes on nonexempt property without 
requiring or expecting an equitable distribution of services back to the community.  
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 Hospitals and higher education institutions receive by far the largest absolute tax 
savings from property tax exemptions. These organizations control 51 percent of total 
nonprofit revenues and 42 percent of nonprofit assets, but account for only one percent of 
the number of charitable nonprofits registered with the IRS (Kenyon and Langley, 2010). 
In contrast, religious and human service organizations account for 43 percent of 
registered charitable nonprofits, but only a small fraction of total assets or revenues is 
reported to the IRS (Kenyon and Langley, 2010).  
 The property tax exemption for nonprofits can be seen as poorly targeted because 
it generally benefits those nonprofit organizations with the most valuable property 
holdings rather than the organizations that provide the greatest public benefit (Kenyon 
and Langley, 2010). While only one third of nonprofit organizations own real property, 
this fraction is much higher for larger organizations with higher revenues, and for 
nonprofits that need large amounts of property in order to carry out their core missions, 
such as retirement homes, hospitals, and higher education institutions (Cordes, Gantz, 
and Pollak, 2002). These properties tend to be located in larger municipalities with more 
valuable land holdings, which increases the impact on local property tax revenue (Brody, 
2002).  
 Larger nonprofits sometimes offer services that compete with for-profit 
organizations that are not property tax exempt, which raises additional issues of 
competitive fairness. Private for-profit firms are at a disadvantage in offering the same 
kind of services as a tax exempt nonprofit, creating an incentive for consumers to choose 
a nonprofit over a for-profit form of organization and ultimately further eroding the 
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municipal property tax base. In response to these concerns, many states have moved 
toward definitions of organizations eligible for exemption that are more narrow than 
those used at the federal level. This narrowing of the kind of organizations eligible for tax 
exemption is an attempt to reclaim tax revenues (Brody, 2007). In South Carolina, local 
municipalities are allowed to determine which organizations are eligible for property tax 
exemptions (Kenyon and Langley, 2010).  
Property tax relief 
 Another form of base erosion stems from certain kinds of property tax relief that 
removes property from the tax base or limits the assessed value. Research has shown that 
the poorest 20 percent of homeowners bear a relative property tax burden that is four 
times greater than the wealthiest one percent of homeowners (Coleman, Hughes, and 
Kehler, 2001). Reschovsky (1994) found that the property tax is regressive on younger 
households and the elderly—although the extent of the regressivity is widely debated 
(Brunori, 2007). Additional research by Youngman (1999) found that regardless of actual 
inequity between types of taxpayers, the perception of the property tax is that it unfairly 
burdens low and moderate income homeowners and the elderly. As a result of these 
perceptions, state and local governments have instituted programs to relieve 
homeowners’ property tax burdens through homestead exemptions, credits, deferrals and 
circuit breakers.  
 Property tax relief is either direct or indirect (Bell, 2012). Direct property tax 
relief targets a reduction in the amount of property taxes paid. Indirect property tax relief 
aims at creating revenue alternatives to the property tax. Forty-five states including South 
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Carolina have levy and assessment limits that seek to provide relief for certain groups of 
property owners.   
 South Carolina has a 15 percent assessment cap on the amount a property’s 
taxable value can increase during reassessment. Reassessment in the state occurs in five-
year intervals and when property transfers ownership. Previous research of assessment 
caps in South Carolina has established a significant fiscal impact of the tax policy on the 
county level (Saltzman, 2004).  
 The classified property tax system in South Carolina utilizes differential 
assessment of various property categories including manufacturing property, utility 
property, transportation and pipeline property, primary (owner-occupied) property, 
agricultural property, personal property, and other real estate, such as second homes and 
commercial rental property. Residential properties in South Carolina fall into two 
categories: owner-occupied, which is assessed at four percent, and second homes or 
commercial rental property, which is assessed at six percent. Research on differential 
assessment programs for residential property is somewhat sparse. Much of the early work 
on differential assessment is largely focused on open land development and agriculture 
(Coughlin, Berry and Plaut, 1978; Anderson, 1993; Stockford, 1989). Some earlier 
research expanded into differential assessment in urban settings (Orr, 1968; Heinberg and 
Oates, 1970; King, 1977; Mieszkowski and Zodrow, 1989). More recent research 
(Kitchen, 2013; McMillen, 2013) has examined the fiscal impacts of differential 
assessment during the recent recession, but little work has been done in rural states like 
South Carolina.  
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Sources of property tax base erosion 
Tax rate responsiveness  
 Taxes can discourage activities that increase the tax base and encourage activities 
that decrease the base. Research (Zodrow, 1986b; Mieszkowski and Zodrow, 1989) has 
established that taxes create inefficiencies by distorting resource allocation decisions 
resulting in capital being moved from high tax jurisdictions to low tax jurisdictions. The 
property tax burden tends to be borne by local residents, which leads to a view of the 
property tax being a benefit tax because it finances local projects that benefit local 
taxpayers. However, government officials seeking to attract capital investment in their 
jurisdictions with lower tax rates may underprovide public services, which affects 
housing consumption (Zodrow, 1986a). Housing consumption changes when residents 
are mobile and can choose the communities that provide them with the right combination 
of tax cost and public service provision (Tiebout, 1976).   
 Two important efficiency issues in property taxation include the creation of 
incentives to hold wealth in nontaxable forms and the impact on location decisions made 
by households and businesses. In general, taxation creates possible distortions of 
economic behavior. These efficiency issues are significant for the property tax because 
the effective tax rate is higher than it may appear. Property tax rates generally range one 
to two percent of the value of the property (Ulbrich, 2011). Property tax rates appear 
much lower than they actually are when compared to state income and sales tax rates. A 
large component of the property tax base is housing. A side effect of Act 388 was an 
increased incentive to convert six percent residential property to four percent residential 
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property because the elimination of school operating millage on owner occupied property 
greatly widened the tax differential.   
 Many state and local governments reduced their tax rates and narrowed their tax 
bases during the more prosperous 1990s. Most did so without understanding the 
comparative dynamics involved in taxation (Bruce, Fox and Tuttle, 2006). State and local 
governments have subsequently faced fiscal challenges during and after the Great 
Recession. As a result, governments have been tempted to adjust their revenue structures 
in order to stave off revenue instability. However, while government officials find it 
politically easier to lower tax rates, offer incentives and exemptions during good 
economic times, it is difficult to press for higher rates and reduced exemptions or 
incentives during economic downturns.  
 One of the most interesting dynamics of taxation is tax rate responsiveness, or 
specifically, incidence and elasticity. Economic incidence, or who actually bears the tax 
burden, is different from statutory incidence, which is who physically receives and pays 
the tax bill (Zodrow, 2006). A landlord may receive and pay a property tax bill, but in 
turn may respond to any tax increases by increasing rent, which shifts the economic 
burden of a tax increase onto the renter. In short, taxpayers will change their behavior to 
avoid paying taxes and the economic incidence of taxes is dependent on the 
responsiveness to changes in tax policy.  
 There are also capitalization effects to consider. If consumers anticipate a 
property to experience a higher rate of taxation, the value of that property will be 
discounted by the present value of the projected increase in future taxes (Zodrow, 2006). 
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The price or value of an asset is affected by changes in the taxes associated with that 
asset. 
 The responsiveness to property tax differentials for various kinds of property 
based decisions can be measured with elasticity. Certain types of properties, like 
residential property, receive preferential treatment by many states and local governments. 
This treatment shifts the tax burden onto other property types, like those used for 
business and rental properties. As property costs to hold higher rate property types rises, 
property owners begin to respond by shifting to property types with lower costs. The 
degree to which this migration occurs is a property’s elasticity.  
 The price and cost of land influences both buyers and sellers. The tax burden falls 
on the agent who responds the least, or has the most inelastic response to price and cost 
change. For example, if property holders are unwilling to sell their land assets, they will 
assume the property tax incidence. For state and local governments, taxing property with 
an elastic demand has lower revenue raising capacity because property owners will shift 
to other property types. Elected officials typically desire revenue sources that keep up 
with inflation for both revenue adequacy and political reasons. Governments desire a 
relatively elastic tax, which grows with the base. Real property provides a stable tax base 
that is relatively immobile. However, under a classification system, a property owner 
need not sell their asset, but merely change its use to seek lower tax costs. Thus, the 
property tax can affect both the mix and use of real property.   
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Mix of economic activities 
 Changes in the mix of economic activities affect the composition of wealth, 
income and consumption. The sales tax rates may dissuade consumers from consuming 
certain goods and services. Under a system with high income taxes, earners are 
incentivized to invest in nontaxed fringe benefits that might not otherwise be chosen. 
Individuals may also shift wealth holdings away from real estate to other less tangible 
forms of property that are not subject to taxation. Tax policy can substantially influence 
employment, output, investment and consumption (House and Shapiro, 2006).  
 The way labor is taxed affects workforce participation and changes to capital 
taxes affect saving and investment (Hemming, Kell and Mahfouz, 2002). Taxes can also 
affect the location of mobile labor and capital as well. Higher corporate and property tax 
rates can decrease economic growth rates (Lee and Gordon, 2005). The consequences of 
tax policy in a border state like Tennessee are much different than other states, like 
Florida, due to the proximity of other markets for workers and consumers. While real 
property like land is not mobile, the purchasers are mobile. This causes areas with no 
distinguishing attractions to be more susceptible to the consequences of higher tax rates. 
Coastal areas and metropolises can generally have higher property tax rates due to their 
amenities.  
 South Carolina and the nation have moved from manufacturing to a more service 
based economy. Accordingly, operations are less land and building intensive. This 
economic evolution leads to changes in the available property tax base. Given a higher 
property tax rate, households and business firms will alter their market behavior. 
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Household acquisition of assets may shift towards smaller homes and lots. There may 
also be a shift in consumption to more untaxed assets like home furnishings and less 
investment in land improvements that may increase property tax burdens. There is often 
state and federal deductions for mortgage interest and property taxes that somewhat offset 
these effects and make owning a home more attractive. Property taxes also make 
businesses consider what asset mix to use. Firms can alter plant size, property held, and 
the amount of land improvements made. Firms can also choose between different types of 
production processes, by substituting labor and capital depending on costs advantages.  
 An important policy aspect is the effect of property taxes on the location decisions 
of both households and firms. Tax differentials between different areas can attract or 
dissuade households and businesses to locate in a certain area. Each area has different 
attributes. Communities with attractions like beach proximity or those with proximities to 
conveniences like airports and interstate highways can levy higher property tax rates. 
However, in communities with comparable attributes, property tax differentials may 
encourage or discourage household and firm location. Thus, regardless of whether a 
property tax rate is perceived as high or low, it is likely to affect the behavior of 




 Three types of legislative actions in South Carolina have led to property tax base 
erosion. Two policies, the use of property tax incentives for business location in 
economic development and property tax exemptions for nonprofit organizations, are 
studied in this research. The third type of legislative action centers on assessment issues 
in the state. These legislative actions include the use of differential assessment in the 
state, the implementation of a 15 percent assessment cap, and the adjustment assessment 
rates on motor vehicle personal property. However, because of difficulties generating 
sufficient data to study, assessment issues in South Carolina were not pursued in this 
research.   
 Economic development incentives for business location 
 The use of property tax incentives has become common in economic 
development. From 2000 to 2009, new job growth in the United States was slowed. State 
and local governments reacted by offering property tax incentives to stimulate economic 
growth and job development (Bell, 2012). Wassmer (2009) found that in 1963 fourteen 
states had “stand alone property tax abatement programs” that incentivized development. 
By 2007, that total had grown to thirty-five states with 7 additional states with similar 
programs, which totaled forty-two states with some form of incentive related property tax 
abatement.  
 Research indicates that these incentives increasingly do not matter significantly in 
business location decisions (Bartik 1985, 1991, 1994; Papke, 1991; Zheng and Warner, 
2010). The use of incentives can result in inefficiency if local governments do not capture 
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the full benefit of offering property tax incentives. State economic development officials 
often drive incentive programs offered for economic development projects, but local 
governments bear the brunt of the costs, as they have to supply services that may exceed 
any additional property tax revenues from the project as a result of the incentives. The 
benefits of new businesses locating in an area are widely dispersed, but the cost of tax 
incentives is concentrated in a few local areas. 
 Property tax exemptions for nonprofit organizations  
 The purpose of property tax exemptions for nonprofit organizations is to 
encourage charitable entities to provide services that might not otherwise be provided or 
that the government would be forced to provide. However, this policy rewards nonprofit 
organizations that hold more valuable property as they receive the larger exemption. This 
encourages nonprofits to locate in areas with higher property values (Kenyon, Langley, 
and Paquin, 2012).  
 In South Carolina, property held by government, schools, colleges, and 
institutions of learning, nonprofit charitable institutions, such as hospitals those that care 
for the handicapped, the elderly, children, or the indigent, property of public libraries, 
churches, parsonages, burying grounds, property of charitable trusts and foundations are 
eligible for property tax exemptions. This research is primarily concerned with nonprofit 
organization defined as formal nonprofit and charitable organizations. The term 
“nonprofit sector” is generally intended to refer to organizations with federal tax exempt 
status and “charitable sector” refers to the subset of these organizations that have 
501(c)(3) public charity status. 
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 Research by Bowman, Cordes and Metcalf (2009) estimates that the value of real 
estate owned by nonprofit organizations has increased from $1.2 trillion in 2000 to 
almost $1.8 trillion in 2005, which was a 45 percent increase. By mid 2009, the value of 
all assets held by exempt organizations was over $2.6 trillion. The estimated revenue loss 
for governments from exemptions was estimated between $17 billion and $32 billion 
annually (Sherlock and Gravelle, 2009). 
 Property tax exemptions are widely provided to nonprofit organizations in South 
Carolina as long as the property is used exclusively for the organization’s purpose and no 
profit is realized. South Carolina is one of seventeen states that grant municipalities the 
power to decide which organizations can obtain property tax exemptions. Nationally, 
1.14 million charitable nonprofits are registered with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
The total number of nonprofits registered in South Carolina is 8,835 (National Center for 
Charitable Statistics, 2014).  
 Property tax exemptions for nonprofits primarily impact municipalities and create 
issues of revenue adequacy, efficiency, and equity. Property tax revenues finance 
municipal services and infrastructure like public safety, street maintenance, and 
sanitation. As more property becomes property tax exempt, municipalities are challenged 
to maintain adequate revenue to provide services. When more property qualifies for tax 
exempt status, local governments may account for this loss either by increasing property 
tax rates for nonexempt landowners or by reducing service levels. Either adjustment 
raises questions of efficiency, revenue adequacy, and equity between citizens.    
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CHAPTER FOUR  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 The two policies studied in this research required different methodologies. This 
chapter details the qualitative and quantitative methods that were utilized.  
Property tax incentives for business location 
 The study of property tax incentives for business location addresses the following 
three research questions:  
 Do the firms studied value factors like infrastructure and a qualified labor force 
over tax incentives?  
 Do the local governments studied conduct adequate impact analysis when offering 
property tax incentives for business location?  
 Are the majority of tax incentives going to new firms or expanding firms already 
located in the jurisdiction?  
 Survey and interview methods were utilized to address the three research 
questions. The questions for the survey and interview of local government officials are 
drawn from previous research completed by the University of North Carolina’s Center for 
Competitive Economics (Morgan, 2009). That survey examined a broader topic: the role 
of local government in economic development. A subset of the original survey was 
dedicated to the use of property tax incentives for business location. Survey questions 
from that subset were utilized in this study. Utilizing the existing questions allows this 
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work to build upon previous research (Morgan, 2009) without reconstructing an entirely 




 The survey was conducted via an internet survey host, Survey Monkey. The use 
of an online survey method reduced the influence of a live surveyor, eliminated coding 
errors, and summarized data much more quickly (Nardi, 2014). The choice was made to 
use an online method in this research because it allowed the research participant to speak 
in their own words, was convenient, and was a common form of communication utilized 
by most local government officials. The internet survey host was chosen because it was 
widely known and commonly used in survey research. Additionally, Survey Monkey 
enables researchers to download results in multiple formats, which facilitated easier 
sorting of responses. The survey questions were divided into three categories to reflect 
the research questions that were addressed and results were reported based on frequency. 
 Recruitment of participants was completed with the assistance of the South 
Carolina Association of Counties and the Municipal Association of South Carolina. The 
survey was sent via email to the county administrator and economic development director 
for all 46 counties and to the municipal managers of all 270 municipalities in South 
Carolina.  
 The survey used in this research consisted of seven multi-part questions (22 
overall questions) that participants completed in an average of 10 to 15 minutes. The 
survey invitation was initially distributed in mid June 2014 and the survey closed in early 
                                                        
1
 The complete survey is presented in Appendix Three.  
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July 2014. Potential respondents received a weekly reminder email during the survey 
period. Responses of participants were completely anonymous unless the respondent 
voluntarily self-identified.  
Interviews 
 Previous research (Morgan, 2009) on property tax incentives was largely limited 
to surveys of local government officials, but was expanded in this research to also include 
participants from two firms involved in large development projects in South Carolina: 
Boeing and BMW. BMW announced intentions to locate near Greer, South Carolina in 
1992, which provides a mature example to study. Boeing announced a new 
manufacturing facility near Charleston, South Carolina in 2004, which provides an 
immature example to study.  
 Interviews are an essential source of evidence when studying human affairs and 
action. Interviews can corroborate findings in the existing literature and also provide 
important insights about research issues (Yin, 2014). This research utilized interviews 
from two categories of participants: company representatives and local government 




 Participants in the first category of interviews were company representatives from 
Boeing and BMW. Interview requests were made through the office of the onsite general 
manager for each firm studied. Interviews with company representatives were held via 
                                                        
2
 The company representatives interview protocol is presented in Appendix Five.   
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telephone and averaged between 20 to 30 minutes in length and were conducted in June 
and July of 2014. 
 Interviews of company representatives are used to address the research question 
of whether firms value factors like infrastructure and a qualified labor force over tax 
incentives. Interview participants were provided upon request for the BMW site near the 
city of Greer and Boeing site near Charleston. Participants from both firms had working 
knowledge of the initial and existing property tax incentives offered to their respective 
firms.  
 Local government officials
3
 
 Participants in the second category of interviews included local government 
officials from jurisdictions that were impacted by the Boeing or BMW development 
projects. The City of Greer as well as county officials from Greenville and Spartanburg 
counties were targeted for interviews related to the BMW project. Charleston County as 
well as municipal officials from the cities of Charleston and North Charleston were 
targeted for interviews related to the Boeing project. Local government interview 
participants include county administrators, municipal managers, and county economic 
development directors. The interview questions and protocol utilized were developed in 
previous research on economic development incentives (Morgan, 2009).  Interviews with 
local government officials were held via telephone and averaged between 20 to 30 
minutes in length and were conducted in June and July of 2014. 
                                                        
3
 The local government official interview protocol is presented in Appendix Four. 
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 Interviews of local government officials were used to explore two research 
questions. The first research question focuses on whether local governments conduct 
adequate impact analysis before and after offering property tax incentives for business 
location. The second research question centers on whether local governments offer 
property tax incentives predominantly to new or existing firms. BMW or Boeing directly 
impacts the jurisdiction of each participant. Local government officials from three 
counties (Charleston, Greenville, and Spartanburg) and two municipalities were 
interviewed (Greer and Charleston). The State Department of Commerce and the City of 
North Charleston declined to participate in the interview process.  
Property tax exemptions for nonprofit organizations 
 The study of property tax exemptions for nonprofit organizations addresses the 
following research question:  
 What is the fiscal cost of property tax exempt land in the municipalities studied?  
The research question for property tax exemptions sought to quantify the fiscal impact of 
property tax exempt land in the 30 most populated municipalities in South Carolina.  




Table 4.1 The 30 Most Populated Municipalities in South Carolina 
Municipality Population Municipality Population 
Columbia 133,358 Anderson 26,985 
Charleston 127,999 Mauldin 24,525 
North Charleston 104,054 Greenwood 23,379 
Mount Pleasant 74,885 North Augusta 22,229 
Rock Hill 69,103 Easley 20,300 
Greenville 61,397 Simpsonville 19,615 
Summerville 46,074 Hanahan 19,597 
Sumter 41,190 Lexington 19,576 
Goose Creek 39,823 Conway 19,300 
Hilton Head Island 39,412 West Columbia 15,824 
Florence 37,792 North Myrtle Beach 14,827 
Spartanburg 37,647 Clemson 14,276 
Aiken 30,296 Orangeburg 13,891 
Myrtle Beach 29,175 Bluffton 13,606 
Greer 27,167 Cayce 12,860 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2013) 
 
 Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) is used to quantify the potential per capita 
property tax exempt revenue cost of property tax exempt land in the municipalities 
studied. Per capita figures were used for scale due to the different populations of the 
municipalities studied. Per capita property tax revenue was the independent variable in 
this analysis and the following four variables were independent variables: municipal 
millage rates, per capita total assessed value, median per capita income, and the percent 
of property tax exempt land in each municipality. The next section provides an 




 Property tax revenue totals by municipality were obtained from the South 
Carolina Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Office and divided by the estimated municipal 
population from the Census Bureau. Millage rates were available in Local Government 
Finance reports that each municipality studied posted to their municipal website. Total 
assessed value was calculated by dividing total property tax revenue by millage rate and 
converted to per capita using estimated municipal population. Median income was 
obtained through the Census Bureau. All figures are for the fiscal year ending 2013. 
 The percent of property tax exempt land was gathered from local government 
officials. The initial contacts for this information were primarily municipal geographic 
information system (GIS) offices. However, not all municipalities have GIS offices in 
South Carolina. Therefore, secondary sources were county GIS offices that can retrieve 
data from county maps within municipal boundaries. When a municipality has land in 
two or more counties and there were no municipal GIS office, the respective county GIS 
offices provide acreage figures in each county. Tax map boundaries for multiple county 
municipalities were confirmed with county tax assessors. Table 4.2 provides an overview 












Table 4.2 Data Sources for Percent of Property Tax Exempt Land 
Municipality GIS Source Municipality GIS Source 
Aiken Aiken County Hilton Head Island Beaufort County 
Anderson City of Anderson Lexington Lexington County 
Bluffton Beaufort County Mauldin Greenville County 
Cayce 
Lexington and 
Richland County Mount Pleasant Charleston County 
Charleston City of Charleston Myrtle Beach Did Not Report 
Clemson City of Clemson  North Myrtle Beach Did Not Report 
Columbia City of Columbia  North Augusta Aiken County 
Conway Did Not Report North Charleston 
Berkley, Charleston, 
and Dorchester County 
Easley Pickens County Orangeburg Did Not Report 
Florence Florence County Rock Hill City of Rock Hill 
Goose Creek Berkley County Simpsonville Greenville County 









County Sumter City of Sumter 
Hanahan Berkley County West Columbia Lexington County 
 
 Each GIS office was contacted during an eight month period from August 2013 to 
April 2014. Data requests included the total property tax exempt acreage and total overall 
acreage in each municipality. The exempt municipal acreage was then divided by the 
total municipal acreage to determine the percent of property tax exempt land in each 
municipality. Any municipal acreage associated with large military bases like Shaw Air 
Force Base in Sumter and Fort Jackson in Columbia was not included in this calculation 
because that land is federally subsidized and receives little to no direct municipal 
services. While some GIS offices are able to drop different layers of exempt property like 
roads and highways from the exempt total, other offices with fewer resources are not as 
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capable. Therefore, total exempt municipal acreage over total municipal acreage was 
used to calculate the percent of property tax exempt land in this analysis.  
Sample size 
 The target sample in this regression analysis was the 30 most populated 
municipalities in South Carolina. However, the percent of property tax exempt municipal 
land was obtained for only 26 municipalities. Initial outlier analysis revealed that the total 
assessed value for Hilton Head Island had a Cook’s D score of 5.87. A variable with 
Cook’s D scores greater than one have a large collective influence on the model and 
should be considered an outlier. One explanation for this finding was Hilton Head Island 
is a large resort community with exceptionally high property values and a small 
population size. Therefore, the observation for Hilton Head Island was not used in the 
analysis, which brings the analyzed observation total to 25 municipalities.  
Regression analysis 
 The dependent variable in the regression analysis in this study was per capita 
property tax revenue ( ). The independent variable of interest in this analysis was 
the percent of tax exempt municipal land (TaxExemptLand). It was anticipated that per 
capita property tax revenue would be significantly negatively affected by the presence of 
tax exempt land. The coefficient for TaxExemptLand variable is the per capita dollar 
amount of fiscal impact of a percent of tax exempt municipal land. Other independent 
variables considered in the model are population (Population), per capita median income  




( ). The significance level in this analysis was set at five percent. The regression 
equation is written as follows: 
PTRPC = b0 +b1TaxExemptLand +b2IncomePC +b3Millage+b4TAVPC +b5Population+e   
  This analysis examined several assumptions. Pairwise correlation analysis was 
used to analyze whether the independent variables were significantly correlated at a five 
percent level. The regression was conducted while controlling for several independent 
variables (covariates). Therefore, consideration was given to the interaction of the 
independent variable of interest, percent of tax exempt land, with the other covariates in 
the model to test the homogeneity of regression slopes assumption. If the interactions are 
significant at a five percent level, then the significant interaction terms must be included 
in the model. However, if interactions were not significant at a five percent level, the 
assumption of no interactions was satisfied and the interactions were not included in the 
final model. Variance inflation factor (VIF) scores for the percent of tax exempt land, per 
capita income, millage, per capita total assessed value, and population are also examined 
for issues with multicollinearity in the model. VIF scores higher than 10 would indicate 






CHAPTER FIVE  
PROPERTY TAX INCENTIVES FOR BUSINESS LOCATION 
Economic impact versus fiscal impact 
 The first form of policy examined in this research is the use of property tax 
incentives for business location. Tax incentives in economic development have been a 
leading tool employed by state and local governments. States offer tax credits, 
exemptions, and deductions to encourage business location, create jobs, and attract 
investment in the local economy.  
 This research has three research questions, including whether firms value tax 
incentives over other factors like infrastructure and a qualified labor force, whether local 
governments conduct adequate impact analysis when using property tax incentives, and if 
the incentives are primarily used to recruit new firms or retain existing firms. Each 
question was addressed through a statewide survey approach with embedded interview 
process.  Interviews of company representatives from two large economic development 
projects in South Carolina are utilized to uncover what factors matter when making 
location decisions. Interviews of local government officials affected by two large 
economic development projects address the level of evaluation conducted when using tax 
incentives and whether incentives are offered to new or existing firms. When examining 
policy, it is important to clarify whether the research involves economic impact analysis 
or fiscal impact analysis.  
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Economic impact analysis 
 The purpose of an economic impact analysis is to estimate the changes in 
employment, income, and levels of business activity (typically measured by gross 
receipts or value added) that may result from a policy. The general approach involves 
projecting the levels of economic activity that would be expected to prevail in the study 
area with and without a policy. The difference between the two analyses measures the 
impact of the project. 
 The economic effects of a policy can be divided into direct effects (initial 
expenditures, persons directly employed, etc.) and secondary effects. To estimate the 
secondary effects of a policy, most analysts employ input output models, which quantify 
the linkages among sectors of the area economy. Others use employment or income 
multipliers derived by a variety of statistical methods. This research is focused on fiscal 
impact analysis.  
Fiscal impact analysis 
 The purpose of fiscal impact analysis to project the costs and revenues of 
governmental units that is likely to occur as a result of a policy. The governmental units 
of primary interest are local jurisdictions that may experience substantial changes in 
population and/or service demands as a result of the policy. The fiscal implications of a 
policy are determined by a number of factors, including policy characteristics (e.g., the 
magnitude of investment) and area characteristics (e.g., state and local tax structure, the 
capacity of existing service delivery systems) and by the nature of the economic and 
demographic effects resulting from the policy.  
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 Specific techniques employed to estimate the fiscal impacts of a policy differ 
somewhat in the details of the estimation procedure, and assessments differ substantially 
in the scope of costs and revenues addressed. In general, the revenues of local 
governments can be broadly classified as own source revenues (i.e., taxes and charges 
assessed and collected directly by local jurisdictions) and intergovernmental transfers 
(i.e., funds received from state and federal levels). Own source revenues can be further 
classified according to their primary determinants into those based on property valuation, 
those based on income or sales, those based on the level of production of some industry, 
and those based largely on changes in population. The techniques that are most 
appropriate for estimating revenues from these sources will differ depending on the 
revenue source (International Association for Impact Assessment, 2009). 
 Economic impact generally dominates the discussion during the economic 
development process. The number of jobs created, higher pay rates, and increased 
consumption levels are usually the benefits featured by development officials. However, 
little attention is given to the fiscal costs associated with creating economic development 
opportunities. Therefore, the focus of this research is on fiscal impact.   
 The costs and revenue impact on local governments as a result of property tax 
incentives for business location are examined. A statewide survey of local government 
and economic development officials was conducted. Additionally, interviews of officials 
involved in two of the state’s largest economic development projects involving the use of 
incentives are performed.  
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Literature review 
Core component of modern economic development strategy 
 From 2000 to 2009, the United States experienced relatively slow job growth. 
State and local governments reacted by offering property tax incentives to stimulate 
economic growth and job development (Bell, 2012). Wassmer (2009) found that in 1963 
fourteen states had “stand alone property tax abatement programs” that incentivized 
development. By 2007, that total had grown to thirty-five states with 7 additional states 
with similar programs, totaling forty-two states with some form of incentive related 
property tax abatement. All states now have some form of a tax incentive program 
(Brockmyer, et al, 2012). Many states have specific tax incentive programs aimed at 
attracting certain industries and manufacturers. Research indicates that billions of dollars 
are spent on tax incentives for business location annually (Mattera, et al, 2011). However, 
getting an exact figure was difficult because many governments do not fully disclose the 
value of incentives offered.  
 Many of the jobs lost due to the Great Recession have not yet been recovered, 
which has led to increased pressure on states to push for regional economic growth in 
jobs and investment. The use of tax incentives has been a leading tool in that effort 
(National Conference of State Legislatures, 2011). Incentives are frequently used as part 
of a bidding war between states seeking to attract relocating and expanding firms. If one 
state offers an incentive, a competing state often feels compelled to offer incentives or 
risk being left behind. By offering tax incentives, governments have less revenue to use 
for public services including education, infrastructure maintenance, healthcare, and 
 92 
emergency services. Conversely, if a government does not offer incentives or fails to use 
them effectively, they may miss opportunities to create jobs by attracting new businesses.  
 There are two key questions surrounding the use of property tax incentives for 
business location. The first is whether the incentives are cost effective. The second 
question centers on how much offering incentives matters to businesses looking to 
relocate and expand.  
Types of incentives offered 
 Business incentives are generally considered to be in two categories. The first 
category is tax instruments, which include property tax abatements, tax increment 
financing, sales tax exemptions and credits, and corporate income tax exemptions and 
credits for investments and job creation (Peters and Fisher, 2004). The second category of 
business incentives used to attract new businesses is nontax incentives. These incentives 
include business grants, loans and loan guarantees. Property tax incentives cost state and 
local governments five to ten billion dollars annually (Kenyon, Langley and Paquin, 
2012).  
 Economic development incentives are important in the United States economy, 
which is relatively mobile. Economists have estimated that up to 14 percent of a 
metropolitan population moves between areas within a four year period (Peters and 
Fisher, 2004). Despite the relative “stickiness” of large scale migration, the threat of exit 
by both residents and businesses provides incentive for local governments to provide 
incentives for retention and attraction. These incentives include the property tax 
exemption.  
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When studying the effects of property tax incentives, a mingling of fiscal costs 
and economic gain often exists. A reduction in unemployment due to new jobs coming to 
an area is an economic gain. A change in population related to a development project is 
also an economic characteristic. Property tax incentives are fiscal costs that result in 
economic change. The fiscal revenue given up and economic gain can lead to recovered 
revenues, but the relationship is not straightforward or easily quantifiably compared. 
However, state and local officials must weigh the fiscal costs versus the potential 
economic gains.   
Tax incentives have become an assumed basic part of the economic development 
package. Incentives are a highly visible piece of the economic development package for 
state and local politicians and viewed as a “tie breaker” for attracting and retaining 
companies. If incentives are strong enough, businesses and their workers simply move 
from one area without incentives to an area with incentives. An increased level of 
competition between local governments can result in a zero sum game as municipalities 
constantly reduce revenue streams to attract new firms.  
The evaluation of the effectiveness of tax incentives 
 The use of business incentives as a development strategy for state and local 
government has been a widely used policy for the last thirty years. Although incentive 
programs continue to expand, there is very limited evidence to support their 
effectiveness. State and local governments create incentives for business location to 
influence firm relocation and expansion, rescue failing businesses and to remain 
competitive with other governments offering similar programs (Burnier, 1992). 
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Governments perceive tax incentives as foregone revenue, but expect that the economic 
benefits will outweigh the fiscal cost in the long run (Buss, 2001). However, the impact 
of tax incentive programs is frequently not evaluated, especially ex post.  
 A number of studies suggest that the relationship between employment growth 
and tax incentives is ambiguous (Gabe and Kraybill, 2002; Luger and Bae, 2005; 
Billings, 2008). Researchers have used various methods to study tax incentive effects 
including case study style interviews, survey, econometric regression, and simulation. 
Some models have adopted regression analysis to evaluate the correlation between state 
economic growth and tax incentives (Zhao, 2013). However, most models have problems 
in separating out nontax confounding variables, such as effects of agglomeration 
economy, firm establishment levels, and self selection of enterprise zones (Gabe and 
Kraybill, 2002). Additionally, static models can produce incoherent outcomes, given the 
dynamic nature of an economy. 
 A large portion of the literature suggests that the relationship between tax 
incentives and regional economic growth is weak at the state level (Zhao, 2013). There 
are two possible explanations for this finding. Tax effects are likely to be smaller in 
larger economies and incentives may induce a more significant new growth in poor and 
needy communities (Zhao, 2013). However, a careful analysis of costs and benefits is 
necessary in order to better understand this relationship. Few cost and benefit analyses of 
tax incentive programs have been carried out to evaluate these explanations. 
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 State evaluation of incentive programs 
 State and local government evaluation of incentive programs varies widely. Ex 
ante approaches are sometimes used to attempt to understand the potential impact of a 
development project before incentives are offered. While ex poste analysis is more 
widely used, its’ use is not consistent across governments. In many cases, both forms of 
analysis are lacking (Brockmyer, et al, 2012).  
 All 50 states offer some form of tax incentives, but only 16 regularly evaluate the 
effects of tax incentive policies. Four states including Arizona, Iowa, Oregon, and 
Washington are evaluating incentives annually. Oregon has implemented a strategic 
investment evaluation component that includes tax incentive “sunsets” or expirations that 
require an evaluation of benefits versus costs of incentives. In that state, participants must 
justify the incentives received before they can be renewed. Washington conducts a broad 
evaluation of incentives offered instead of only evaluating a handful of benefits. During 
sporadic evaluations, other states have found that tax incentives do not necessarily create 
the projected number of jobs (Louisiana Economic Development, 2010) or that the costs 
associated with offering tax incentives for business location can be up to five times larger 
than most estimates (Minnesota Office of the Legislative Auditor, 2008).   
 The majority of the states are not regularly evaluating the effectiveness of tax 
incentive programs. The literature on tax incentives suggests the presence of a 
“knowledge gap” between the implementation of tax incentive policy and the evaluation 
of that policy’s cost effectiveness (Brockmyer et al, 2012). The Pew Research Center 
classifies South Carolina as “trailing behind” other states in evaluating the cost 
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effectiveness of tax incentives for business location (Brockmyer, et al, 2012).  By failing 
to evaluate the use of tax incentives, governments in South Carolina are making decisions 
to offer tax incentives for business location based on incomplete information.  
 Academic evaluation of incentive programs 
 Researchers have utilized various methods to evaluate the cost and benefit of tax 
incentives. Some scholars find that certain types of tax incentive programs have positive 
impact on local job growth (Luger and Bae, 2005; Billings, 2008; Woodward and 
Guimaraes, 2008; Bartik, 1991). But other studies find an ambiguous relationship 
between tax incentives and positive economic development (Fisher and Peters, 1997; 
Gabe and Kraybill, 2002). 
 Academic evaluation of tax incentive use is broad and somewhat scattered. A case 
study in North Carolina by Luger and Bae (2005) focused on tax credit for job creation, 
machines and equipment, central administrative offices, and research and development. 
Studies of the BMW plant in South Carolina (Woodward and Guimaraes, 2008) and 
enterprise zones in Colorado (Billings, 2008) found that targeted tax incentives attract 
private firms to a new location, stimulating the economy and creating jobs through the 
multiplier effect. Several other studies have found very little evidence of a significant 
impact of tax incentives on local development. Table 5.1 provides a summary of some of 
this research.  
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Table 5.1 Studies of Impact of Development Tax Incentives 
Study Study Methodology Impact of Incentives 
Due (1961) Statistical Minimal 
Oakland (1978) Econometric Minimal 
Newman and Sullivan 
(1988) 
Econometric Small but statistically insignificant 
Eisinger (1988) Econometric, survey, 
and case study 
Minimal 
Bartik (1991) Econometric Small but statistically insignificant 
Wasylenko (1997) Econometric Small but statistically insignificant 
Bartik (2005) Econometric Small but statistically insignificant 
Kenyon, Langley and 
Paquin (2012) 




 Bartik (1994) argues that tax breaks do not provide enough leverage to attract new 
businesses. While Bartik states that it is highly unlikely for incentive related revenues to 
be permanently negative, he also finds that firm economic activity is not very sensitive to 
tax incentives (Peters and Fisher, 2004). Bartik adds that a firm’s elasticity is 
approximately 0.3. Therefore, a 10 percent cut in taxes would produce only a 3 percent 
increase in firm investment. Firms looking to relocate would need to spend much more 
than what the tax incentives can offer in benefit. Therefore, firms that do locate in the 
local area may have done so even without the tax exemptions, which result in the local 
government giving away revenue unnecessarily. Another problem with tax incentives is 
that firms do not always remain in a community once incentives expire. A firm may close 
or move before they pay the full tax rate.  
New firms increasingly expect tax incentives in exchange for opening in a 
community, while existing firms may feel disadvantaged and investigate relocating to a 
neighboring community. These are unintended consequences of redistributing the 
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property tax burden unevenly across property owners by offering tax incentives and 
exemptions. 
If tax incentives have little impact, why has their use by local governments 
grown? One possible explanation could be the competitive environment between local 
government that will not allow one local government to cease offering incentives without 
risking a loss of businesses to another area. Competition among jurisdictions contributes 
to a destruction cycle between local governments (Zheng and Warner, 2010). Another 
explanation could be that the jobs and, thus wages, that businesses bring to a community, 
are viewed as the real prize for local governments. Instead, could local government 
attract and retain businesses without foregoing valuable revenue sources, like property 
taxes? Are tax incentives important to businesses looking to relocate?  An examination of 
what attracts businesses to a specific geographic location could provide an answer.  
Business location decisions 
Globalization and advancements in technology have increased the mobility of 
firms by lowering the costs of operating from multiple locations. Firms can now conduct 
live meetings from around the world and global markets are now available to small firms. 
Firms of all sizes now have extensive and inexpensive access to demographic and 
regional information, which has allowed firms to locate manufacturing in countries with 
low labor costs, house back office operations in cities with lower costs of living, and still 
place executive leadership in headquarters in large cities (Cohen, 2000). With the rise of 
the internet, it is no longer imperative for firms to be located near large cities to sell their 
product or services to a broad customer base. Attracting a firm’s entire operation is 
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becoming more difficult for local governments, so they must create an appealing 
environment for firms that are searching for a location for all or part of their business 
operations. While a high state and local marginal tax rate reduces firm start ups (Papke, 
1991), there are other factors that a community may offer firms instead of automatically 
including or focusing on tax incentives in their economic development package.   
 A survey of business leaders revealed that the top priority of firms is workforce 
suitability (Arthur Andersen Company, 1995). As the business environment has become 
more dynamic, the demand for an educated workforce has increased. A focus on 
education and training systems by local government is attractive to businesses. An 
abundant and qualified workforce is necessary in order for firms to be able to recruit 
workers from the nearby region. Firms will inevitably bring some existing employees 
with them, and those employees will expect good elementary and secondary school 
systems for their children (Cohen, 2000). By reducing the property tax base through tax 
incentives and exemptions, these same communities may hinder their ability to offer a 
quality education.  
 Another priority for firms is minimal bureaucracy. Businesses are looking for 
areas where they can minimize start up and operation costs related to government 
regulation such as zoning, permit procedures, labor policies, and environmental 
regulations. New businesses generally have an operations timeline of six to nine months 
once a location has been selected (Cohen, 2000).  
 Infrastructure is the basic physical and organizational structures and facilities 
(e.g., buildings, roads, utilities, schools, etc.) needed for the successful operation of an 
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enterprise. Papke (1991) found that local governments that lack infrastructure or have a 
large amount of regulatory compliance mandates are less desirable. The presence of a 
suitable infrastructure is more important to businesses than marginal tax incentives 
(Papke, 1991).  
Regardless of the approach a local government takes in attracting and retaining 
businesses, there are potential positives and negatives to offering development incentives 
in the form of property tax relief. Local government must not only consider the potential 
impact of the firm on the community but also the impact of tax redistribution on the 
community. Some firms may seek tax incentives just to gain a competitive edge. The 
possibility also exists that attracting a new firm to the area may crowd out existing firms 
in the market (Hansen and Rohlin, 2010). Larger firms may move into the area 
temporarily because of the advantage created by tax incentives and drive other local firms 
out of the market. More mobile firms may also leave the community in the future and 
weaken the local economy considerably.  
Public monies could be spent more efficiently than by offering tax incentives 
(Buss, 2001). Local government must consider not only the costs of the incentive 
programs but also the opportunity costs of not collecting funds or shifting the burden to 
other taxpayers. State and local governments can offer more cost effective policies, such 
as customized job training, labor market intermediaries, and the provision of business 
services (Kenyon, Langley, and Paquin, 2012). Those programs are ranked highly among 
business leaders as reasons for locating in a specific community (Arthur Andersen 
Company, 1995). Communities with a high number of potentially attractive attributes and 
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a low number of potentially unattractive attributes are viewed as more suitable to 
relocating and expanding businesses. A list of desirable community attributes is given in 
Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 Factors firms consider in choosing a location  
Potentially Attractive Attributes Potentially Unattractive Attributes 
Adequate skill level and suitability 
for the labor market 
High general taxation levels and tax 
policies of the state 
High quality educational systems Workers’ compensation costs 
Availability and reasonable cost of 
housing 
Presence of competitors 
Adequacy of transportation systems The presence of tax liens 
Access to suppliers and contractors Title complexities on property 
Proximity to attractions (quality of 
life) 
Cost and availability of water, sewer, 
and solid waste disposal 
Road/train/air/truck access Poor infrastructure (e.g., power, 
telecommunications) capacity 
Sufficient market for the company’s 
product 
Possible cost of environmental 
remediation 
Source: Cohen, 2000 
Table 5.3 provides additional location priorities and cost sensitivities based on the 
age and type of product that a targeted firm or industry produces. By conducting asset 
mapping and SWOT analysis, local governments can determine which product or service 
industries are most appropriate to target.   
  
 102 

















 Urban lifestyle 
 High face to face interaction 
 Availability of talent from 















 Low cost entry level labor 
 Low cost space 




Source: Cohen, 2000 
 
Table 5.4 provides business location priorities and cost sensitivities based on 
types of operations. Globalization and technological advances have allowed businesses to 
incorporate a more disjointed organizational structure and reduces the likelihood of 
attracting a firm’s entire operation. However, developers can target specific aspects of 
operations for which their area is more suitable. By conducting a community asset 
analysis, local government can determine which category the community best fits and 
recruit new business towards their existing strengths.  
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Table 5.4 Location Priorities by Business Function 




Sensitivity to Cost 
Cost sensitivity (within 
a normal range) is less 
important than 
availability of key 
requirements. 
 Accessible international air service  
 High end hotels, restaurants, entertainment, cultural 
events; major league sports team/stadium with 
skyboxes to facilitate heavy inter-company face to 
face interaction 
 Professional support services, good choice of office 
space or availability of land to build to suit 
 Diverse professional employee base 
 Attractive housing for executives, affordable 
housing for managers and support staff within 
reasonable commute 
 Strong educational system for employee’s children 




Sensitivity to Cost 
Cost sensitivity is less 
important than the 
availability of talent 
and other requirements  
 
 Proximity to concentration of universities 
 Clusters of highly educated workers, or 
alternatively, lifestyle amenities that are attractive to 
a pool of talent 
 Control over physical environment to buffer 




Sensitivity to Cost 




 State of the art telecommunications capacity 
 Affordable housing costs 
 Quality labor force with technical skills 
 Good schools for employee recruitment and their 
children 





Sensitivity to Cost 
Sensitivity to housing 
costs; taxes, utility 
rates 
 Good transportation system, near major interstates 
 Strong utility systems: electric, water, wastewater, 
gas 
 Well educated workforce 
Source: Cohen, 2000 
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Mainstream criticisms of the use of tax incentives 
 Four mainstream criticisms of incentive focused development strategy can be 
found in the literature (Burnett, 2011).  The first criticism is that incentives are a “zero 
sum” game because they create bidding wars among states. One state luring business 
away from another with the promise of tax benefits does not create any new economic 
activity, rather it just transfers existing activity into another geographic location.  
 The second criticism is that some studies find that a company’s decision to locate 
in a particular state has little to do with the incentives offered and more to do with the 
preexisting assets of a state, such as workforce education levels, transportation capacity 
and access, housing affordability and a geography that is appropriately located for the 
firm’s needs. A possible implication is that state policymakers should focus less on 
specialized incentives and more on improving attractive assets. 
 The third criticism is that incentives are used inappropriately to compensate for 
weak spots in the economic climate, tax or regulatory infrastructure of a state. Another 
strategy might be to engage in strategic planning to improve their overall business 
climates including a review and analysis of regulatory barriers, tax codes, business 
permitting systems, workers’ compensation systems and labor relations.  
 The final criticism of the use of tax incentives is that spending limited public 
dollars on incentives erodes the tax base, resulting in underfunding of critical services, 
such as transportation infrastructure or education. In addition, a loss of tax dollars to 
incentive programs could lead to the imposition of additional taxes on citizens or other 
businesses to make up the difference, which in turn leads to uncertainty, inequity or 
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instability in the tax system (Bruce, Carroll and Deskins, 2005).  
The use of tax incentives in South Carolina 
 South Carolina offers an array of tax credits and development subsidies. Two of 
the largest recipients of property tax incentives for business location in South Carolina 
have been BMW and Boeing. To further examine the use of property tax incentives, this 
research will provide a brief overview of those development projects.   
 Obtaining data and impact analysis for economic development incentives in South 
Carolina can be difficult. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests filed with the 
State Department of Commerce often include redacted figures as evidenced by the 





. Requests for additional details for the projects featured in 
this research, BMW and Boeing, did not receive a reply.  
 BMW and Boeing provide good studies for this research for multiple reasons. 
Each project has become a benchmark for future development in the state. BMW’s 
manufacturing facility was announced in 1992, which provides a mature example to 
study. Boeing’s plan to locate in South Carolina was announced in 2004, which provides 
a less mature case to study. Both projects involved a myriad of incentive and bond 
packages. Most importantly for our purposes, both projects involved multiple local 
governments (e.g., counties and municipalities).   
 South Carolina commonly uses fee in lieu of taxes (FILOT) to reduce the property 
                                                        
4 A copy of the Amazon economic impact analysis report is presented in Appendix One. 
5
 A copy of the Spirit Pharmaceuticals economic impact analysis report is presented in Appendix Two. 
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taxes for new and expanding businesses. The FILOT incentive became law in 1987. 
Qualifying businesses can pay taxes based on lower assessment rates ranging between 
four and six percent depending on the investment size (U.S Department of Commerce, 
2013). Due to Boeings large investment, it qualified for a four percent assessment rate 
with taxes fixed for 15 years.   
 Without a FILOT program, industrial property is assessed at 10.5 percent in South 
Carolina. Commercial and rental property is assessed at six percent. The 10.5 percent 
assessment on industrial property places South Carolina at a disadvantage compared to 
neighboring states like Georgia, where some counties offer full property tax exemptions 
for ten years. Compared to North Carolina business investors, South Carolina businesses 
may pay three to four times the property taxes due to high assessment rates on non-
incentivized property (Miley and Associates, 2010).  The presence of tax incentives in 
neighboring states necessitates the use of limits at home, which leads to a de facto war 
among the states for development (Burstein and Rolnick, 1995).  
 Research by the Minnesota Taxpayers Association found that South Carolina 
ranks among the highest states in property taxes on industrial property in the United 
States (Minnesota Center for Fiscal Excellence, 2014). The manufacturing sector in 
South Carolina pays 12.6 percent of all property taxes in South Carolina, but represents 
around five percent of the establishments in the state.  Taxes for public school districts 
represented about 60 percent of the total tax burden (South Carolina Budget and Control 
Board, 2013). Manufacturing firms pay almost five times what a typical owner occupied 
resident would pay in total property taxes on a property of the same market value (Miley 
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and Associates, 2010). This revenue makes homeowner’s property taxes lower, but 
decreases South Carolina’s competitiveness with neighboring states in order to draw new 
facilities and jobs.  
 Critics of incentives offered in South Carolina believe that revenue lost by 
offering incentives have resulted in underfunding in key areas like public education, 
social services, and infrastructure, despite attracting new jobs (Good Jobs First, 2014). 
South Carolina consistently ranks low on educational attainment (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2012) and highway fatalities (Hartgen, Fields, and San Jose, 2013). Many 
public services, including education and road maintenance, are financed from property 
tax revenues. 
BMW project overview 
 In 1992, German car manufacturer BMW received an incentive package valued at 
$150 million to open a new assembly plant near Greer, South Carolina. Construction of 
the plant began in April 1993 with the first production employees being hired in January 
1994.  In 2003, the manufacturer received additional incentives valued at $100 million 
for plant expansion (Good Jobs First, 2014).   
 The BMW facility is located in an unincorporated area of Spartanburg County 
near the border with Greenville County. The closest municipality is Greer. The 
population of Greer is estimated at over 26,000 (United States Census Bureau, 2013). 
Greer has experienced a housing boom since the BMW facility opened. BMW’s five year 
estimated impact on the local economy including much of Spartanburg and Greenville 
counties was $2 billion (Nash, 2011). The BMW facility produces over 30,000 vehicles 
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each month and has over 7,000 employees with thousands more working for associated 
suppliers. It has been estimated that BMW has invested over $6 billion in South Carolina 
in the last twenty years (Good Jobs First, 2014).  
 A University of South Carolina study found that less than a decade after opening 
its facility, the state’s BMW facility and its suppliers account for more than one percent 
of the states total workforce (Woodward and Guimaraes, 2008). About 50 plants in South 
Carolina provided parts to BMW. It has been estimated that those suppliers have added 
over 16,000 jobs. BMW was estimated to have received $325 million (2012 dollars) in 
public money and tax breaks, which has seemingly been a net positive for the state. 
However, while the per capita incomes for Greenville and Spartanburg counties are 
higher than the state average, they have not risen faster than the rate of inflation over the 
last 10 years, and the poverty level in both areas has increased (United States Census, 
2013).  
 BMW pays no property taxes on land, and its taxes on buildings and equipment 
are 43 percent lower than what other firms pay in neighboring areas (Woodward and 
Guimaraes, 2008). While its fiscal contributions are limited, local governments still need 
to pay for public services and infrastructure to maintain and attract businesses. Incentive 
programs may make it harder for states to finance important functions, such as 
transportation systems, public education, and utilities programs (Kaye, 2008).  
 BMW has lobbied the state government in South Carolina extensively. The 
creation of the General Obligation Economic Development Act (GOEDA) was largely 
attributed to the efforts of BMW. The bond act specifies that in order to receive 
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incentives, participants must involve a $400 million investment and create at least 400 
jobs, which are the precise numbers created with its latest expansion. That expansion 
qualifies BMW to receive as much as $80 million of the $250 million economic 
development pool created by the GOEDA legislation. BMW pays one dollar annually to 
lease a tract of land valued at $36 million from the state.  
 Any negative fiscal effects have been somewhat offset by BMW’s strategy of 
working with local suppliers, which has had a multiplier effect on the upstate of South 
Carolina that resulted in a positive economic impact. Not only have regional suppliers 
generated more jobs and revenue, but also employees have purchased more at local 
businesses. The spending leads to more jobs and income in other establishments. 
Woodward and Guimaraes (2008) found that BMW’s South Carolina plant supports 
23,050 jobs and 40 suppliers across 11 counties through the multiplier effect.  The value 
of property in the area, such as housing and land, has increased at a higher rate than the 
state average as well. In addition, Greenville, Spartanburg, and Laurens counties have 
received additional revenue of $2.4 million every year from the increase of property, 
income and sales taxes (Woodward and Guimaraes, 2009).  
Boeing project overview 
 In 2004, Vought Aircraft Industries along with Alenia Aeronautic received initial 
subsidies worth over $100 million to build a manufacturing complex near Charleston, 
South Carolina. The plant produces components for Boeing. By 2009, Boeing received 
additional incentives and subsidies from the state valued up to $900 million to locate their 
new large aircraft production line at the same location (personal communication, July 16, 
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2014). The new manufacturing facility began producing 7E7 Dreamliner aircraft in 2011.  
  Boeing received a package of state and local tax breaks, land, and training 
assistance valued at $116 million (personal communication, July 16, 2014). The state also 
agreed to issue $160 million in bonds to finance the construction of the Boeing facility 
that the company will pay back. Boeing spent at least $750 million on the new production 
line and created over 3800 jobs in addition to the existing 2,200 Boeing employees 
already in the area (Miley and Associates, 2010).  
 Boeing’s initial property tax incentives are effective for 15 years. The company 
will pay an estimated $2.5 million annually to Charleston public schools. If the incentives 
are allowed to expire in 15 years, the estimated tax amount is over $5 million (Miley and 
Associates, 2010). Under the incentive plan offered, Boeing would be paying property 
taxes based on an assessment rate of four percent for 30 years. Boeing will receive a 50 
percent credit against property taxes for the first 15 years, which reduces their assessment 
ratio to two percent. Beginning in the 16th year, Boeing will pay property taxes at the 
assessment ratio of four percent. The two percent assessment incentive is estimated to be 
worth approximately $53 million. 
 The Boeing facility will pay almost $3.5 million a year in local government 
property taxes. Once the 15 year tax incentive ends, the facility will pay an estimated $7 
million a year in local government property taxes. For years 16 through 30, Boeing will 
pay more than $105 million in local property taxes to Charleston County and Charleston 
County schools (personal communication, July 16, 2014). 
 State officials determined Boeing’s incentive package with some input from 
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county officials. Municipal officials had little to no influence on the package, although it 
did impact their ability to raise funds locally via the property tax (personal 
communication, July 15, 2014). The Boeing project did include clawback provisions as a 
part of the incentive package. Should Boeing not meet certain investment and 
employment levels, the company is required to reimburse the state.  
 Boeing officials indicated that the reasons the company chose South Carolina 
centered largely on the presence of Vought, the skill level of the existing workers, overall 
business climate, attractive power pricing from SCANA and Santee Cooper, access to the 
Port of Charleston, Charleston International Airport and major interstate highways 
(personal communication, July 16, 2014). The Coordinating Council of Economic 
Development (CCED) found that the Boeing incentives will result in a net positive 
benefit once all incentive costs, local and state government are taken into account. 
Requests for a detailed copy of the CCED impact analysis were denied (personal 
communication, July 17, 2014). Boeing is regularly compared to BMW. The key question 
regarding the Boeing project is will the aerospace giant build the same type of auxiliary 
enterprises experienced with BMW.  
Analysis 
 This chapter explores three research questions. The first question is whether firms 
value tax incentives over other factors like infrastructure and a qualified labor force. An 
incentive policy is created to attract new businesses and incentivize expansion of existing 
businesses. However, if firms do not value the policy’s incentives over other factors and 
would have chosen to locate and/or expand in South Carolina without them, then it can be 
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concluded that the policy is inefficient.   
 The second question is whether local governments conduct adequate impact 
analysis when property tax incentives for business location are offered. The literature 
ranks South Carolina as poor in tax incentive evaluation. The Great Recession has 
reduced some of the fiscal resources for local governments. Less consumption leads to 
lower local sales tax revenue, higher unemployment reduces both spending and state 
income taxes, and stagnant or declining property values can limit property tax revenues in 
the long run. Without adequate pre and post incentive cost benefit analysis of the tax 
incentive programs used to attract economic development, local governments could make 
decisions that result in revenue adequacy issues.  
 The third question explored in this chapter examines whether the majority of 
incentives are used to recruit new firms or incentivize expansion of existing firms. The 
tax base consists of different types of taxpayers. Among businesses, there are established 
firms and new firms recruited to the area. If one type of business receives more incentives 





 and embedded interviews
8
 
 A statewide survey of local government and economic development officials was 
used to better understand the use of property tax incentives in South Carolina. Embedded 
interviews of local government officials and company representatives involved in two 
major economic development projects in South Carolina, BMW and Boeing, were also 
                                                        
6
 A copy of the survey is presented in Appendix Three. 
7
  Survey results are presented in Appendix Seven. 
8
 Copies of the interview protocols are presented in Appendix Four and Appendix Five. 
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conducted. Each economic development project utilized tax incentives for business 
location and expansion. Each firm also receives preferential property tax treatment, 
which make good examples to study.  
 Local governments and BMW 
 Representatives from three local governments involved with the BMW 
manufacturing site were interviewed to illustrate the use and perceived effectiveness of 
incentives used in the project. Officials from the City of Greer, Greenville County and 
Spartanburg County were contacted. All participants indicated that county government 
had lead responsibility with some assistance from third parties such as the Appalachian 
Council of Governments and other development agencies. The size of the BMW project 
also necessitated the involvement of state officials including the governor at the time and 
the state Department of Commerce.  
 Those interviewed indicate that the cooperation level across governments 
involved with the project were mostly positive, although one municipal official replied 
that cooperation was neither positive nor negative. County officials state that the overall 
use of tax incentives is balanced between attracting new firms and retaining existing 
businesses. Both counties only require written performance agreements in some cases and 
only Greenville County regularly performs pre and post project cost benefit analysis. The 
Spartanburg County official contacted indicated that they depend on state agencies for 
impact analysis due to budgetary limitations.  
 A county official interviewed during this research indicated that while the merits 
of offering tax incentives to BMW initially were not questioned, it was uniformly felt that 
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incentives must be offered to compete with other states (personal communication, June 
24, 2014). “BMW has been a major win for the state of South Carolina” added a another 
county official who continued, “ Clearly, whatever was done has worked” (personal 
communication, June 25, 2014).   
 Little debate can be had on the economic success of BMW in South Carolina. 
However, there is much academic debate as to whether firms are actually attracted to an 
area by incentives. The majority of the literature on the use of incentives is inconclusive 
(Gabe and Kraybill, 2002; Luger and Bae, 2005; Billings, 2008). Most governments 
perceive the fiscal cost of tax incentives are outweighed by the economic benefits (Buss, 
2001), but incentive programs are not widely evaluated (Brockmyer, et al, 2012). 
 BMW perspective 
 BMW officials have cited the presences of a “good labor climate” and 
“availability of qualified workers, as well as numerous global firms already in the area”, 
as well as a solid local transportation infrastructure that includes interstate access, nearby 
airports, established rail systems, and port access as reasons for locating in the upstate of 
South Carolina (Good Jobs First, 2014). A commitment from state and local lawmakers 
in maintaining stable tax rates and an income tax credit of $1,500 per new job created 
was also a priority for BMW, but a company official maintained that “without the 
availability of an educated workforce, existing infrastructure, and conducive geography, 
the deal would not have materialized” (personal communication, June 26, 2014). While 
the incentives provided were attractive, they were “secondary factors” to more pressing 
needs like a capable labor pool and existing infrastructure (personal communication, June 
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26, 2014).  
 The company official also added, “BMW is cognizant of the surrounding 
community and strategically encourages a local supply chain for its manufacturing 
operations. This practice is something unique that BMW brings to the local area: 
exponential growth through supply vendors” (personal communication, June 26, 2014). If 
such attributes are found with only certain manufacturers, then not all manufacturers will 
bring suppliers with them to obtain such exponential economic growth. Thus, not all 
firms will produce the results obtained by the BMW project, a factor that might be 
relevant in putting together a firm specific package of tax incentives for business 
location.  
 Local governments and Boeing 
 The cities of Charleston and North Charleston were the municipalities contacted 
to explore the Boeing project in coastal South Carolina. While the City of Charleston 
participated in the interview process, the City of North Charleston and the State 
Department of Commerce declined. Charleston County also participated. Similar to the 
findings in the BMW study, officials with the City of Charleston and Charleston County 
acknowledged that counties take the lead in economic development projects. And also 
like BMW, state and county officials spearheaded the Boeing project with heavy 
involvement of the governor’s office and the state Department of Commerce as well as 
numerous third party development organizations (e.g., councils of government, 
development consultants, etc.).  
 The participating local government officials indicated that the cooperation level 
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during the Boeing project was very positive. Each government offers tax incentives for 
economic development that are balanced between attracting new and retaining existing 
firms. The County of Charleston indicated that it sets written performance requirements 
for all incentive programs (personal communication, June 26, 2014). The county also 
indicated that it routinely runs impact analysis after offering incentives as a means to 
examine if performance agreements have been met, but do not always run the same 
analysis prior to offering incentives. One county official stated that impact analysis can 
be “tough to quantify,” but is a much easier task to complete as “a retrospective analysis” 
when outcomes are available (personal communication, June 26, 2014).  
 According to a City of Charleston official interviewed, impact analysis of the use 
of incentives is not regularly completed (personal communication, July 15, 2014). Given 
the lack of long run outcomes from the Boeing project, local government officials were 
asked of the project’s perceived success thus far. A municipal representative responded, 
“initial returns are extremely positive” and went on to cite increases in local sales and tax 
revenue as well as an uptick in the local housing market (personal communication, July 
15, 2014). Charleston County representatives responded that Boeing has been an 
“unequivocal success” so far and that they are hopeful of creating an “aerospace cluster 






 Before providing the details uncovered in interviews with Boeing officials, it is 
important to note the context in which the discussion occurred. The National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) sued Boeing in 2011, alleging that the company scrapped its 
plans for a new plant in the state of Washington to punish union workers for a recent 
strike. Instead, Boeing located its new manufacturing facility in non-union South 
Carolina. The original complaint was filed by a machinists’ union in 2010 and 
investigated by the NLRB. The lawsuit was eventually dropped in late 2011 when the 
machinist union and Boeing reached a four year contract extension for facilities in 
unionized Washington State. Given these circumstances, Boeing officials were 
understandably hesitant to comment on labor related reasons for locating in South 
Carolina. 
 Company officials did indicate that while the tax friendly environment of South 
Carolina included both tax incentives and bond agreements for building facilities, “these 
incentives alone would not qualify an area as suitable” (personal communication, July 16, 
2014). When looking to relocate, an area “must have access to suitable infrastructure to 
handle the size of a Boeing plant” (personal communication, July 16, 2014). 
Additionally, “South Carolina’s willingness to provide resources to train workers in 
aerospace technologies and advanced manufacturing was a big selling point” (personal 
communication, July 16, 2014). 
 With local schools like Trident Technical College adding curriculum specific to 
Boeing’s operation, the firm feels it can “count on a steady stream of qualified workers” 
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as it expands its operations moving forward (personal communication, July 16, 2014). 
According to the personnel interviewed, the state of South Carolina “went above and 
beyond in their bond agreements to help build the new Boeing facilities.” The company 
believes it “will pay back the incentives received many times over by reinvesting in the 
community and hiring more workers” (personal communication, July 16, 2014).  
The value placed on tax incentives over other factors  
 Whether firms value property tax incentives over other factors like infrastructure 
and a qualified labor force is the first issue examined in this section. To explore this 
issue, interviews were conducted with officials involved in two major economic 
development projects in South Carolina, BMW and Boeing. As a part of this study, 
company officials from both organizations as well as representatives from each relevant 
local government are interviewed. The interview findings are then compared to the 
existing literature, which finds ambiguity and limited importance of tax incentives in 
economic development and firm location and expansion decisions (Arthur Andersen 
Company, 1995; Cohen, 2000; Gabe and Kraybill, 2002; Luger and Bae, 2005; Billings, 
2008; Kenyon, Langley, and Paquin, 2012).  
 Officials with both BMW and Boeing were clear that while tax incentives were 
attractive, neither organization would have located in South Carolina without existing 
infrastructure and a qualified labor pool. The findings seem to support a finding that 
firms do not value tax incentives over other factors like infrastructure and a qualified 
labor force and is consistent with the findings of ambiguity and indifference in the value 
firms place on tax incentives in the literature. If the intended effect of property tax 
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incentives for business location is to attract new and expanding businesses, then the 
policy is at least somewhat inefficient.  
 Local government officials in both cases believe that the incentives were justified 
and worth the cost given the benefits both received and projected. There is also a feeling 
among local government officials that incentives are necessary to compete with other 
locations, which is consistent with the findings detailed in the literature. This finding 
would suggest that the true intent of tax incentives for business location is not to attract 
new and expanding firms, but rather to remain competitive with other state and local 
governments.  Such competition perpetuates the “war among the states” in economic 
development (Burstein and Rolnick, 1995).  
Local governments and impact analysis of tax incentives 
 The second issue examined in this chapter seeks to uncover whether local 
governments conduct adequate impact analysis when using tax incentives for business 
location. To explore this issue, a survey of all municipal (270) and county governments 
(46) in South Carolina focusing on county administrators and municipal managers in 
addition to economic development directors was completed. The South Carolina 
Association of Counties and the Municipal Association of South Carolina agreed to 
distribute the surveys to their member jurisdictions. The survey received 68 responses, 
which included 45 municipalities and 23 counties.  
 The Census Bureau defines counties as urbanized areas with a population over 
50,000, urban clusters with a population range from 2,500 to 50,000, and rural with a 
population under 2,500. South Carolina’s county populations range from just over 9,900 
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to over 466,000 across 46 counties. Of the county respondents in the survey conducted in 
this research, three are from urbanized areas with a population greater than 50,000, while 
15 were from urbanized clusters with populations under 50,000. The per capita income 
for counties in South Carolina ranges from $12,924 to $32,731 with the average 
statewide per capita income at $23,443. Survey respondents in this research come from 
six counties that are above the state average per capita income (there are 11 total counties 
above the state average in the state) and 17 counties that are below the state average per 
capita income. Both population types (i.e., rural and urban) were well represented as well 
as counties that are above and below the state average per capita income.  
 Census guidelines for classifying a municipal population as rural (population less 
than 2,500), urban (population less than 50,000), or metropolitan (population greater than 
50,000) areas are utilized. The population range for the municipalities surveyed in this 
research was from 45 to over 133,000. Of the municipal respondents, 16 are rural (out of 
71 total rural municipalities in the state), 11 are urban (out of 193 total urban 
municipalities in the state), and four are metropolitan (out of 6 total metropolitan 
municipalities in the state). While 26 percent of South Carolina municipalities are rural, 
the rural response rate to the survey was 38 percent. Urban municipalities represent 71 
percent of South Carolina municipalities and had 52 percent response rate in this survey 
research. South Carolina has six municipalities classified as metropolitan and four took 
part in this survey research.  
 Fifty-two percent
9
 of the local government survey respondents indicated that their 
                                                        
9
 Survey results are presented in Appendix Seven. 
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jurisdiction specifically offered property tax incentives for business location. Fifty-seven 
percent of those governments either did not conduct cost benefit analysis of using 
incentives or were not aware of whether incentives were analyzed prior to offering them 
in economic development. Only 25 percent of the respondents performed a cost benefit 
analysis of incentives after offering business incentives. Twenty-eight percent of those 
surveyed had a formal policy for determining which businesses should be eligible to 
receive incentives.  
 Only 11 percent
10
 of respondents knew whether their jurisdiction required a 
certain percentage of new positions to be hired locally. Forty-two percent of survey 
respondents indicated that their local government included clawback provisions and/or 
performance targets in incentive agreements for businesses. However, 58 percent of the 
local government officials surveyed either never or only sometimes require written 
performance agreements as a condition for offering business incentives to attract 
economic development.  
 The survey results are also supplemented during the interviews of local 
government officials involved in the BMW and Boeing projects. As indicated in the 
previous section, local government officials associated with both the BMW and Boeing 
projects indicate a limited ability to conduct extensive impact analysis of tax incentives. 
While both projects had a mostly positive level of cooperation among state and local 
governments, only Charleston County indicated that it regularly required claw back 
provisions and performance targets for incentivized firms.  
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 Survey results are presented in Appendix Seven. 
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 This research appears to support the literature findings that local governments do 
not always conduct adequate impact analysis when using tax incentives. While the BMW 
and Boeing projects are perceived as unmitigated successes, it is unclear whether other 
smaller projects will produce the similar outcomes. Further study is needed in that area. 
The findings are consistent with the conclusions of other research (Minnesota Center for 
Fiscal Excellence, 2014; Pew Center on the States, 2012) that note the inadequacy of 
South Carolina’s ex post assessment of tax incentives.  
 This inadequacy is an important finding considering the strain on the state’s fiscal 
resources during the post Great Recession era. Revenue adequacy is very important to 
local governments that have limited ability to generate additional funds outside of the 
property tax. Combining the findings of the previous section that firms do not place a 
high value on property tax incentives with the inadequacy of ex post impact analysis in 
South Carolina, it appears that South Carolina state and local governments may be 
surrendering more property tax revenues than necessary and potentially creating issues of 
revenue inadequacy.  
Tax incentives, new industry, and existing firms 
 Tax incentives can be offered to new and/or existing businesses. A common 
perception in economic development is that the majority of resources are used to attract 
outside firms to an area, which leads to increased competition among state and local 
governments (Burstein and Rolnick, 1995). The survey and interview process of local 
government officials and firms was used to examine whether tax incentives are 
predominantly offered to new or existing firms.  
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 The survey of 68 South Carolina municipal, county, and economic development 
officials found that 53 percent of the jurisdictions believe tax incentives are used in a 
balanced manner to recruit new companies and retaining existing industry. Thirty-three 
percent of respondents use tax incentives mostly to recruit new industry. Only eight 
percent of those surveyed use tax incentives mostly for the retention and support of 
existing industry.  
 The local government officials interviewed during the BMW and Boeing project 
interviews indicate that a balanced approach is preferred “to encourage equal parts 
relocation to the state and expansion of existing industry” (personal communication, June 
26, 2014). Another official added, “The end goal is job creation and income 
improvements. If an incentive will help ‘move that process down the tracks’ then we do 
not care if the firm is already located in our jurisdiction or not” (personal communication, 
June 24, 2014). Both BMW and Boeing officials indicated during the interview process 
that state and local governments have continued to provide stable tax rates and offer new 
incentives to encourage growth in their operations (personal communications, June 26, 
2014 and July 16, 2014).  
 A majority of local government officials surveyed and interviewed indicate that 
they use economic development tax incentives in a balanced manner between recruiting 
new companies and retaining existing industry. The findings appear to support a sense of 
equity across different types of firms receiving tax incentives in South Carolina. The 
finding of the literature that tax incentives are predominantly offered to recruit new 
industry and are not given to existing firms cannot be validated in South Carolina. 
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However, given the limited information available on the incentives offered to relocating 
and expanding firms in South Carolina, further investigation involving additional local 
governments and firms may be necessary.  
Findings 
 This chapter presents three findings from the research. Each finding is important 
to the efficiency, equity and revenue adequacy of the property tax system in South 
Carolina.  
The firms studied value infrastructure and a qualified labor pool over tax incentives 
 The first finding is that while property tax incentives maybe attractive, firms may 
not locate in South Carolina without an adequate existing infrastructure and a qualified 
labor pool. While intended to attract business location, tax incentives could actually hurt 
infrastructure provision and labor pool development, resulting in inefficiency. Some 
surveyed also indicated that the true intent of tax incentives is to remain competitive with 
other locations that offer similar programs and not to attract new development.   
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Local governments appear to not conduct adequate impact analysis when using tax 
incentives 
 The second major finding is that local governments may not conduct adequate 
impact analysis when using tax incentives. Previous research (Minnesota Center for 
Fiscal Excellence, 2014 and Pew Center on the States, 2012) found that South Carolina is 
lacking in its evaluation of tax incentive programs. This research supports those findings.  
Tax incentives appear to be used in a balanced manner in South Carolina 
 The survey and interviews of local government officials indicate that economic 
development tax incentives are used in a balanced manner between recruiting new 
companies and retaining existing industry in South Carolina. The findings seem to 
support a sense of equity across different types of incentivized businesses in South 
Carolina. Both BMW and Boeing officials indicated that state and local governments 
were willing to not only incentivize the firm’s initial location decisions, but also 
incentivize future expansion projects.  
 Business incentives, including tax breaks and financial assistance, can be strong 
policy levers for state government leaders. Over the past 30 years, the number and type of 
incentive programs utilized by states has changed significantly. As incentive programs 
grow and change, so must the efforts and methods to monitor them. Some states have 
started to implement increasingly sophisticated oversight and accountability procedures 
to ensure a clear return on investment. Given the serious impact of the Great Recession 
on the economic and fiscal vitality of states and local governments, reviewing tax 
incentive programs to ensure they are achieving their intent may be more important than 
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ever. Interstate competition for business and industries persists and the debate on the 
effectiveness and true cost of business incentive programs will continue. 
 Even though some studies show that targeted tax incentives are beneficial, more 
research needs to be conducted regarding fiscal costs and economic benefits. South 
Carolina currently may not have an adequate system for evaluating the effectiveness of 
tax incentives for economic development purposes. This issue is exacerbated by an 
inability to request and receive complete (non-redacted) data on tax incentive use to make 
an independent analysis.  
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CHAPTER SIX  
PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
Property tax exemptions 
 The second policy leading to property tax base erosion studied in this research is 
property tax exemptions for nonprofit organizations. The research question with property 
tax exemptions in this study centered on the fiscal impact of property tax exempt land. 
This is an important question because very little research quantifying the fiscal impact of 
exempt municipal land has been undertaken in South Carolina. Property tax exemptions 
have regularly been used to support nonprofit organizations in order to encourage the 
provision of services that might not otherwise be provided or would have to be provided 
by state and local governments. Certain exemptions, such as state government property, 
religious organizations (with qualifications), and educational institutions, are beyond the 
discretion of local government, but even then, there are ways to ask or require them to 
contribute to local public revenue. Property tax exemptions are regularly granted in South 
Carolina and can be seen as a poor proxy for the social benefits realized from nonprofit 
organizations.  
 Area specific decision rules about granting exemptions are needed in order to 
determine which nonprofit organizations contribute the most benefit to the local host 
community. When that benefit fails to exceed the cost in property tax revenue and 
services provided, corrective policy may be required. However, very little quantification 
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of the fiscal costs in more rural states like South Carolina has been completed. This 
research is intended to begin to bridge that research gap.  
Literature review 
Exempt organizations 
 Exempt nonprofit organizations offer services that are indirectly subsidized by the 
remaining property owners through higher property tax payments (Stiglitz, 1998). 
Correcting for inequity becomes problematic because of the government’s inability to 
make credible commitments. Policy makers are largely short sighted due to election 
cycles, which makes creating policy that serves with long run optimal objectives more 
difficult. Instead, constituents are usually given next best policy options that meet more 
short term objectives that are best suited for the policymakers’ continued presence in 
office. The politician who proposes taxation or the use of fees on nonprofit organizations 
could hurt his or her short run electability, even if that action is optimal in the long run.  
 Research challenges 
 A relatively small amount of research has explored policy issues related to 
property tax exemptions for nonprofit organizations, in part due to lack of data 
availability and measurement issues. Exemptions are often promoted based on the social 
benefit of the services provided by nonprofit organizations (Diamond, 2002). However, 
determining actual values of those benefits can be quite difficult. Exemptions are also 
justified by the claim that nonprofits offer relief from expenditures that would otherwise 
have to be incurred by local governments. Difficulties arise in attempting to determine 
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the cost, efficiency, and necessity of services if government were charged with provision 
of such charitable services. Some services, like providing food and shelter for the 
homeless, naturally seem easy to justify, but other exempt nonprofits may not serve such 
a worthy cause. Comparing the value of the property tax exemption to the value of the 
services provided by a nonprofit organization is also difficult.  
 Data availability is limited because state and local governments, faced with 
limited resources, do not track the value of exempt land and buildings. Tax assessors do 
not regularly assess land that is property tax exempt because exempt land generates no 
tax revenues. Lack of assessment data on exempt land makes it difficult to analyze the 
cost of exempt property. A dearth of reliable data exists for both the value of exempt land 
and buildings and quantifiable benefits provided by exempt nonprofit organizations.  
Local government and exemptions 
 For municipalities with a significant share of total property value owned by tax 
exempt nonprofits, and especially those that are also highly reliant on property tax 
revenues, the charitable property tax exemption can create fiscal challenges. The impact 
of the charitable property tax exemption on municipal revenues varies widely across 
municipalities. Some cities experience significant impact on the ability to raise sufficient 
revenue, while most municipalities are largely unaffected because they have small 
nonprofit sectors.  
 Most states follow federal tax rules and definitions for their own income taxes as 
a way to minimize confusion and administrative costs. As a result, nonprofit 
organizations that meet federal definitions for income tax exemptions are often exempt 
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from state income taxes and local property taxes as well (Lerch, 2004). State and local 
revenue shortfalls have led to research centered on the appropriateness of tax exemptions 
in general and tax exemptions for nonprofits in particular (Stokeld, 1995; Netzer, 2002; 
Brody, 2010 a, 2010 b). In the United States, the revenue lost from the property tax 
exemption for nonprofits was estimated up to $32 billion in FY2009 (Kenyon and 
Langley, 2011).  
 States use different rules to determine whether property owned by a nonprofit 
organization is exempt from property taxes (Turner, 1998). The following seventeen 
states grant local governments the authority to determine which nonprofits qualify for tax 
exemption within certain categories: Alabama, Arkansas, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont. In the states listed, subject to 
state mandates for state government entities and religious and educational institutions, 
local governments can determine which organizations are eligible for property tax 
exemptions and may be able to negotiate payment in lieu of tax (PILOT) programs. 
 Municipalities may not necessarily be aware of the costs in forgone revenue 
related to property tax exemption, which is a focus of this study. These municipalities 
may also be uncertain of the total direct and indirect benefits received by their citizens 
from tax exempt organizations. Nonprofit organizations in turn may not understand the 
impact of their exemption on their host cities and its taxpayers, or the impact on for-
profit, nonexempt firms with whom they are in competition. If there were a better 
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understanding of costs and benefits, more nearly optimal outcomes could be obtainable 
through appropriate policy actions.  
Property tax exemptions for nonprofits  
 Research on property tax exemptions and nonprofit organizations at the national 
level has largely been limited to large cities (examples include Brody, 1998 2002, 2007, 
2010 a; Cordes, Gantz, and Pollak, 2002; Kenyon and Langley, 2011) and mainly explore 
the impacts of property tax exemptions as well as policy alternatives such as payment in 
lieu of taxes (PILOT) programs. PILOTs are defined as ad hoc or standard payments 
from a nonprofit to a local government as a means to offset property tax revenue forgone 
because of the nonprofit’s tax exemption. PILOTs cover a portion of the nonprofit’s share 
of the cost of public services provided by municipalities (Kenyon and Langley, 2010).  
 The issue of the property tax exemption for nonprofit organizations and the use of 
PILOTs has expanded beyond temporarily cash strapped cities asking nonprofits for 
money, which has led state and local governments to reexamine their relationship with 
local nonprofit organizations (Brody, Marquez, and Toran, 2012). The definition of a 
charity, which benefits from the nonprofit property tax exemption, and the best solutions 
to the current situation have become a focus of academic research.  
 Sherlock and Gravelle (2009) estimated that in fiscal year 2009, real (inflation 
adjusted) property tax revenues forgone due to the charitable exemption were between 
$17 and $32 billion nationally, or roughly 4 to 8 percent of total property taxes. While 
real GDP grew by 38 percent from 1995 to 2010, real total revenues reported by 
charitable nonprofits registered with the IRS grew by 65 percent (National Center for 
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Charitable Statistics, 2014). Charitable nonprofit real revenues grew from $825 billion to 
$1.36 trillion over that period (Kenyon and Langley, 2011). Netzer (2002) found that 
large shares of the services produced by nonprofits were exported from the jurisdiction in 
which the exempt nonprofit was located. The costs of the property tax exemption are 
borne by the residents and property owners in the host municipality, but the benefits 
created by exempt organizations affect a wider geography beyond the local area (Brody, 
2002). Requiring full property taxes or implementing PILOT programs is a way of 
exporting the relevant share of the local property tax burden to nonresidents who use 
those services.  
 Nonprofits defined 
 Charitable organizations can be defined as those registered under 501(c)(3) of the 
Internal Revenue Code. Examples of 501(c)(3) charitable nonprofits include nonprofit 
hospitals, public universities, museums, soup kitchens, churches, and housing 
developments for the elderly.  
 Nationally, 1.14 million charitable nonprofits are registered with the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS). The total number of nonprofits registered in South Carolina is 
22,050 (National Center for Charitable Statistics, 2014). Some nonprofit organizations 
provide valuable public services, often on limited finances, and perhaps deserve to be 
subsidized by the rest of the community. Others benefit mainly their members or a 
limited and not particularly “needy” clientele. Some nonprofits are large users of 
municipal services, while others use very few services. Some own property, while others 
rent their facilities, and do not benefit from the tax exemption. Furthermore, Grimm 
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(1999) used a case study analysis to examine the treatment of nonprofit organizations 
based on the extent of their production of collective or public goods. Grimm’s research 
found that many nonprofit organizations did not necessarily deserve exempt status based 
on the existing criterion.  
 Nonprofit hospitals and exemptions 
 Hospitals are by far the most studied nonprofit organization when examining 
property tax exemptions. Research by Hansmann (1987) studied the impact of tax 
exemptions on the market share of nonprofit and for-profit firms and found that 
exemptions significantly increase the market share of nonprofit firms compared to for-
profits. Chang and Tuckerman (1990) found that the share of the health care market held 
by nonprofit hospitals was not increased by property tax exemptions. Hall and Colombo 
(1991) argue that Hansmann’s research does not properly account for the charitable 
services and deservedness of property tax exemptions, especially nonprofit organizations 
like hospitals.  
 With the expansion of social programs like Medicare, Medicaid, and the 
Affordable Care Act, the authors ponder whether the charitable exemption still serves its 
original intent, now that so many previously indigent patients are now paying patients 
under government support. Morrisey, Wedig, and Hassan (1996) found that, while the 
majority of nonprofit hospitals produce community dividends that exceed the value of the 
tax exemptions they receive, almost 20 percent of nonprofits do not meet that standard. 
They recommend that a new evaluative approach be taken, which incorporates the 
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amount of good a nonprofit organization brings to its community in order to justify 
receiving tax exemptions and subsidies.  
 Young, et. al. (2013) offered a national assessment of the level and pattern of 
benefits that tax exempt hospitals provided before the implementation of the Affordable 
Care Act requirements. On a national basis, they found that hospitals devoted, on 
average, less than eight percent of their operating expenditures to community benefits. 
However, the level of benefits provided varied widely among the hospitals. Moreover, 
hospitals that provided relatively high levels of one type of benefit were not likely to 
have provided high levels of other types of benefits to the community. 
 Nonprofits competing with for-profit organizations 
 Larger nonprofits sometimes offer services that compete with for-profit 
organizations that are not property tax exempt, which raises additional issues of 
competitive fairness. Private for-profit firms are at a disadvantage in offering the same 
kind of services as a tax exempt nonprofit, creating an incentive for consumers to choose 
a nonprofit over a for-profit form of organization and ultimately further eroding the 
municipal property tax base. Lakdawalla and Phillipson (2006) found that nonprofit 
organizations have a competitive advantage over for-profit firms and that there was little 
difference between the behaviors of nonprofit and for-profit firms in the marketplace. 
The marginal cost advantages given to nonprofit organizations can provide an advantage 
for exempt nonprofit organizations.   
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 Nonprofit property tax exemptions, location, and equity 
 Many cities whose economies used to be dominated by manufacturing have seen 
relatively mobile for-profit businesses leave their cities, while property tax exempt 
colleges, universities, and medical centers that are tied to their location due to fixed 
capital investments and other factors remain in place (Penn Institute for Urban Research, 
2009). Two studies (Hansmann, 1987 and Gully and Santerre, 1993) found that nonprofit 
firms account for a greater share of the market in areas where local property and 
corporate tax rates are highest if the organization receives tax exemptions. Gulley and 
Santerre (1993) also found that higher property tax rates tend to attract more nonprofit 
organizations. 
 Cordes and Weisbrod (1998) also found that exempt nonprofits locating in higher 
value areas tend to engage in more commercialized activity that competes with the 
services of for-profit organizations.  The higher the property taxes are, the more valuable 
is the nonprofit’s exemption from property tax (Lerch, 2004). Thus, the combined 
findings from Hansmann (1987), Gully and Santerre (1993), and Lerch (2004) suggest 
that tax exemptions give nonprofits an incentive to locate in higher value areas with an 
economic advantage over for-profit firms. Calabrese and Carroll (2012) found that 
counties with a greater presence of nonprofit organizations tend to have higher 
homeowner tax burdens on average in the United States.  
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Challenges to nonprofit tax exemptions 
 Exempt organizations use public services that must be paid for by nonexempt 
taxpayers. Nonexempt property owners, as well as non-property owners (through rent and 
other taxes), face higher tax burdens, which further contributes to the public’s disdain for 
the property tax (Lerch, 2004). Local governments must choose to either increase the 
rates on nonexempt property owners or reduce service levels as more property is 
exempted.  
 Some governments have legally challenged nonprofit tax exemptions. However, 
the nonprofit sector has achieved remarkable success in state supreme courts and 
statehouses in defending property tax exemptions (Brody, 2010 a). Given the political 
costs, repealing exemptions for charitable organizations seems unlikely (Brunori, et al, 
2006). Therefore, municipalities must develop better information about the costs of 
exempt property in order to better discern when new exemptions should be granted.  
Analysis 
Fiscal cost analysis 
Little information is readily available about tax exempt property in South 
Carolina. The state does not possess a database with consolidated and specific data about 
tax exempt property across municipalities. Limited municipal and county budgets lessen 
any substantial and up to date record keeping on properties that do not generate revenue 
through taxation. Additionally, the quality and quantity of data varies from county to 
county. Some cities, like Greenville, have sophisticated electronic records and geographic 
information system (GIS) capabilities that other cities, or even entire counties, do not 
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possess. In some cities, the municipality is the key data holder, while in other areas 
counties are more knowledgeable.  
 This research was primarily concerned with quantifying the fiscal impact of 
property tax exempt land on municipalities, because a larger share of the nonprofit 
service providers are located in municipalities. As a first step, the percent of property tax 
exempt land by municipality was determined
11
. Various municipal and county officials 
ranging from county tax assessors to municipal GIS departments were contacted to 
collect this information. Local governments in the 30 most populated municipalities
12
 
were contacted and asked to provide their total acreage and the total exempt acreage from 
which the percent of tax exempt land was determined.  
Acreage statistics are derived without the inclusion of any federal land that was 
property tax exempt. Two municipalities studied, Columbia and Sumter, host large 
military bases that are exempt from local property taxes and receive undisclosed federal 
subsidies in lieu of property tax revenue. Also, military bases provide many of their own 
municipal services. Thus, that acreage was not included in either the total acreage or 
exempt acreage. 
 Regression analysis was conducted in order to determine if higher percentages of 
property tax exempt land results in decreases in per capita property tax revenue while 
controlling for population, per capita income, millage rate, and per capita total assessed 
value. If this is the case, then as municipalities grant more exemptions they will have 
                                                        
11
 Data for the percent of land that is property tax exempt for the municipalities studied is presented in 
Table 6.4 in Appendix Seven. 
12
 Population data for the 30 largest municipalities in South Carolina is presented in Table 6.3 in Appendix 
Seven.   
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fewer fiscal resources to provide services. With fewer fiscal resources, municipalities 
must increasingly choose between raising tax rates on the remaining tax base or lower 
expenditures by reducing service levels.  
The dependent variable in this study was per capita property tax revenue. Per 
capita revenue was used for scale due to the range of municipal populations studied. Data 
for property tax revenues was obtained from 2012-2013 municipal budgets
13
. The percent 
of property tax exempt (municipal) land was the independent variable of interest. Data for 
the percent of property tax exempt land was collected from county and municipal GIS 
offices. The coefficient of this variable provides the per capita dollar amount of per capita 
revenue change for a one percent increase in tax exempt land across the municipalities 
studied. Other independent variables
14
 in this analysis include millage rate, population, 
median per capita income, and per capita total assessed valuation of property (TAV). 
TAV was calculated by dividing total property tax revenue by the municipal millage rate 
and then converted to a per capita figure.  
It was anticipated that per capita property tax revenue would be negatively 
affected by tax exempt land (TaxExemptLand). The coefficient for the TaxExemptLand 
variable represents the per capita dollar amount of fiscal impact of a percent of tax 
exempt municipal land. Because of the nature of the property tax, if land is removed from 
the taxable base, taxpayers should see an increase in tax burden. However, if per capita 
property tax revenue decreases, then the municipality will have fewer resources to 
provide the same level of services that would have been offered with fewer exemptions.  
                                                        
13
 Data for per capita property tax revenue can be found Table 6.5 in Appendix Seven. 
14
 Data for the independent variables can be found in Appendix Seven. 
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 The target sample size in this regression analysis was the 30 most populated 
municipalities. However, the percent of property tax exempt municipal land was obtained 
for only 26 municipalities. The cities of Conway, Myrtle Beach, North Myrtle Beach, and 
Orangeburg did not provide data to calculate the percentage of property tax exempt 
municipal land. Initial outlier analysis revealed that the total assessed value for Hilton 
Head Island had a Cook’s D score of 5.87, which represents a large collective influence 
on the model. Observations with Cook’s D scores greater than one are considered outliers 
and are not considered in the model. Therefore, the final regression analysis included 25 
of the 30 largest municipalities in South Carolina.  
 Pairwise correlation analysis revealed several significant correlations at a five 
percent level.  The percent of tax exempt land was correlated with population (r=0.457, 
p=0.0214) and per capita income (r=-0.496, p=0.0116), which is not surprising since 
government facilities, hospitals, religious organizations and other charitable service 
providers tend to cluster in population centers that have higher income levels on average. 
Millage was correlated with per capita income (r=-0.523, p=0.0036). Per capita total 
assessed value was correlated with per capita income (r=0.4695, p=0.00102) and per 
capita property tax revenue (r=0.5879, p=0.0001). Variance inflation factor scores for the 
percent of tax exempt land (2.94), per capita income (3.55), millage (1.72), per capita 
total assessed value (1.72), and population (1.99) indicated that there are no issues with 
multicollinearity in the model.  
 The regression was conducted while controlling for several independent variables 
(covariates). Consideration was given to the interaction of the independent variable of 
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interest, percent of tax exempt land, with the other covariates in the model to test the 
homogeneity of regression slopes assumption. The interaction of the percent of tax 
exempt land with population (t(24)=-0.99, p=0.3364), per capita income (t(24)=0.46, 
p=0.6522), millage (t(24)=-0.64, p=0.5347), and per capita total assessed value (t(24)=-
1.53, p=0.1471) were not significant at a five percent level. Therefore, the assumption of 
no interactions in the analysis was satisfied and these interactions were not included in 
the final model.  
 Regression analysis 
Regression analysis suggested that including percent of tax exempt land, per 
capita income, millage, per capita total assessed value and population resulted in a 
statistically significant model for predicting per capita property tax (F(5)=85, p=0.001). 
The percent of property tax exempt land was a significant predictor of per capita property 
tax revenue at a five percent significance level (t(24)=-2.90, p=0.0093). The overall 
model can explain 95 percent of the variability in per capita property tax revenue. Table 
6.1 provides an overview of the regression output.  
Table 6.1 Exemptions Regression Analysis Results 
Variable 𝜷 SE 𝜷 P value 
Intercept -5.91 82.25 0.9435 
Percent of Tax exempt Land -2.73 0.9435 0.0093 
Per Capita Income  -0.0074 0.0031 0.0288 
Millage 3170.19 309.05 <0.0001 
Per Capita Total Assessed Value 0.0635 0.0049 <0.0001 
Population 0.0005 0.0002 0.0225 
Notes: 𝑅2=0.95 (p value < 0.0001); 𝛽 coefficients are expressed in terms of per capita property 
tax revenue dollars 
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For each additional one percent of tax exempt property, holding the other 
variables in the model constant, the expected per capita property tax revenue decreases by 
$2.73 across the municipalities studied. Estimates of the total potential property tax 
revenue losses for each municipality were calculated by multiplying a municipality’s 
population by per capita dollar amount for a one percent increase in tax exempt land 
across the municipalities studied. That value represents the revenue lost for each one 
percent of property tax exempt acres.  
For example, the state’s largest municipality, Columbia, had a population l33,358 
in 2013. The potential property tax revenue loss for a one percent increase in exempt 
acres is $364,067. This figure was calculated by multiplying municipal population by the 
per capita dollar amount lost for a one percent increase in tax exempt land. Columbia 
reported that 42.3 percent of its municipal land as property tax exempt, which means the 
city is potentially losing up to over $15.4 million in property tax base annually. For the 
smallest municipality studied, Cayce, a one percent increase in property tax exempt land 
results in a revenue loss of $35,107 annually and a total potential lost property tax base of 










Aiken $82,708 Hanahan $53,500 
Anderson $73,669 Lexington $53,442 
Bluffton $37,144 Mauldin $66,953 
Cayce $35,108 Mount Pleasant $204,436 
Charleston $349,437 North Augusta $60,685 
Clemson $38,973 North Charleston $284,067 
Columbia $364,067 Rock Hill $188,651 
Easley $55,419 Simpsonville $53,549 
Florence $103,172 Spartanburg $102,776 
Goose Creek $108,717 Summerville $125,782 
Greenville $167,614 Sumter $112,449 
Greenwood $63,825 West Columbia $43,200 
Greer $74,166  
 
The percent of property tax exempt municipal land studied ranged from 12.2 
percent in North Augusta to 47.5 percent in Bluffton. The median percent of property tax 
exempt municipal land was 25.1 and the median population was 27,076. The median 
potential property tax revenue loss for a one percent increase in exempt acreage across 
the municipalities studied is $73,917 and the total potential median property tax base 
surrendered due to exemptions exceeds $1.8 million, which represents a significant cost 
in each of the municipal budgets studied. In order to make up for these losses, 
municipalities may need to shift a larger portion of the tax burden onto nonexempt 
property owners or reduce service levels.  
Per capita median income was negatively associated with per capita property tax 
revenue (t(24)=-2.37, p=0.0288). As per capita median income increases by one dollar, 
holding other variables constant, per capita property tax revenue decreases by $0.007 
cents. The per capita total assessed value was, as one would expect, positively associated 
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with per capita property tax revenue (t(24)=12.74, p=0.0001). As per capita total assessed 
value increases by one dollar, per capita property tax revenues increases by a little over 
$0.06.  Municipal millage rate was also a significant positive independent variable 
(t(24)=10.26, p=0.0001). As municipal millage rates rises one mill, an additional 
$3,170.19 is created in per capita property tax revenue on average across the 
municipalities studied. Population was a small, but significant predictor of per capita 
property tax revenue (t(24)=2.48, p= 0.0225).   
Per capita property tax revenue does decrease as the percent of tax exempt land 
increases, which was the focus of this research. When additional property tax exemptions 
are granted, municipalities have fewer resources to provide the same level of services. 
Municipalities must choose whether to cut service levels or seek additional funding—
resulting in revenue adequacy issues. Additional revenue is most likely to come in the 
form of additional taxes on nonexempt property—creating issues of equity between 
property holders.   
There were several limitations in this analysis. The regression analysis only 
included 25 municipalities (N=25). The 95 percent confidence interval for the per capita 
revenue reduction for a one percent increase in tax exempt land ranged from negative 
$0.75 to negative $4.71, which might be narrowed if the number of participating 
municipalities could be expanded.  
Columbia’s average potential loss in revenue was calculated at $364,067, but the 
city’s actual loss could range from $100,018 to $628,116. Cayce’s average potential loss 
in revenue was calculated at $35,107, but the city’s actual loss could range from $9,645 
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to $60,570. The evidence offered in this research supports the expectation that, as the 
percent of property tax exempt land increases, the per capita property tax revenue 
decreases.  
Evaluation 
Revenue adequacy  
 Based on 25 South Carolina municipalities, a one percent increase in the share of 
tax exempt property in the tax base reduces expected annual property tax revenue by 
$2.73 per capita, with a range from $35,107 in the Town of Cayce to $364,067 in the City 
of Columbia. The costs associated with property tax base erosion were significant in 
South Carolina. The potential loss for a one percent increase in the share of property tax 
exempt land was $364,067 for the most populated municipality studied, Columbia. 
Likewise, if Columbia were to reduce its share of tax exempt property by one percent, the 
city is estimated to gain an additional property tax base worth an average of $364,067. 
For the least populated municipality studied, Cayce, the potential property tax base lost 
was $35,107 for each percent of its total acreage that is exempt from property tax. 
Exempt properties tend to be located in more populated municipalities in South Carolina. 
More populated areas tend to have more valuable land holdings nationally, which 
increases the impact on local property tax revenue as property owned by nonprofits is 
removed from the taxable base.  
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Equity 
 Larger nonprofits frequently offer services that compete with for-profit 
organizations that are not property tax exempt, which raises the issue of competitive 
fairness. The costs of property tax exemption for nonprofits fall most heavily on the 
municipality, but the benefits created by exempt organizations accrue to a wider 
geographic area.  
 Nonprofit organizations tend to locate in more populated areas over less 
populated areas for many reasons, including a critical mass of donors and clients. The tax 
exemption, like tax breaks for business, may not be decisive, but it may make locating in 
higher rent areas more affordable. The equity issue with property tax exemptions for 
nonprofit organizations is focused on the impact of the exemption and inequity between 
property owners and not necessarily the location attraction aspect.  
Efficiency 
 The efficiency issue with property tax exemptions for nonprofit organizations lies 
in the lack of relationship between the value of the tax exemption, the cost to the 
municipality in providing services to the tax exempt entity, and the value of services the 
exempt organization provides. Many exempt organizations offer valuable services with 
economic benefits that may justify the fiscal costs. For some exempt organizations, the 
gain to the local government and community is less clear.  
 Municipalities have the difficult task of asking nonexempt businesses and 
residential property owners to pay for infrastructure and municipal services through 
property taxes while nonprofit organizations are exempt. The benefits created by any 
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particular exempt nonprofit organization are not necessarily proportional to the property 
tax revenue forgone, and the benefit of the tax exemption only applies to those nonprofits 
that own real property.  
Conclusion 
 Based on statistical evidence, the cost to municipalities and their nonexempt 
property owners of property tax exempt land appears to be significant in South Carolina. 
The benefits that charitable exemptions offer are highly variable and in specific instances, 
may be modest relative to the value of the lost property tax revenue to municipalities and 
the costs of providing municipal services to exempt properties. 
 Elected officials often are reluctant to introduce any new policy that requires 
payments from nonprofit organizations because of its potential impact on their own long 
term electability and, in some cases, concerns about the financial stress on the nonprofits. 
However, under current policy, the delineation between organizations that provide the 
most social good and those that provide only marginal good is not very clear and not 
related to the value of the property tax exemptions. Equity issues among exempt and 
nonexempt property owners are numerous and not all areas are serviced equally.  
 A clearer (and narrower) definition of exempt charitable organizations would 
offer one approach to controlling revenue loss. Payments in lieu of taxes are another 
possible avenue, particularly for municipalities that are heavily impacted by state owned 
property as well as other exempt properties. While existing reliance on fees and charges 
helps to alleviate the difference between exempt and nonexempt properties, those 
programs could be expanded. Several municipalities have explored using fees and 
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charges more, but to date none have expanded beyond the most obvious categories of 
solid waste collection, water and sewer, and building inspection (personal 
communication, September 2, 2014). 
 Nonprofits are supposed to pay federal and state income taxes on unrelated 
business income, such as rental of their facilities, but most South Carolina municipalities 
have not collected business license tax revenues on activities to date (personal 
communication, September 2, 2014). The local business license is essentially an income 
tax and would be an obvious vehicle for collecting additional revenue from exempt 
nonprofits that are engaging in commercial type activities. 
 Nonprofit organizations are valuable partners in providing services and improving 
quality of life in South Carolina communities. But the value of their services bears no 
direct relationship to the value of their tax exemptions (which some do not receive 
because they do not own property) and the costs of providing them with municipal 
services. In difficult economic times, South Carolina municipalities need to rethink their 
fiscal relationship with nonprofit organizations in the interests of efficiency, revenue 




CHAPTER SEVEN  
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 This research addressed four research questions centered on two sources of 
property tax base erosion. The first policy is the use of property tax incentives for 
business location. Three findings emerged on the tax incentive issue. First, firms appear 
to value factors like infrastructure and a qualified labor force over property tax 
incentives. This was an important finding because property tax revenue is very important 
to local governments in providing infrastructure and public education. A conflict emerges 
between losing revenue to incentives and the need to provide more public services and 
infrastructure to new or expanding firms. New development increases the demand on 
public education, highway infrastructure and public services like fire and police services. 
Incentives are important factors on the margin, but if a jurisdiction does not have 
infrastructure or a capable workforce, firms like Boeing and BMW may not consider 
locating in that area. 
 The next finding supports the perception that South Carolina local governments 
do not conduct adequate impact analysis of the use of tax incentives for business location.  
Increased ex ante and ex post analysis and transparency is necessary in South Carolina. 
Several local government officials surveyed in this research stated that they do not have 
the necessary resources to complete adequate impact analysis of tax incentives for 
business location. Third party analysis is difficult due to the level of redaction performed 
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on documents detailing the economic benefits and fiscal costs associated with existing 
property tax incentives for business location.  
 The third finding in this research suggests that property tax incentives for business 
location appear to be utilized in a balanced manner between new firms and existing firms 
in South Carolina. This finding requires further examination of additional economic 
development projects for confirmation. Additional research is also necessary to uncover 
the average size of firms receiving property tax incentives for business location. This 
analysis focused on two large corporations in urban areas. It would be interesting to see 
the level of incentives being offered in rural areas as well as smaller firms.  
 The second policy studied was property tax exemptions for nonprofit 
organizations in South Carolina. The study of this policy led to the fourth finding in this 
research. There was a significant fiscal cost associated with property tax exempt 
municipal land in the jurisdictions studied. Many nonprofit organizations provide 
valuable services that would not otherwise be provided, or would have to be provided by 
state and local governments, perhaps, at a higher cost. However, some nonprofits serve a 
much narrower purpose. The fiscal cost identified in this research should be considered 
against nonprofit organizations that provide more marginal social and economic benefits.  
 The remainder of this chapter focuses on policy recommendations. These policy 
recommendations are intended to serve as alternatives and improvements on the current 
practices involving property tax incentives for business location and property tax 
exemptions for nonprofit organizations. Each policy recommendation section was 
organized by the policy addressed.  
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Property tax incentives for business location 
 Property tax incentives for business location are one of the most common 
economic development strategies in South Carolina and across the nation. This research 
established that tax incentives for business location are used in a balanced approach with 
new and existing businesses. The literature raises concerns over the effectiveness and 
evaluation of tax incentives in economic development. This research had three main 
findings related to the use of incentives for business location. First, firms in this research 
value infrastructure and a qualified labor pool over tax incentives, which reinforce the 
findings in the literature. However, competition between local governments and states 
forces South Carolina counties to offer comparable incentives, especially to new firms. 
The provision of infrastructure including public services, highway maintenance, and 
public education is funded in part by property tax revenue. A portion of this revenue is 
offered as an incentive to entice new and expanding businesses to jurisdictions in South 
Carolina.  
 Because firms value infrastructure and a qualified labor pool over tax incentives, 
judicious use of property tax incentives for business location may need to be a priority for 
state and local governments to maintain and improve upon existing infrastructure. 
Evaluation of tax incentives is also important. A survey of municipal, county, and 
economic development officials in South Carolina found that local governments do not 
conduct adequate impact analysis when using tax incentives. The literature supports three 
recommended strategies to ensure that the benefits of tax incentives for economic 
development are worth the fiscal costs.  
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Recommended strategies  
 The first strategy is for local governments to specify qualifications for a property 
tax break and strengthen the approval process. States often require companies to meet 
certain criteria such as number of jobs created, wages paid and other benefits provided. 
There may also be stipulations based on the size of capital investment made and tax 
revenues created to qualify for a tax incentive. Forty-three states have a rule that at least 
one incentive program address this type of stipulation (Brockmyer, 2012).   
 The second strategy to ensure that tax incentives are effective is to require public 
disclosures and online accountability. This process largely employs the use of online 
transparency and accountability systems (Burnett, 2011). Transparent systems provide 
the public with company specific information on the amount of the tax subsidy, 
comparisons on the number of jobs promised and the number of jobs actually created, 
wage levels for employees, and the company’s compliance record with various state rules 
and regulations. Mattera, et al. (2010) singled out Illinois, Ohio and Wisconsin as having 
some of the most robust online disclosure systems in the nation. Mattera also found that 
37 states provided online recipient disclosure for at least one key subsidy program, which 
is a significant improvement from 2007 when only about 23 states were doing so. 
 The third strategy to ensure that tax incentives are effective involves the use of 
clawbacks (Burnett 2011). Some states penalize businesses that fail to meet the 
requirements of the tax incentive. A good clawback program has two main attributes 
(Mattera et al., 2010). First, all state and local subsidy agreements must contain clawback 
provisions. Second, the tax incentive granting jurisdiction must be able to recapture all or 
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part of a subsidy, with interest, and any company that does not meet its contractual 
commitment also can be barred from future tax incentives. Presently, at least 37 states use 
some form of clawback provision, either written into their statutes or defined by program 
guidelines (Mattera et al., 2011). Other common mechanisms states use include placing 
sunset provisions in statutes so that property tax incentive programs cannot continue 
without further legislative action and close monitoring of programs using performance 
audits (Brockmyer, 2012).  
 State and local government officials in South Carolina feel strongly that property 
tax incentives for business location are a necessary strategy to remain competitive with 
other jurisdictions in economic development. The competitive environment between 
jurisdictions may not allow a jurisdiction to cease offering incentives without risking a 
loss of businesses to another area resulting in a zero sum competition between local 
governments (Zheng and Warner, 2010). However, the overall effectiveness of tax 
incentives is questionable in that firms in South Carolina appear to place more value on 
infrastructure and qualified workers. Thus, when state and local government officials feel 
that tax incentives must be used for competitive reasons, evaluation may be key.  
 Property tax incentives for business location are not currently adequately 
evaluated in the state. But possible solutions to improve the process do exist. By 
strengthening the qualification process, improving transparency, and including clawback 
provisions in future property tax incentive programs, evaluation improvement can be 
realized in South Carolina.   
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Property tax exemptions for nonprofit organizations 
 This research begins to quantify the fiscal impact associated with tax exempt land 
in South Carolina. For each additional one percent of tax exempt property, holding other 
factors constant, the expected per capita property tax revenue decreases by $2.73 across 
the municipalities studied. The potential tax revenue loss for a one percent increase in 
exempted acres in the municipalities studied ranges from $35,107 to $364,067 annually.  
 More research is necessary to build upon the foundation laid by this research. For 
example, the 95 percent confidence interval for the per capita revenue reduction for a one 
percent increase in tax exempt land ranges from negative $0.75 to negative $4.71, which 
might be narrowed if the number of participating municipalities could be expanded. The 
fiscal cost for municipalities could be lower than the impact found in this research, or the 
impact could be much more. Additional investigation is necessary.   
 While nonprofit organizations tend to locate in more populated areas in the 
municipalities studied, the organizations do not necessarily locate in higher value areas in 
South Carolina. There may be several reasons for nonprofit organizations to locate in 
areas with more population including maintaining a critical mass of donors and clients, as 




Recommended strategies  
 The literature identifies four policy alternatives that municipalities can utilize to 
regain lost property tax revenue base due to nonprofit organization exemptions. Strategies 
include narrowing the definition of exempt organizations, utilizing payment in lieu of 
taxes, and shifting more of the cost of municipal services to targeted fees and charges. 
 Narrowing of the definition of exempt organizations 
 South Carolina law permits property tax exemptions for a variety of charitable 
nonprofit organizations. Some exemptions are for specific organizations like the 
American Legion, YMCA, and Salvation Army. Others are more generally allocated to 
religious organizations, museums, and other 501(c)(3) charitable organizations. Many 
exemptions for charitable organizations are justified on the basis that those organizations 
provide services to underserved groups that would not otherwise be provided. Hopkins 
(2011) offers the following explanation of why nonprofits are tax exempt: 
Tax exemption is an acknowledgement of an organization performing an 
activity that relieves some burden that would otherwise fall to federal, 
state, or local government. The government, in fact, provides an indirect 
subsidy to nonprofits and receives a direct benefit in return. Nonprofits 
also benefit the society as a whole when they provide valuable services. 
The viability of some of these services would be threatened if they were 
subject to taxes (Hopkins, 2011, p. 176). 
 Over the last ten years, the number of nonprofit organizations in South Carolina 
has increased by 55 percent (National Center for Charitable Statistics, 2014). That 
growth, coupled with declining or slow growing property values, may be placing 
additional stress on municipal budgets. Nationally, some municipalities have begun to 
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narrow the definition of what constitutes a nonprofit organization (Kenyon and Langley, 
2010). A redefinition of nonprofit organizations could lead to the loss of exempt status by 
some less charitable nonprofit organizations and in turn, help some South Carolina 
municipalities regain lost tax revenues. 
 Payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs) 
 PILOTs are defined as ad hoc or standard payments from nonprofits to a local 
government as a means to offset property tax revenue forgone because of the nonprofit’s 
tax exemption. PILOTs cover the cost of the nonprofit’s share of public services, like 
road maintenance and fire services, provided by municipalities and normally funded by 
property taxes (Kenyon and Langley, 2010). 
 PILOT programs are negotiated agreements between a nonprofit and a 
municipality that can range from one time payments to recurring donations. PILOTs are 
voluntary (not required by law). Some municipalities negotiate such payments from 
existing nonprofits when the nonprofit expands operations or territory, or redefines their 
mission. 
 Payments are generally monetary, but some negotiations have yielded payment-
in-kind agreements or service in lieu of taxes (SILOTs). Hospitals providing a social 
good such as free clinics for indigent patients or health care services for city employees 
would be an example of a SILOT program. PILOT programs seem to be growing due to 
rising scrutiny of the nonprofit sector, and increasing pressure on municipalities to find 
new sources of revenue (Kenyon and Langley, 2010). 
 In some states, state agencies also make payments in lieu of taxes to 
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municipalities for their facilities in recognition of the loss of property tax revenue and the 
expectation that those facilities use and benefit from municipal services (Minnesota 
Center for Fiscal Excellence, 2014). South Carolina was not one of those states. State 
owned property was included in the nontaxed property in our statistical analysis, and in 
some cases represented a significant part of the nontaxable property within municipal 
boundaries. 
 Fees and charges 
 South Carolina relies heavily on fees and charges as a revenue source at both the 
state and local levels. Local property taxes in South Carolina are only about 30 percent of 
local government own source revenue (funds raised locally) and 25 percent of total 
revenue (including federal and state aid). Licenses, permits, fees and other charges 
account for 54 percent of municipal own source revenue and 45 percent of all municipal 
revenue in South Carolina. (South Carolina Budget and Control Board, 2013). These 
other local revenue sources offer an opportunity to generate municipal revenue from non-
property tax sources. User fees in particular are appropriate as long as the users can be 
clearly identified. Recreational services, water and sewer services, solid waste collection, 
municipal parking spaces, building inspections, and transit are among the more common 
municipal services for which a fee is charged to users. Sometimes municipal services are 
funded partly by taxes and partly by user fees, and often some subsidy provision is made 
for low income households. 
 While nonprofits may not use personal services such as recreation or public 
transit, they do use other services where the users can be clearly identified, including fire 
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and police protection, solid waste disposal, streets and parking. Charging a fee for some 
services rather than funding the service out of general taxation helps restore equity to the 
distribution of the cost of public services between nonprofits owning real estate, other 
nonprofits, for-profit firms and households. Otherwise, the last four categories are 
essentially subsidizing tax exempt owners of real property, which includes both state 
government entities and nonprofits. 
 Several South Carolina municipalities have explored the possibility of levying 
fees on nonprofits based on their use of specific services. In one municipality, the cost of 
fire and police calls to nonprofit agencies was determined and used in setting a proposed 
fee, although that proposal was never implemented (personal communication, April 12, 
2012).  
 Many nonprofit organizations provide valuable services that may not otherwise be 
provided or services that would have to be provided by state and local government at a 
higher cost. Some nonprofit organizations employ a large workforce and offer substantial 
economic benefits. In many cases, the economic benefits easily outweigh the fiscal costs. 
However, other nonprofit organizations may not benefit a wider clientele, employ large 
numbers, or provide substantial economic benefit to a community.  
 South Carolina municipalities are able to choose which organizations receive 
property tax exemptions. Local governments looking for ways to reclaim revenues lost to 
nonprofit exemptions have several options, including narrowing the definition of the 
organizations that receive exemptions, implementing PILOT programs, utilizing fees and 
charges, and creating business license taxes. The fiscal impact identified in this research 
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establishes a foundation for future research of exempt property in South Carolina. This 
research also provides local government officials with a fiscal cost benchmark to 
compare with potential economic benefits realized from offering nonprofit organizations 
property tax exemptions.  
Conclusions and future research 
 This research explores property tax base erosion in the form of two policies, 
including property tax incentives for business location and property tax exemptions for 
nonprofit organizations in South Carolina. Firms appear to value infrastructure and a 
qualified labor force over tax incentives when making location decisions. Further 
research is necessary to determine the percent that different factors matter in firm 
location decisions. The existing research needs to be expanded to include more firms of 
various sizes. One possible future research question would be whether tax incentives 
offered vary based on the size of the firm being recruited or retained. Those surveyed 
appear to indicate a balance between tax incentives being offered to new and existing 
firms. However, there is little research addressing the size of firms offered incentives. 
Additionally, the effects of agglomeration for large firms like Boeing and BMW need to 
be examined in more depth.  Company officials interviewed in this research felt that the 
incentives they were offered will be paid back “many times over” (personal 
communication, July 16, 2014). Monitoring and evaluating this statement is an area for 
future research.  
 Local governments in South Carolina do not appear to be performing adequate 
impact analysis when using property tax incentives for business location. Further research 
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is needed to better understand this issue in more detail. This research was limited to 
interviews in three counties and two municipalities and a survey of 68 local government 
officials. A more thorough county-by-county analysis would provide a better 
understanding of how widespread the poor evaluation process is in the state.  
 The fiscal impact of property tax exempt municipal land studied in South Carolina 
was significant. Additional quantitative analysis of the fiscal costs and economic benefits 
offered by nonprofit organizations is necessary. Organizations may not currently receive 
relief from state and local governments that matches the economic and social benefits 
provided by their services. Particular interest should be paid to better defining what 
constitutes a charitable organization that is worthy of receiving property tax exemptions 
at significant fiscal costs.  
 This research has laid the groundwork for further research that may provide 
additional evidence on the economic benefits and fiscal costs of these policy strategies. 
Thus, it is hoped that local government officials and applied scholars will continue to 
seek reliable data and ask questions about the practice of the policies studied in this 
















































Appendix three: Statewide survey 
2014 Survey of Economic Development Incentives  
for Business Location in South Carolina 
 
Jonathan Keisler at Clemson University is conducting a survey of local government 
economic development incentives for business location in South Carolina. Please respond 
to this brief survey on behalf of your jurisdiction or forward to the appropriate person. 
You may submit your completed questionnaire online in a matter of minutes. Your input 
is very valuable. The deadline for submitting your responses is Friday, June 27
th
, 2014.  
 
1. Which of the following statements best describes the entity with primary 
responsibility for economic development in your jurisdiction (Check only one.) 
a. ___  A local government unit has primary responsibility for economic  
development in our jurisdiction. 
b. ___  A county government unit has primary responsibility for economic  
development in our jurisdiction. 
c. ___   A state government unit has primary responsibility for economic  
development in our jurisdiction. 
d. ___  A nonprofit development organization (i.e., Council of 
Government) has  
primary responsibility for economic development in our 
jurisdiction.   
e. ___  No single organization is primarily responsible for economic  
development in our jurisdiction. 
 
2. Which other organization(s) have responsibility for economic development in your 
jurisdiction? (Exclude the primary organization from Question 1. Check all that 
apply.) 
a. ___  A local government unit also has responsibility for economic  
development in our jurisdiction.  
b. ___  A county government unit also has responsibility for economic  
development in our jurisdiction. 
c. ___   A state government unit also has responsibility for economic  
development in our jurisdiction. 
d. ___  A nonprofit development organization (i.e., Council of 
Government) also  
has responsibility for economic development.  
e. ___  No other organization(s) have responsibility for economic  
development in our jurisdiction. 
 
3. How would you describe the level of cooperation among your jurisdiction’s economic 
development organizations?  
a. ___ Very Poor 
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b. ___ Poor 
c. ___ Neutral 
d. ___ Good  
e. ___ Very Good 
4. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements by circling the 
number that best corresponds to your viewpoint.  
         Strongly    
Strongly 
         Disagree       
Agree 
a. Our jurisdiction competes with other jurisdictions   1 2 3 4
 5 
 in the region for economic development.  
b. Our jurisdiction collaborates with other jurisdictions  1 2 3 4
 5 
 in the region on economic development.  
c. The roles of the various economic development   1 2 3 4
 5 
 organizations serving this jurisdiction are clearly defined.  
d. Our jurisdiction experiences conflict with other state and 1 2 3 4
 5 
 local organizations over economic development strategy 
e. The incentives offered by other jurisdictions strongly 1 2 3 4
 5 
 influence the types of incentives we provide.  
f. The incentives offered by other jurisdictions increase 1 2 3 4
 5 
 costs for our jurisdiction.   
g. Our jurisdiction has a voice in what incentives are offered 1 2 3 4
 5 
 in our area.  
 
5. A.  Does your jurisdiction offer property tax incentives for business location?  
(Check only one)    
a. ___  YES, we use property tax incentives for business location.  
b. ___  NO, we use other types of incentives for business location  
(Specify: ______________________________________) 
c. ___  NO, we do not use any incentives for business location.  
 
 
B.  How does your jurisdiction use incentives in its economic development efforts?  
(Check only one.) 
a. ___  Mostly to recruit new industry 
b. ___  Balanced between recruiting new companies and retaining existing  
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industry 
c. ___  Mostly to retain and support existing industry 
 
6. A.  Do you require a written performance agreement as a condition for providing 
business  
incentives?  
a. ___  Always 
b. ___  Sometimes 
c. ___  Never 
 
B.  Does your jurisdiction perform a cost/benefit analysis prior to offering business  
incentives?  ___ YES  ___ NO 
 
C.  Does your jurisdiction perform a cost/benefit analysis after to offering business 
incentives?  ___ YES  ___ NO 
 
D.  Does your jurisdiction have a formal policy for determining eligibility for 
business incentives?  ___ YES  ___ NO 
 
E.  Does your local government ever require a percentage of new employees to be 
hired locally?  ___ YES  ___ NO 
 
F.  Do you require companies to return/repay incentives if they fail to meet 
performance targets?  ___ YES  ___ NO 
 
G.  Please indicated any change in dollar value of the average size of any business 
incentive packages over the last five years. (Check the appropriate number.) 
 
1. ___ Much less 
2. ___ Slightly less 
3. ___ About the same 
4. ___ Slightly larger 
5. ___ Much larger 
 
 
7. A.  Would you like to expand upon any your responses to this survey? 
         ___ YES  ___ NO 
 
B. Would you like to be contacted by the researcher to expand upon your responses 
to this  survey? ___ YES  ___ NO 
 







Local Government/Jurisdiction Profile 
 
1. Name: ______________________________________________ 
 
2. Title: ______________________________________________ 
 
3. Name of Jurisdiction:  ______________________________________________ 
 




Appendix four: Local government interview protocol 




Interviewee (Title and Name): 
_____________________________________________________ 
Development Project: _____ BMW _____ Boeing 
Local Government Official type: 
_____ A: State Department of Commerce Official 
_____ B: County Administrator 
_____ C: County Economic Development Official 
_____ D: Municipal Administrator 
_____ E: Municipal Economic Development Official 
_____ F: Third Party Economic Development Official  
Employed with Local Government at the time of the development project? 
_____ YES ____ NO 
Direct knowledge of the incentives offered during the development project? 
_____ YES ____ NO 












Introduction: Jonathan Keisler at Clemson University is conducting interviews of local 
government officials involved in economic development projects involving the use of 
incentives for business location in South Carolina. Your response is on behalf of your 
jurisdiction. If you feel another representative would be a more appropriate respondent, 
please notify the interviewer. This survey will require 10 to 15 minutes to complete. If at 
any point you wish to discontinue this interview, please let the interviewer know. Your 
input is very valuable.  
 







2. What other organizations, if any, have responsibility for economic development in 






3. How would you describe the level of cooperation among your jurisdiction’s economic 






4. Tell me about how your jurisdiction competes and collaborates with other jurisdictions 






5. Tell me about the use of property tax incentives for business location in your 
jurisdiction (either independently or collaboratively with other levels of government. 













7. Tell me about how does your jurisdiction use incentives in its economic development 
efforts? Are they primary used to recruit new firms or to retain and support 







8. How often do you require a written performance agreement as a condition for 






9. Please share with me how often your jurisdiction performs an impact analysis when 
offering tax incentives for business location. If impact analysis is completed, is it 























Appendix five: Company representative interview protocol 
Company Representative Interview Protocol 
 
Company: _____ BMW _____ Boeing 
Interviewee (Title and Name): 
_____________________________________________________ 
Employed with the company at the time of the development project? 
_____ YES ____ NO 
Direct knowledge of the incentives offered during the development project? 
_____ YES ____ NO 












Introduction: Jonathan Keisler at Clemson University is conducting interviews of 
representatives of companies involved in economic development projects involving the 
use of incentives for business location in South Carolina. Your response is on behalf of 
your organization. If you feel another representative would be a more appropriate 
respondent, please notify the interviewer. This survey will require 10 to 15 minutes to 
complete. If at any point you wish to discontinue this interview, please let the interviewer 
know. Your input is very valuable.  
 
1. Tell me about the entity that your organization primarily dealt with during the firm’s 






2. Please tell me about what factors your firm found attractive when deciding to locate in 


















5. Tell me about the presence of infrastructure and the quality of labor force in the area 
you located in South Carolina. How would you rank infrastructure, labor force and tax 






6. Was your firm required to sign a written performance agreement as a condition for 






7. Were the incentives offered solely to recruit your firm’s location in South Carolina or 












Thank you for participating in this interview!
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Appendix six: Incentive survey results 
 
1. Which of the following statements best describes the entity with primary 
 responsibility for economic development in your jurisdiction (Check only one.) 
a. 13 (19.4%) A local government unit has primary responsibility for  
 economic development in our jurisdiction. 
b. 36 (53.7%) A county government unit has primary responsibility for  
 economic development in our jurisdiction. 
c. 0 (0.0%)   A state government unit has primary responsibility for  
 economic development in our jurisdiction. 
d. 8 (11.9%)  A nonprofit development organization (i.e., Council of  
 Government) has primary responsibility for economic development in our 
 jurisdiction.   
e. 10 (14.9%) No single organization is primarily responsible for   
 economic development in our jurisdiction. 
 
Answered: 67 Skipped:1 
 
2. Which other organization(s) have responsibility for economic development in your 
jurisdiction? (Exclude the primary organization from Question 1. Check all that 
apply.) 
a. 30 (44.7%) A local government unit also has responsibility for economic 
development in our jurisdiction.  
b. 27 (40.3%) A county government unit also has responsibility for economic 
development in our jurisdiction. 
c. 27 (40.3%) A state government unit also has responsibility for economic 
development in our jurisdiction. 
d. 28 (41.7%) A nonprofit development organization (i.e., Council of 
Government) also has responsibility for economic development.  
e. 6 (8.96%) No other organization(s) have responsibility for economic 
development in our jurisdiction. 
 
Answered: 67 Skipped:1 
 
3. How would you describe the level of cooperation among your 
jurisdiction’s economic development organizations?  
a. 1 (1.4%) Very Poor 
b. 3 (4.4%) Poor 
c. 11 (16.4%) Neutral 
d. 33 (49.2%) Good  
e. 19 (28.3%) Very Good 
 





4. A.  Does your jurisdiction offer property tax incentives for business location?  
(Check only one)    
a. 35 (52.2%) YES, we use property tax incentives for business location.  
b. 7 (10.4%)   NO, we use other types of incentives for business location  
c. 25 (37.3%) NO, we do not use any incentives for business location.  
 
Answered: 67 Skipped:1 
 
B.  How does your jurisdiction use incentives in its economic development efforts?  
(Check only one.) 
a. 20 (33.3%) Mostly to recruit new industry 
b. 32 (53.3%) Balanced between recruiting new companies and retaining 
existing industry 
c. 8 (13.3%) Mostly to retain and support existing industry 
 
Answered: 60 Skipped:8 
 
5. A. Do you require a written performance agreement as a condition for providing 
business incentives?  
a. 26 (41.9%) Always 
b. 14 (22.5%) Sometimes 
c. 22 (35.4%) Never 
 
Answered: 62 Skipped:6 
 
B.  Does your jurisdiction perform a cost/benefit analysis prior to offering business  
incentives?   
a. 27 (42.8%) YES  
b. 22 (34.9%) NO  
c. 14 (22.2%) UNKNOWN 
 
Answered: 63 Skipped:5 
 
 
C.  Does your jurisdiction perform a cost/benefit analysis after to offering business 
incentives?  
a. 16 (25.4%) YES  
b. 31 (49.2%) NO  
c. 16 (25.4%) UNKNOWN 
 




D.  Does your jurisdiction have a formal policy for determining eligibility for 
business incentives?   
a. 18 (29.1%) YES  
b. 34 (53.1%) NO  
c. 12 (18.7%) UNKNOWN 
 
Answered: 64 Skipped:4 
 
E.  Does your local government ever require a percentage of new employees to be 
hired locally?   
a. 7 (11.2%) YES  
b. 40 (64.5%) NO  
c. 15 (24.1%) UNKNOWN 
 
Answered: 62 Skipped:6 
 
F.  Do you require companies to return/repay incentives if they fail to meet 
performance targets?  
a. 26 (41.9%) YES  
b. 19 (30.6%) NO  
c. 17 (27.4%) UNKNOWN 
 
Answered: 62 Skipped:6 
 
G.  Please indicated any change in dollar value of the average size of any business 
incentive packages over the last five years. (Check the appropriate number.) 
 
1. 3 (5.3%) Much less 
2. 3 (5.3%) Slightly less 
3. 36 (64.2%) About the same 
4. 11 (19.6%) Slightly larger 
5. 3 (5.3%) Much larger 
 
Answered: 56 Skipped:12 
 
6. A.  Would you like to expand upon any your responses to this survey? 
a. 11 (18.6%) YES  
b. 48 (81.3%) NO  
 





B. Would you like to be contacted by the researcher to expand upon your responses 
to this  survey? 
a. 7 (11.4%) YES  
b. 54 (88.5%) NO  
 
Answered: 61 Skipped:7 
 
 
7. Which type of local government do you represent? 
a. 45 (66.1%) YES  
b. 23 (33.8%) NO  
 
Answered: 68 Skipped:0 
 
8. (MUNICIPALITIES ONLY) Which population range best describes your 
municipality? 
a. 16 (38.1%) <2,500 residents 
b. 11 (26.1%) 2501 to 10,000 residents 
c. 11 (26.1%) 10,001 to 50,000 residents  
d. 4 (9.52%) over 50,000 residents  
 
Answered: 42 Skipped:3  
 
9. (COUNTIES ONLY) Which population range best describes your county? 
a. 2 (9.5%) <2,500 residents 
b. 10 (47.6%) 2501 to 10,000 residents 
c. 3 (14.2%) 10,001 to 50,000 residents  
d. 6 (28.5%) over 50,000 residents  
 
Answered: 21 Skipped:2 
 
 
10. (COUNTIES ONLY) The state average per capita income is $23,443. Which 
average per capita income range best describes your county? 
a. 17 (73.9%) Below the state average per capita income 
b. 6 (26.1%) Above the state average per capita income 
 
Answered: 23 Skipped: 0
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Appendix seven: Regression data 
Table 6.3 Estimated Populations for 30 Largest Municipalities  
Municipality Population Municipality Population 
Aiken 30,296 Hilton Head Island 39,412 
Anderson 26,985 Lexington 19,576 
Bluffton 13,606 Mauldin 24,525 
Cayce 12,860 Mount Pleasant 74,885 
Charleston 127,999 Myrtle Beach 29,175 
Clemson 14,276 North Myrtle Beach 14,827 
Columbia 133,358 North Augusta 22,229 
Conway 19,300 North Charleston 104,054 
Easley 20,300 Orangeburg 13,891 
Florence 37,792 Rock Hill 69,103 
Goose Creek 39,823 Simpsonville 19,615 
Greenville 61,397 Spartanburg 37,647 
Greenwood 23,379 Summerville 46,074 
Greer 27,167 Sumter 41,190 
Hanahan 19,597 West Columbia 15,824 
Source: United States Census Bureau (2013) 
Table 6.4 Percent of Land that is Property Tax Exempt 
Municipality 
Percent of Land 
Property Tax 
Exempt Municipality 
Percent of Land 
Property Tax 
Exempt 
Aiken 23.20 Hilton Head Island 16.10 
Anderson 15.06 Lexington 15.00 
Bluffton 47.50 Mauldin 26.20 
Cayce 27.10 Mount Pleasant 23.67 
Charleston 33.50 Myrtle Beach Did Not Report 
Clemson 14.60 North Myrtle Beach Did Not Report 
Columbia 42.30 North Augusta 12.20 
Conway Did Not Report North Charleston 43.90 
Easley 17.82 Orangeburg Did Not Report 
Florence 18.07 Rock Hill 44.56 
Goose Creek 36.40 Simpsonville 24.00 
Greenville 23.80 Spartanburg 26.19 
Greenwood 38.48 Summerville 18.18 
Greer 28.80 Sumter 40.56 
Hanahan 17.98 West Columbia 28.11 
Source: Original data collected from local government GIS offices 
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Table 6.5 Per Capita Property Tax Revenue for the 30 Largest Municipalities 
Municipality 
Per Capita Property 




Aiken $325.49  Hilton Head Island $302.84  
Anderson $454.56  Lexington $158.20  
Bluffton $303.07  Mauldin $247.92  
Cayce $97.43  Mount Pleasant $248.85  
Charleston $519.51  Myrtle Beach $125.80  
Clemson $238.29  North Myrtle Beach $769.45  
Columbia $336.93  North Augusta $247.71  
Conway $254.59  North Charleston $383.87  
Easley $136.19  Orangeburg $242.04  
Florence $78.14  Rock Hill $223.54  
Goose Creek $60.35  Simpsonville $363.66  
Greenville $478.70  Spartanburg $363.99  
Greenwood $329.99  Summerville $180.81  
Greer $343.95  Sumter $303.32  
Hanahan $115.52  West Columbia $255.92  
Source: Municipal Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (divided by municipal estimated 
population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013)) 
 
Table 6.6 Municipal Millage Rates for the 30 Largest Municipalities in South Carolina 
Municipality 
Municipal 
Millage Rate Municipality 
Municipal Millage 
Rate 
Aiken 0.06200 Hilton Head Island 0.02083 
Anderson 0.12500 Lexington 0.03514 
Bluffton 0.04435 Mauldin 0.05630 
Cayce 0.04417 Mount Pleasant 0.03830 
Charleston 0.08230 Myrtle Beach 0.06610 
Clemson 0.08340 North Myrtle Beach 0.03800 
Columbia 0.09810 North Augusta 0.07720 
Conway 0.07930 North Charleston 0.09500 
Easley 0.05800 Orangeburg 0.09000 
Florence 0.05670 Rock Hill 0.09350 
Goose Creek 0.03650 Simpsonville 0.06170 
Greenville 0.08540 Spartanburg 0.10300 
Greenwood 0.09870 Summerville 0.06240 
Greer 0.09780 Sumter 0.10200 
Hanahan 0.05390 West Columbia 0.06188 
Source: South Carolina Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Office (2013) 
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Table 6.7 Per Capita Total Assessed Value for the 30 Largest Municipalities 
Municipality 
Per Capita Total 
Assessed Value Municipality 
Per Capita Total 
Assessed Value 
Aiken $5,249.78 Hilton Head Island $14,538.43 
Anderson $3,636.48 Lexington $4,502.12 
Bluffton $7,059.05 Mauldin $4,403.54 
Cayce $2,432.09 Mount Pleasant $6,497.49 
Charleston $6,555.38 Myrtle Beach $1,903.24 
Clemson $2,857.14 North Myrtle Beach $20,248.71 
Columbia $3,536.51 North Augusta $3,208.62 
Conway $3,210.45 North Charleston $4,040.72 
Easley $2,348.12 Orangeburg $2,689.35 
Florence $1,378.05 Rock Hill $3,139.44 
Goose Creek $1,653.53 Simpsonville $5,893.95 
Greenville $5,605.37 Spartanburg $3,533.89 
Greenwood $3,343.35 Summerville $2,897.55 
Greer $3,516.84 Sumter $2,973.70 
Hanahan $2,143.26 West Columbia $4,135.79 
Source: Calculation of total property tax revenue divided by millage rate in per capita terms 
Table 6.8 Per Capita Median Income for the 30 Largest Municipalities 
Municipality 
Per Capita 
Median Income Municipality 
Per Capita 
Median Income 
Aiken $23,172 Hilton Head Island $36,621 
Anderson $18,577 Lexington $23,416 
Bluffton $17,327 Mauldin $24,750 
Cayce $17,745 Mount Pleasant $30,823 
Charleston $22,414 Myrtle Beach $23,214 
Clemson $19,272 North Myrtle Beach $27,006 
Columbia $18,853 North Augusta $21,391 
Conway $16,611 North Charleston $14,361 
Easley $20,965 Orangeburg $15,263 
Florence $20,336 Rock Hill $18,929 
Goose Creek $16,905 Simpsonville $21,139 
Greenville $23,242 Spartanburg $18,136 
Greenwood $14,347 Summerville $20,103 
Greer $17,546 Sumter $16,949 
Hanahan $22,629 West Columbia $18,135 
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